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ABSTRACT
CHANGING ENERGY FUTURES:
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
THE ADOPTION OF ENERGY ALTERNATIVES IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
by
Mark Diffenderfer
University of New Hampshire, May,

1990

In an attempt to develop a comprehensive approach to
the study of the adoption of energy systems, this disserta
tion first critically examines a variety of approaches to
this phenomenon, including market models of adoption, the
adoption of innovations literature, and the social psychol
ogy of attitudes and behavior.
Market models are seen as
generally reductionistic and the argument is made that they
fail to take into consideration a variety of non-cost con
siderations.
The assumption here is that while price con
siderations play a role in this process, decisions are also
affected by values and attitudes which are not directly in
corporated into market models.
A general model of adoption
is developed which incorporates situational variables, d e 
cision factors, and individual characteristics.
This model provides the basis for an analysis of data
obtained through a survey of homeowners in the state of New
Hampshire.
Respondents in the survey are separated into
three basic groups:
those who have actually made an active
decision to purchase an energy system (adopters), those who
have thought about purchasing a nonconventional system and
then decided against such a purchase (aware nonadopters)
and those who have never thought about purchasing any sort
of energy system (unaware nonadopters).
The model is used in six different logit comparisons:
centralized versus decentralized adopters; aware no n 
adopters versus, first, solar adopters and, secondly, wood
adopters; all nonadopters compared to all adopters; and u n 
aware nonadopters compared to, again, solar adopters and
then wood wood adopters.
While the results vary for each
comparison, generally they demonstrate that: a) demographic
variables do not help us to understand the differences be 
tween these groups; and b) while some type of price consid
eration plays a role in these analyses, non-cost considera
tions like a desire to be independent or the amount of ex
posure to alternatives are also very important in helping
us to understand this process.

CHAPTER 1
ENERGY AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM
Introduction
Our contemporary history is filled with examples of
environmental problems.

Much of what we once took for

granted has become increasingly problematic.

Clean air,

clean water and abundant food supplies have been replaced
by smog, acid rain, toxic pollution of our land and drink
ing water, mercury and dioxin-laden fish, PBB-riddled
cattle, and periodic energy shortages.

The increasing p u b 

lic concern about these issues has not been readily trans
lated into solutions.

Political debate has consistently

broken down into opposing camps, in particular,

those who

favor increased regulation of the market and those who want
to free up the market and give more incentives to economic
growth.
The environmental movement,
diverse.

in turn, has become more

There has been a growing realization that these

problems call into question some of the basic underlying
assumptions regarding the relationship between our politi
cal and economic systems.

This theoretical formulation has

led to a call for more radical reforms which challenge
basic property rights -- in particular as they pertain to
air and water pollution -- and the social organization of

production,

including the distribution of the costs and

benefits associated with the methods of industrial produc
tion currently found in both capitalist and socialist
economies.

But the movement has been unable to decide on

strategies, as reflected in the perpetual conflict over
whether to make changes by working within the political
system or to demand more radical transformation of the
political and economic systems of modern states.

Some in 

dividuals prefer the moderate reforms of the environmental
lobbyists, arguing that we can't afford to wait for more
radical reforms. Other people tend to support the ideology
and strategy associated with Green politics.

Still others

work outside of the system with groups such as Greenpeace
or Earth First or propose the more radical changes associa
ted with bioregionalism.
This dissertation is designed to be an exploratory
study of the spread of what are variously called ap
propriate, decentralized, or nonconventional technologies.
This is a phenomenon which challenges one of the basic
tenets underlying our process of industrialization -- the
centralized control and distribution of energy.

While this

centralization can be seen in varying degrees, the tendency
in the post World War II United States has been to rely in
creasingly on forms of energy which are controlled, either
in their price or in their marketing, by large corporations
and utilities.

We all recognize the monopolistic control

of electricity production by public utilities, but we fre-
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quently fail to recognize the variety of ways that other
forms of energy are centrally controlled.

For example,

while home heating oil may appear to be a decentralized
form of energy {there are a lot of distributors in every
region), its price is determined more by large corporations
through their control of the amount of oil that is refined
than it is by local levels of demand (which are relatively
inelastic) or the competitiveness that might exist between
local distributors.
During the past decade or so, there has been a notice
able expansion in the use of decentralized energy tech
nologies.

The growth of this movement is the product of a

variety of forces operating on both the macro level of so
cial systems and the micro level of individual decisions.
This dissertation will focus on the latter, examining the
variables which seem to be important in helping us to un
derstand the decisions made by individuals regarding the
type of home heating systems they will use.

These subjec

tive decisions are based on expectations, values, and emo
tions as well as rational considerations.

But these fac

tors are also constrained by the institutional and cultural
framework within which decisions are made.
Much of the emphasis of the contemporary environmental
movement has been devoted to an examination of the rela
tionship between energy and production.

The concern has

been with the environmental impacts of production,

the

spiral of increasingly greater levels of production and

4

consumption, and the social costs of that production.
central part of this examination,

As a

the movement has become

increasingly concerned with the centralized control of en
ergy and has begun to look for ways to facilitate the
spread of decentralized technologies.

Such diffusion is,

naturally, dependent upon a variety of considerations, many
of which will be examined in this dissertation.
This emphasis, however, has not always been prevalent
in the movement.

To fully understand the importance of en

ergy issues to the movement in general, we must look at the
historical development of environmentalism in the United
States.

The next few sections are intended to give a brief

■summary of the movement,

not necessarily in terms of its

strategy but in terms of the evolution of one ideological
wing of the movement:

the appropriate technology movement.

The purpose is to show the growing awareness of the cen
trality of energy issues to the movement as a whole, the
way that a focus on alternative technologies has enabled
the members of the movement to address criticisms that have
been leveled at environmentalists, and to provide a basis
for understanding the argument about the importance of en
vironmentally benign energy systems to the future of our
society.

In this way we can place the individual decisions

made by homeowners into a larger social context.

5

From Conservation to Environmental Reform

Frequently, when we think of environmentalism we tend,
to equate it with conservation.
standable.

Certainly this is under

America has a long history of environmental

concern, and the environmental movement is indebted to the
conservation movement for its intellectual roots, its early
leaders and organization as well as the resources which
were necessary for its initial mobilization
1980).

(Morrisson,

But the movement has always been, and remains

today, much more complex and more diverse in its orienta
tion.
To begin to understand the early development of the
movement, we need to examine the historical context that
gave it birth.

We need to look more closely at the larger

social changes that have led to increased environmental
degradation.
During the first 50 years following the establishment
of the United States, the prevailing political philosophy
was Jeffersonian in nature.

Agriculture was seen as the

foundation of the country's wealth.

The American vision

was of a nation of small farmers, each independent

from

the others, thus facilitating the psychological and econom
ic independence which were prerequisites of democracy.
On the other hand, there was a growing recognition of
the importance of manufacture.

States were often eager to

create a climate that was favorable to economic expansion.
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But, at the same time, they "found 'manifestly erroneous'
the notion that individuals should be left alone, that the
people individually,

and not the government,

'are the

judges of the interests, and consequently should be allowed
to regulate them unobstructed'"

(Handlin, 1969).

would play a role in every part of the economy.

The state
It would

abet commerce and industry as long as the activity was in
the public interest, but it would also regulate the indus
try, especially through periodic inspections, to make sure
that interest was not abused.

(Of course, such practices

also added prestige in foreign ports so that products sold
b e tter.)
During the next 50 years, the trend was toward a
greater extension of governmental rights to private indus
try in order to advance the public good (Handlin, 1969).
But there was also a healthy fear that if corporations were
allowed to develop and roam the country at will, then they
would become vast trusts for the accumulation of wealth.
This in turn would undermine political participation and
decision making.
limit this power.

Thus, a variety of laws were enacted to
These included attempts to place limits

on the amount of real property that a corporation could
own, the amount of time that they could exist, as well as
the number and types of enterprises in which they could be
involved. At times, the states made the corporations sub
ject to periodic audits.

All of these regulations were

based on the recognition that while corporations were
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necessary to advance the public interest, they were also
real

actors in the political and economic realm which, by

nature, lacked any conscience.

They might, then, use their

power and influence to undermine democratic processes and
to limit competition in the economy (Berle, 1957).
These restrictions were subsequently abandoned.

To

facilitate the westward expansion via the railroads, it was
necessary that companies be allowed to purchase vast tracts
of land and, in order to assure adequate payback, that they
be allowed to exist for long periods of time.

Without

this, no private individuals would risk the investment that
was needed.
This led to a general trend of increased privatization
of environmental resources and property rights.

Individu

als and corporations were granted ownership of, or ceded
property rights to, vast tracts of public lands.

As a

result, resources were depleted with no concern for future
needs or for the impact on the environment as a whole.
In response to this,
ments arose.

two distinct conservation move

The first of these, which is most often

identified with Gifford Pinchot, argued that our wilderness
areas and natural resources were a public heritage and
these resources

should be placed in trust with the federal

government acting as steward to assure that these resources
be used for the greater public good.
"public” was similar to Burke's
tions)

Their vision of a

(incorporating many genera

and they felt that the long term interests of the
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society were being undermined by a short-term profit
motivation that was leading businessmen to plunder the en 
vironment.

This overconsumption of resources threatened

the long-term well-being of the nation (O'Brien, 1983).
They believed further that the public interest could some
how be objectively determined by a scientific and adminis
trative elite in the employ of the federal government
(Andrews, 1980)
On the other hand, there was a small group of people
concerned with preserving the pristine beauty of the natu
ral environment for its own sake.

These preservationists

believed that much of our lands should be set aside for
their aesthetic value and the appreciation of future gener
ations.

Their concern was not with facilitating future

production.

Rather, they viewed the environment not simply

as a means of subsistence for modern people but as some
thing to be enjoyed in its own right.

(O'Brien, 1983)

Such diverse views of the environment quite obviously
placed the preservationists and the conservationists at
odds.

This points to a basic fallacy in the approach of

the conservationists since it is impossible to identify a
single, unitary public interest (Andrews, 1980).

Further

more, while Pinchot recognized that the gravest threat to
the environment was the alliance between business and the
government, it seems idealistic to assume that bureaucratic
administrators could be made less subject to political
pressure or to the exercise of power and influence by cor-
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porations or that scientific neutrality and objectivity
could be maintained.

Eventually, each of the bureaucracies

charged with protecting the public interest developed
political ties with the corporations which stood to gain
the most from the exploitation of these resources.
The majority of the political battles were won by the
conservation wing of the movement.

This gave the environ

mental movement of the pre World War II era a distinctly
conservative tone, oriented toward the use of natural
resources for long-term production and, notably, the build
ing of dams for electrical power.

(In fact, the last major

battle fought between Muir and Pinchot was over a dam pro
posed for the Hetch-Hetchy Valley in Yosemite.)
The movement at this time did not possess a radical
orientation, despite Pinchot's recognition of the col
laboration between politicians and businessman.

There was

no attempt to confront the existing political and economic
system.

Rather, many of those involved in the movement

came from the political and economic elite.

The "public

interest" was served through a sort of bureaucratic
logrolling of the interests of these elite.
By the 1 9 6 0 ’s there was an increasing recognition that
our current practices were having serious negative reper
cussions on the environment.

The publication of Rachel

Carson's Silent Spring (1962) heightened the awareness of
the general public to the extent of environmental problems,
especially the effects of DDT on the food chain.

At the
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same time, there w a s a growing realization among environ
mentalists that there could be no assurance of action on
the part of the federal government-

The government was

doing little to ameliorate the problems in our urban areas,
the negative impacts of industrialization, or the in
tensifying issues surrounding the outdoor environment.
There was heightened distress over air and water pollution
and an accruing disquietude over such issues as pesticides,
open spaces, wildlife, and soil preservation (Andrews,
1980).
A variety of factors led to the coalescence of this
awareness into an environmental movement.

The political

climate of the 6 0 's was of prime importance.

Idealistic

youths of the post-Kennedy era were looking for
change society.

ways to

Th e y began to focus on the fact that while

people were increasingly able to afford the time and ex
pense necessary to enjoy the environment, they found their
endeavors to be increasingly less rewarding.

The other

factor was the growing tendency on the part of the judicia
ry to insure that all interests, not just economic claims,
were evident in administrative decisions (Andrews, 1980).
The latter was characteristic of decisions in the civil
rights and the w o m e n ’s rights issues as it was of environ
mental decisions.
At the core of this movement were people who were well
aware of the role that power plays in political decisions,
including many young lawyers who were inclined to use liti
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gation to prevent undesirable courses of action.

The ad

vantage of such a strategy was that even if it failed it
still served to enhance the availability of information and
to draw media attention.
These core activists were convinced that voluntary
participation would never lead to solutions to our environ
mental problems.

They recognized that federal agencies

(e.g., the TVA, the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau
of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers) were a
fundamental part of the dilemma.

The ability of these

bureaucracies to carry out their agenda was directly depen
dent upon their ability to exclude a variety of actors and
interests from decisions.
The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) on January 1, 1970 provided a valuable tool for
these activists.

By requiring federal agencies to consider

non-monetary consequences and to make complete documenta
tion of all impacts available to the public,

it extended to

all interested parties the ability to challenge the un
derlying assumptions and goals of the agencies involved
(Andrews,

1980).

At their best, these administrative reforms allowed
environmentalists to halt some of the most abhorrent en
vironmental practices (e.g., the use of DDT) and to chal
lenge potentially harmful policies.

The conflictual nature

of this approach inherently involved compromises.

In

creased costs of goods, fewer jobs, lower levels of produc-
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tion, reduced energy efficiencies, etc. were all seen as
the price which had to be paid to protect the environment.
Success in this endeavor depended upon continued public
support for these trade-offs.

This necessitated that en

vironmentalists be able to offset the information dis
seminated b y corporations; information that was intended to
sway public opinion in the reverse direction.

Following

the 1973-74 oil embargo, the associated entrenchment of
stagflation changed the context of this debate.

Energy and the Environment

Even prior to 1973, the environmental movement had
been increasingly susceptible to claims made by its op
ponents that this was an elitist movement,

consisting

primarily of members of the upper class who were u n 
concerned with the regressive impacts of environmental
legislation (Morrison, 1980).

Environmentalists were pi c 

tured as being more concerned with scenic beauty than dams,
more worried about oil spills than offshore oil develop
ment, as being for "planned scarcity"

(Schnaiberg, 1980),

all of which tended to raise prices of essential goods and
impose disproportionate costs on the poor and working
class.

Environmentalists, it was argued, are pro-nature

and anti-people.

While such arguments may or may not have

reflected the views of the "silent majority", they made
political victories more difficult.
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Following the Arab oil embargo, the subsequent debate
over energy policy seemed to break down into two camps:
those who saw certain limits to growth versus those who
favored continued expansion, or what Schurr has referred to
as the limitationists and the expansionists (Schurr, et al,
1979).

The expansionists' point of view was essentially

that progress in the industrialized world is identified
with the increased consumption of material goods.

This

consumption has been tied to vastly expanded use of energy.
The use of wind, water and wood

has been replaced by a

reliance on fossil fuels to maximize the efficiency of the
production process

(which might be connected by some with

to the marginal productivy of capital) since in the period
following World War II industrialists felt (without any
empirical support) that it was cheaper to rely on tech
nological innovation than it was to continue to rely on in
creasingly expensive labor.

Our continued growth was d e 

pendent upon our ability to find additional fossil fuels.
Finite limits to these fuels was not a major consideration.
Over the long run, science and technology would be able to
develop new energy systems long before supplies were
depleted or became prohibitively expensive.
The limitationists'

view is based on the assumption

that the world's resources are finite and for that reason
it is impossible
present rate.

to imagine continued consumption at the

To do so would inevitably lead to u n 

acceptable consequences.

We must, they argued, begin to
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limit growth,

in particular the conspicuous consumption of

the affluent minority in the industrialized world.

This

approach drew strength from the first report to the Club of
Rome by Dennis and Donella Meadows, The Limits to Growth.
Their computer simulation of the world system found indus
trial growth to be the most de-stabilizing of all the
world's problems -- greater even than population -- since
it affects so many variables in their model: natural
resource usage rate, the availability of capital, pollu
tion, etc.

They further argued that we are living in a

golden age and saw little hope that the developing coun
tries of the world would be able to attain the standard of
living enjoyed by the West.

They also pointed out the in

herent tendency of capitalism to expand exponentially,
resulting in eventual overshoot and collapse unless we b e 
gin to limit the forces of growth.
There are a few critical differences that divide the
two camps.

First of all,

there is the question of how long

our current rate of growth can continue.

Expansionists b e 

lieve that science and technology can find new resources
and develop new energy systems indefinitely.

Limitation

ists feel that growth cannot continue and that it is neces
sary to critically examine our entire process of produc
tion.
The second difference concerns the consequences of
growth.

Expansionists argue that the negative consequences

of growth are far outweighed by the benefits and that many

of the negative consequences are subject to amelioration.
Furthermore,' even the attempts to control some of the more
blatant consequences of growth may have severe negative
repercussions, such as the loss of jobs and economic
decline.

The limitationists believe that continued growth

at our present rate can only result in the collapse of our
entire system.
The third issue has to do with whether or not growth
can lead to greater distributive equity.

Expansionists

presume that continued growth is a prerequisite to the ex
tension of the good things in life to the majority of the
world's population.

Limitationists argue that you cannot

deduce the welfare of individuals from aggregate statistic
of production.

Such indicators do not tell us the way in

which the goods produced are distributed among the world's
population.

The extremely high levels of production that

we have experienced since World War II, they would argue,
have benefited a small minority of the world's population
at the expense of the vast majority in the less developed
countries.
Finally, there are differing views of the relationshi
between people and nature.
person-oriented.

The expansionist viewpoint is

Nature is a source of the commodities

necessary for a better life.

Limitationists feel that

people are a part of nature.

They take for granted that

people should preserve nature, not just exploit it.
Dunlap and VanLiere

(1978) see evidence of a paradig-
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matic shift in our cultural view of the relationship b e 
tween humans and nature.

In the past, growth and progress

have proceeded apace under what they term the Human Exceptionalism Paradigm (HEP).

This approach envisions h u 

mans as unique because of their culture.

Culture can vary

more quickly than biological systems, giving people an
evolutionary tool that puts them apart from and above n a 
ture.

Culture has become a tool -- some might say an

ecological niche -- and cultural accumulation allows pro g 
ress to continue unabated.

The New Environmental Paradigm

(NEP) sees humans as simply one more species in the biotic
community and recognizes that because of the links between
ecosystems, there is no way to anticipate all of the co n 
sequences of our interactions with nature.

NEP is a view

of the world as a finite biological and physical system
which places constraints on economic growth and progress.
There is another, even more fundamental dichotomy in
our views of nature which bifurcates even environ
mentalists.

According to Schnaiberg (1980) there are two

differing meanings of "the environment".

The first, the

most common, is to simply regard the environment as a home.
It i s ■this conception which lies at the heart of our con
cerns with "fouling our own nest" or of discussions of
"spaceship Earth".

This is the approach which bolstered

the environmental movement prior to 1974.

It is difficult

for anyone to be against a desire for clean air or clean
water.

This definition gave the movement a broad con-
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stituency.

It could easily cut across class lines.

But an

approach of this sort, while important, is superficial.
A more fundamental perception of the environment sees
it as a basis of subsistence for the society.

Such an ap

proach forces us to consider all of the impacts which our
methods of gaining sustenance will have on the environment,
in terms of both environmental additions and depletions
(Schnaiberg,

1980).

This is an inherently more radical

critique since it forces us to question the most fundamen
tal aspects of productive and consumptive activity.
energy m

Since

one form or another (including labor) is funda

mental to all modes of production, we shall elaborate on
Schnaiberg's point by turning to an examination of the re
lationship between energy and production.

Energy as a Basis of Social Production

Concern with the relationship between energy and
society has a long history.

Many theorists have concerned

themselves with the importance of energy for society and
for production.

Spencer (1972),

Cottrell

(1955), Mumford

(1966), Odum (1971) and others attempted to focus attention
even prior to the oil embargo.

Following the crisis, ho w 

ever, the debate began to focus on the ways in which energy
use has affected society.
Commoner (1976) argues that our economic and environ
mental difficulties are. inextricably intertwined with ener
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gy use.

By relying on the first law of thermodynamics --

that the energy of the universe is constant -- as a basis
for determining efficiency, we tend to focus on considera
tions such as the amount of heat lost over distance, in
sulation, etc.

We have thus developed a blatant disregard

for the second law of thermodynamics which informs us that
while this energy may be constant,
exist in a usable form.

it does not necessarily

Since the entropy of the universe

is constantly increasing, while all of the energy in the
universe exists it is increasingly, on average, in a more
unorganised state.

From the standpoint of the evolution of

the universe we do not have to worry about attaining a m a x 
imum state of disorder in the near future.

But from the

perspective of societal systems of production, we must be
concerned about the continued availability of energy
resources in the near future.

Once used, they are no

longer available for further use even though they techni
cally exist in some form.

From this latter point of view,

the most important consideration is that energy resources
be matched to the task at hand in order to reduce the
amount of waste (heat).
All physical systems in the universe are subject to
these laws.

Ecosystem production (the relationship between

communities of organisms and their physical environment)
mediated by flows of energy through the system.

As eco

systems change their environmental structure from simpler
to more complex systems, their growth slows and they tend

is
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towards a more stable, steady state where further growth is
permitted only to the point where it offsets any surplus
subsistence base.

In fact, many systems grow to only about

half of the potential limits of their physical environment.
In this process of ecosystem production, materials circu
late through the system of production within the limits im
posed by the availability of energy.
Economies, societal systems of production,

apparently

-- but only apparently -- violate these basic laws.

To the

extent that human production systems are able to operate
across ecosystems,

rather than within them, they can appear

to offset this tendency towards entropy.

Yet human systems

are still dependent on flows of energy and nutrients.
The key to this disparity is to be found in the way in
which ecosystems and economies use their surplus.

In

ecosystems this surplus would be limited to the additional
physical resources that would be available to additional
populations.

In economies,

this surplus would include both

physical resources and capital.

As opposed to ecosystems,

economies return only a portion of their surplus to in
creased consumption.

The rest is funneled into tools and

machines in order to increase the efficiency of production
and the available surplus.

This greater productive capac

ity and the rising expectations of consumers leads to e x 
ponentially increasing production (Schnaiberg,

1980).

Commoner (1976) sees this process as the basis of
stagflation.

Attempts to increase productivity in the
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post-war economy have been dependent upon our use of tech
nology.

Increased reliance on this technology has d i s 

placed labor,

thus contributing to unemployment.

At the

same time, since this machinery is dependent upon energy,
the cost of goods produced must continue to increase as
long as this energy is derived from non-renewable
resources.

In

te this energy

addition,

the use of

fossil

fuels togenera

results in additions

to the

environment

w h i c h are increasingly detrimental.
While this analysis may be only a limited explanation
of stagflation,

it at least illustrates a growing awareness

of the pervasive effects of energy.
driving force of production.
cient for production.

Energy is the central

Matter alone is not suffi

It must be acted upon in some way.

Energy is both a mediator of these transformation as well
as a commodity in its own right.

But the environmental

withdrawals and additions that are associated with the ex
traction, transformation and disposal of materials in
evitably meet the upper limits
ecosystem.

At

limited or new

of any particular

these limits, either

production must be

ecosystems must be tapped. Even so,

there

are still upper limits to the thermal carrying capacity of
the biosphere.
This exploitation of ecosystems for production leads
to water pollution, toxic pollution, acid rain, smog,
global warming,
of

and a host of related problems.

Our view

the earth as a "home" leads to meliorative attempts to
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may more accurately be regarded as a bundle of rights, as
sociated with these rights are obligations, primarily the
obligation to leave that property in a usable condition for
future generations.

Capitalism,

and to a certain extent

socialism, have lost sight of the fact that economies exist
to serve people.

Capital and real property are social

creations which exist to facilitate labor in the production
of sustenance,

not simply to further the accumulation of

private capital

(John Paul II, 1981; McPherson, 1977).

Liberal democracies have tended to protect the rights of
capital at the expense of labor and have tended to place
less emphasis on the obligations which the ownership of
capital entails.
A segment of the environmental movement has focused on
this more radical critique of contemporary society.

To the

extent that environmentalists can demonstrate the dysfunc
tional nature of the centralized ownership and/or control
of energy systems -- furthering inflation, unemployment,
environmental degradation, conspicuous consumption -- then
they are directly undermining the legitimacy of these means
of production.
Our concern here is not to attempt to place greater
blame on either socialism or capitalism for environmental
degradation.

The fact is that in both systems, decisions

regarding the generation and allocation of resources are
arrived at through bureaucratic organizations -- the one
governmental,

the other private.

The nature of these deci
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sions varies greatly both between socialist and capitalist
societies as well as among various socialist or capitalist
societies.

For example, the Soviet Union has demanded

sacrifice from workers and consumers and has devoted much
of its surplus to furthering production by building up its
industrial base.

On the other hand, China has, until

recently, devoted a much larger share of its surplus to so
cial welfare and attempts to raise the standard of living.
On a world-wide scale, however, the argument has been made
that equivalent levels of industrialization have generally
resulted in similar levels of environmental degradation,
both in terms of additions and withdrawals

(Schnaiberg,

1980) .
The point here is that we assume greater control by
consumers in these decisions when they are made in marketoriented polyarchies.

We all too often assume that since

corporations must market products, they market what people
will buy.

But as Lindblom (1977) points out, this assump

tion is much too simple.

There are a variety of factors

the undermine this principle.

Customers,

for example, may

be incompetent to choose, they may be hoodwinked, or the
market may be rigged.
2.

We shall elaborate on this Chapter

For now, let us consider how market systems,

like other

forms of economic organization, ultimately put decisions
into the hands of a few individuals who are able to e x 
ercise a great deal of discretion in what they produce.
While they are concerned with what people will buy, the in

24

centives built into the system encourage them to resolve
such questions in terms of private profits rather than in
the public interest.

Lindlom argues that decision makers

exercise discretion over a number of important areas:
whether products will be dispersed by a few large firms or
many small ones, the organization of the workplace, the
types of technology employed, etc.

Thus, major decisions

are removed from the political agenda.
Of equal importance to the notion that markets are not
popularly controlled is the question of just how much popu
lar control actually exists in polyarchies.

A host of lit

erature in the social sciences attests to the influence of
a corporate elite on political process (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1967,1983; Kolko, 1962).

One need not assume any

sort of conspiracy among the governing class, nor should we
get bogged down in discussions of how many elite decision
makers exist.

To argue with Kolko's figure of 2500 top ex

ecutives by adding the top executives of the next four cor
porations in each sector of the economy (thus raising the
number to 4000) misses the point.

The fundamental issue is

also a basic sociological insight, as reflected in the work
of Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Weber, and others.

This is the

understanding that in any complex system, the proximate d e 
cisions are made by only a few'people (Lindblom,

1977).

The correct question is whether or not these individuals.
are subject to polyarchic controls.
In all market-oriented polyarchies, business has a
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privileged position.

Political leaders grant incentives to

business that are denied to other organizations.

And exec

utives bring a number of assets -- economic and organiza
tional —

to the support of parties,

electoral activities.

interest groups, and

Thus the processes are far less dem

ocratic that they appear.

Not only do businessmen win when

there are conflicting interests, they are able to shape
these interests in the first place.

The privileged p o s i 

tion of business is legitimated through the media, the edu
cational system, and other socializing institutions.
We shall elaborate on these points in Chapter 2.

The

point here is that much of the environmental literature
misses the central argument regarding the expropriation of
property and the distribution of costs and benefits associ
ated with energy use, in particular the allocation of
scarce resources.

The distribution of scarce goods will

always result in a political battle.

Theorists since Plato

and Aristotle have recognized this fact.

But more con

temporary theory has assumed that the growing surplus asso
ciated with industrial society would eliminate scarcity.
Even Marx was optimistic about the ability of industri
alization to eliminate poverty as long as the relations of
production were altered.

Such assumptions were easier to

make in a time of resource abundance.

But when even the

air and the water of the planet have become scarce
resources then we must recognize the changing nature of
this controversy.
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In reaction to this, a branch of the movement has d e 
veloped an even more radical critique of contemporary
society.

What Devall (1980; Devall and Sessions, 1985)

refers to as the deep ecology movement has drawn on the
works of Gary Snyder, Theodore Roczak, Murray Boochkin and
others in an attempt to develop

a radical transformation

of social organizations and values.
has evolved into bioregionalism,

More recently, this

a movement designed to

have regions live within their available resources (Sales,
1985).

While it is a radically different metaphysical and

epistimolgical framework,
economic plan.

it has not developed a political-

This is a drawback for any movement and has

characterized many of the discussions regarding the chang
ing paradigms in modern society.

But it is a serious fail

ing because what we face is a real political battle over
the distribution of scarcity -- a battle in which wealth
and income lend some people an upper hand.
The publication of a variety of work in the post
crisis era led to a new emphasis on the development of "ap
propriate technologies" as a solution to this fundamental
problem.

E. F. Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful (1973) p r e 

sented to the developed countries a lucid framework for the
advancement of these technologies.
From an entirely different perspective, the second
report to the Club of Rome by Mesarovic and Pestel (197 4)
mounted a telling critique of the Meadows'

earlier study.

Their criticisms were founded partly on the assumption that
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it was possible to change from the exponential type of
growth exhibited by economies today to a more organic
growth.

Again the focal point was the extent to which p r o 

duction was based on renewable resources.

They were aware,

however, of the political dimensions of this process.

They

argued that the change was not possible without reductions
in the disparities of wealth between the developed and the
less developed countries.

Without greater equality, there

would be conflicts between the users and the suppliers of
the world's resources as well as conflicts between short
term and long-term interests.
Morrison (1980) points out that environmental issues
were never the primary concern of the appropriate tech
nologies movement.

However, technologies which degrade

ecosystems are inherently unacceptable.

The adoption of

this framework by environmentalists provided a means of a d 
dressing the economic, political and social issues associa
ted with development on a global basis.

Implicit in this

approach is a radical critique of contemporary systems of
production and distribution, both capitalist and socialist.
Amory Levins'

Soft Energy Paths

essence of this critique.

(1977) illustrates the

Associated with different energy

technologies, both hard (capital-intensive, centralized,
environmentally degrading)
decentralized,

and soft (labor-intensive,

and environmentally benign), are energy

paths -- the institutional frameworks and values which tend
to support a certain type of technology.

Lovins argues
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that the values necessary for a switch to a soft energy
path currently exist.

What is needed, he says, is to begin

substituting one type of technology for another.
The problem with this approach is that Lovins has
missed the most critical aspect of this problem.

In the

first place, there is not much question about the existence
of values which tend to support either of these tech
nologies.

The real question is, more accurately, whether

or not those values which might support centralized energy
systems are deemed more or less important than those which
support the decentralized technologies.
ety of values all at the same time.
often come into conflict.

People had a vari

But these values may

Values of democracy, indepen

dence and innovation may actually compete with other values
more closely associated with capitalism.
More importantly, Lovins underestimates the political
nature of this debate.

The soft technology movement is at

its core a challenge to the existing power structure.

To

argue that we can merely begin to substitute one technology
for another ignores the fact that what we face is actually
a political battle.

The change to soft technology calls

for a radical transformation of the means and the relations
of production in the industrialized world since

the

bureaucratic organization of production rests upon central
ized control of the means of production, including the pro
duction of energy.

This control is legitimated through the

existing relations of production as well as through appeals
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to values rooted in the basic fabric of society.

It is

perpetuated through the legal system, the media, the educa
tional system and other supporting institutions.

This con

trol facilitates the extension of property rights to in
clude the determination of acceptable limits of additions
and withdrawals.
Lovins, however, seems to be assuming one of two
things: either politicians will begin to make policies
which will facilitate the development of soft energy tech
nologies and lead to increased rates of adoption, or as the
grass roots adoption of soft technologies proceeds, the
market will begin to grow leading to increased power and
influence for the manufacturers of decentralized systems
who will then force the political system to respond with
additional incentives.
The issue here is whether we are going to continue to
base policies on the assumption that markets operate to
meet values expressed in terms of price or whether we are
going to develop a more comprehensive view of behavior.
While these models offer a certain rigor and elegance while
their postulates hold, they inevitably fail to explain the
complexity of human interaction and decision processes.
Moreover, they almost insure that the needed alternatives
will not be fully developed until "rational" decision
makers perceive a greater potential for profit from these
alternatives than from charging much higher prices for an
increasingly scarce commodity.
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What we need is a theoretical framework broad enough
to include a wide variety of variables pertinent to adop
tion yet specific enough to allow us to make some fundamen
tal determination of the needs for future energy policy.
We must be aware a) of the subjective nature of the deci
sion to adopt any alternative, including people's expecta
tions, values, and emotional and rational motivations; b)
of the fact that these subjective variables are constrained
by the institutional framework; and c) that individuals who
are in positions of power will frequently use their ability
to control rewards and sanctions to both encourage the
adoption of those alternatives which least threaten their
position and to perpetuate a value system which supports
the existing institutional framework.

Synopsis

As we can see from this brief history, production in
industrial society is inextricably tied to forms of energy
use.

The environmental movement has increasingly realized

the importance of the way in which we use energy not only
for quality of life considerations but also for the impacts
which different forms of energy have on the environment.
The solutions to this problem are inherently politi
cal. The focus of this political struggle has been primari
ly on the most obvious, most degrading forms of energy sys
tems —

nuclear, coal, and oil —

through attempts to stop

the building of new plants or to install pollution control
devices on older plants.
measures.

But these are only stop-gap

In the meantime, the attempts to advance

alternatives have been stifled because so many people con
centrate on the need to find substitutes for the large,
centralized fossil fuel plants rather then finding ways to
reduce the need for those fuels in the first place.

The

individual homeowners who end up using this fuel have been
ignored because the turn-over in new homes is so slow that
they seem to offer little hope over the short-term.
On the other hand, there are many alternatives that
can be incorporated into either new or old homes.

Such

alternatives reduce our need for centralized production of
energy and thus would make alternatives like co-generation
more viable.

This dissertation will focus on the way in

which people's purchases of alternative, decentralized en
ergy systems (active or passive solar designs, wood stoves,
windmills, etc.) is influenced by their attitudes, values,
and demographic characteristics.

In addition, we will ex

amine some the role of price factors, information, habit
and other market-oriented variables to determine the rela
tive impact of markets on the adoption process.
In order to begin to understand what variables might
affect people's decisions, we will next, in Chapter 2, look
at the variety of explanations of consumer behavior in
markets.

Following this, Chapter 3 examines the sociologi

cal and social-psychological literature to determine what
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types of considerations would be appropriate to include in
our model.

In Chapter 4 we will explore the findings of

numerous studies on the use of energy.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the methodology chapters.
Chapter 5 will lay out the research design of this dis
sertation.

To gather data on consumer behavior, a survey

of homeowners was conducted in the state of New Hampshire.
Chapter 6 will begin to explore the data for any basic dif
ferences between those people who choose to install energy
alternatives and those who opt for more traditional sys
tems.

In Chapter 7 we will develop logit models which will

allow to see which variables in this study help us to

un

derstand the difference between adopters and non-adopters.
Finally, Chapter 8 will make some conclusions about the
viability of the general model presented in this disserta
tion versus the traditional models of behavior explored in
Chapters 2 and 3.

We will also show how this study en

riches our understanding of this form of behavior over the
studies examined in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ADOPTION
Introduction
Despite the important role which energy plays as a fa
cilitator of social action and interaction processes,
sociologists have traditionally paid it scant attention
(Klausner, 1978).

While this changed following the second

oil price increase of 1979-80, most research efforts have
been relegated to a diverse group of social scientists,
engineers, physicists, and economists conducting largely
uncoordinated research.

The result has been a haphazard

approach to the study of energy decisions which has been
theoretically limited and, at times, unsophisticated.

The

problems which we face are not just technological or even,
in the final analysis, economic.
cial and political problems.

They are essentially so

Thus it would seem that

sociology, and systems theory in particular, can potential
ly provide a more focused approach to the study of energy
decisions.

It should help us to understand the complex in

teractions of people making decisions in on-going social
situations.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.

First of all,

we shall examine three theories which attempt to explain
consumer behavior and some of the problems with those ap33
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proaches.

Since the adoption of home energy systems is es

sentially a form of consumer behavior, these should give us
a great deal of insight.

Secondly, we shall look more

closely at the sociological literature to see what types of
variables we might look for to more fully explain behaviors
which take place within social systems.

Markets

Exchange in markets is generally seen as a "more ef
fective" mechanism for allocating goods and services to
meet people's needs than the central planning that occurs
in non-market economies.

Without markets, someone must de

cide the complex issues involved in any economy:

what

should be produced, how resources should be allocated by
the society, what price should be charged for various
goods, etc.

In a market these decisions are all made by

individuals acting to further their own interests (Lind
blom, 1977).
Since individuals freely enter into these exchanges,
they pay prices for goods that reflect their value trade
offs, their interests.

In economic terms, the prices that

accurately reflect people’s interests are efficiency
prices.

They reflect an individual's appraisals of the

marginal utilities of goods.

While in theory efficiency

prices can be established by either markets or by authority
systems (bureaucracies), this is much more easily ac-
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complished by markets.

The price must inform both buyers

and sellers of the costs at which goods and services can be
provided.
—

Prices which do not accurately reflect the costs

i.e. the alternatives foregone —

prices.

are known as arbitrary

Such prices may deter, but not necessarily pre

vent, producers from becoming involved in exchange.
It is possible to extrapolate from these individual
exchanges to an ideal situation.

If you imagine that in

free exchanges each individual (both buyer and seller) en
ters into exchange only because it is advantageous, then
both individuals increase their satisfaction levels.

Under

appropriate conditions, a situation can be reached in which
all mutually advantageous exchanges —
changes —

are conducted.

and only those ex

Such a situation is referred to

as a Pareto optimum.
Given such an optimal situation, it is easy to see why
markets are much more desirable than authority systems for
increasing satisfaction levels in any society.

The problem

of course, is that we are seldom given such a situation.

A

variety of conditions make it impossible to attain op
timality.
In order for such a condition to be attained, people
must be free to enter into exchanges, there must be a large
number of producers with no few so large that they can con
trol market activities, these producers must be manufactur
ing homogeneous products, and both buyers and sellers must
have complete knowledge of market activities.
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In the real world there are many divergences from
these prerequisites.
3 areas —

If we look at markets as existing in

labor, consumption, and production —

we realize

that the extensive inequalities that have developed between
producers and consumers, between producers, and among con
sumers prevent markets from reaching a Pareto optimum.

For

example, laborers are not always free to enter into ex
change relations with producers.

In many situations, given

the relative lack of alternatives they must sell their
labor at a price determined by the producer.

Furthermore,

negotiations are not carried on constantly since this would
be too costly.
Perhaps more important for our analysis, the variety
of options open to consumers is limited through a host of
processes.

There may be little competition between pro

ducers as a result of monopoly or, in less extreme cases,
the domination of markets by a few producers.

Furthermore,

it is literally impossible for consumers today to be aware
of the variety of market activities, including cost and
quality of goods marketed or purchased.
The externalities associated with production also imp
ly uncounted costs.

The uncounted costs lead to arbitrary,

not efficiency prices.
with these problems.

Market systems are not able to deal
(Of course, authority systems have

historically ignored such problems).
In addition, production decisions are often influenced
by investment in research and development, taxing policies,
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and import/export quotas and tariffs, all of which are the
product of political decisions and are thus outside the
realm of market forces.

They can alter market activities,

investment in production, etc.

(The extent to which these

political decisions are democratic is an entirely different
matter.)
Finally, optimality may not be attained because of
consumer incompetence.

Consumers are seen as being ra

tionally motivated because to gain something they must give
up something else.

This leads us to a consideration of the

basic theories of consumer motivation.

To fully understand

the behavior of markets we must move back and forth between
macro level and micro level theories.

In the next section,

we begin to examine why individuals behave the way that
v

they do in economic realms.

Models of Consumer Behavior

There are three fundamental ways to explain consumer
behavior.

The first of these views the consumer as

sovereign, as independently making decisions based on his
or her values, and as being the driving force of produc
tion.

The second, which we shall call here the manipulated

consumer, sees the consumer as subject to the influence of
advertising and other corporate activities.

The final

view, that of structured consumption, sees consumer behav
ior as being a reaction to the alternatives that are made
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available by a particular form of production.
these are ideal types.

Certainly

Reality probably lies somewhere in

between these different points of view.

But before we try

to develop a synthesis it is probably best to examine each
of these in turn.

Consumer sovereignty.

The basic assumption of neoclassical

economic theory is that consumers, under budget con
straints, act rationally to maximize the subjective utility
associated with their behavior.

People’s economic choices

are motivated by a desire to gain something.

But the indi

vidual must act rationally because in order to gain some
thing of value one must give up something else.

Scitovsky

points out that unless one is rich, it is impossible to
fully satisfy all of your needs.

The consumer must see to

it that "any extra dollar [spent] on one thing yields as
much satisfaction as if [spent] on another.

If this were

not so, a little rearrangement of spending patterns could
yield more satisfaction at no cost" (1976:4)

Not only is

this the "cornerstone of economic theory and a faithful
description of rational choice...[it is] the basis for our
expectation that market prices correctly reflect what con
sumers want..." (1976:10). Supply and demand schedules are
the statistical outcomes of these aggregated decisions.
Production levels in market soc-ieties should theoretically
be geared to these schedules.
In this perspective, purchases will not be made by
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consumers unless those purchases satisfy some basic need.
Needs, in turn, are regarded as always existing.

Sales in

the market occur because the demand for a product, rooted
in these basic needs, exists or is at least latently await
ing activation.
This approach to decision making has been formalized
in Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU).

According to

Simons (1981) there are a number of assumptions which un
derlie this theory.

SEU assumes that decision makers have

a well defined set of alternatives from which to choose,
that they have a well defined utility function (i.e., that
they can hierarchically rank all of their wants or needs
and assign to each a specific valuation), that they can as
sign a joint probability distribution to all future sets of
events, and that the decision maker will select the
alternative which will maximize the expected outcome in
terms of the utility function.
Information about consumers can be inferred: a) if we
assume that consumers make choices in order to maximize a
utility function, and b) if we can assume a form for that
function (Dinan, 1987). The specific form of that utility
function will be affected by the discount rate —

the will

ingness of a consumer to invest in, e.g., energy conserva
tion technologies.

The discount rate reveals the rate of

return which a consumer feels is necessary in order to un
dertake an investment in conservation (Dinan, 1987).
lower rate indicates a willingness to invest.

A

We shall
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return to this issue later.
There are a number of criticisms leveled at this ap
proach.

First, as Dinan (1987) points out, consumers do

not necessarily make choices in a manner consistent with
the theory -- i.e., they do not necessarily compare all
alternatives based simply on the expected utility.

They

may, instead, come to their decisions by comparing goods
one dimension at a time rather than by comparing the entire
unit.
Goods should be seen as bundles of properties or char
acteristics.

As Lancaster (1979) argues, consumers are

only interested in goods because they possess properties or
characteristics which the consumer finds desirable.

It

used to be assumed that the utility of a good was a simple
product of the addition of all of the characteristics of
the good.

But you can only assume linearity and additivity

of traits when goods are divisible —
be consumed in any quantity.

i.e., when they can

Additivity assumptions are

inappropriate when goods can only be consumed in fixed
sizes; when they are indivisible.
This presents certain problems for this approach since
a recognition of this difference makes decision more dif
ficult.

For divisible goods, consumers only need to know

the quantity of characteristics per unit.

However, for in

divisible goods, consumers need to know the ratio of char
acteristics (Lancaster, 1979). This assumes a complicated
calculus on the part of the consumer.
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When the consumer subjectively decides that all of the
available alternatives offer different, and valued, charac
teristics, then he or she will probably select only a sub
set of all the possible traits for comparison.

If the to

tal number of options is too large, the consumer may over
react and attempt to minimize the number of traits to be
considered and select the first alternative which meets
some minimum standard.

The degree of active reasoning in

volved, or the extent of the search for information, will
thus be subject in part to the amount of product differen
tiation.
A second factor leading to what market researchers
refer to as extended problem solving is the salience of the
purchase; the degree to which the purchase reflects on
one's self image or the amount of social pressure, both of
which may raise the amount of involvement in the decision
process.

Finally, extended problem solving necessitates

sufficient time to seek out information.
these factors —
pressure —

Of course, all of

involvement, differentiation, and time

are present to greater or lesser degrees.

Thus, decision making which is a product of these factors
runs the gamut from a total lack of active reasoning (for
routing decision making) to extended problem solving.
Individuals are also likely to seek out information if
there is a perceived risk involved.

More contemporary

elaboration of SEU theory recognizes that people make deci
sions under conditions of uncertainty.

Risk will be higher
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if: there is a high price; the length of the commitment
(such as a house purchase) is long; the purchase is con
spicuous —

i.e., it is more visible or there is social

pressure to make the right decision; there are greater
potential harmful effects; or the decision will have im
pacts on subsequent decisions.
Other conditions affect the desire to seek out in
formation.

If information appears to be readily available,

consumers are more likely to attempt to incorporate it into
their decision.

Finally, a person's confidence in his or

her decision making ability has an impact.

If a consumer

is confident that he or she can judge or evaluate brands,
then they are more likely to seek out information.
Market research points out that all of this is
mediated by personality characteristics, family roles, and
demographic variables.

Personality traits would include

open-mindedness, cognitive capacity, or the confidence in
one's ability to control the environment.

Family role

structures would incorporate such variables as one's con
cern for the welfare of a spouse or children or sex (women
search more for durable goods than men).

Demographic char

acteristics include age, permanence or transience, etc.
At some point the marginal utility of additional in
crements of information is reduced.

The added costs of ac

cumulating more data will add little to the reduction of
risk.

Therefore, it is no longer rational to seek out in

formation.

Alternatively, information overload may inhibit
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buying by leading the consumer to disregard pertinent in
formation.
While these considerations make SEU a more compli
cated, more elaborate approach, there are still numerous
problems.

In the first place, these models assume that

price always measures both scarcity and value, but price
cannot distinguish between "natural" effects on supply (or
demand) and those that arise from policy.

In other words,

price may reflect a relationship between supply and demand,
but it does not take into consideration the fact that ei
ther of these may reflect a variety of government policies
rather than any absolute resource depletions. This does not
pose a problem for markets, but it raises important issues
with regard to the development of energy substitutes, since
it is entirely possible for policy decisions to keep price
at a

lower level than it might otherwise be, given the

real levels of scarcity.
In addition, differential funding for research and de
velopment, primarily the result of political decisions, af
fects the ability of different market sectors to compete
with each other.

Many of the externalities associated with

production, especially with regard to centralized energy
systems, are not recognized by the market.

We also cannot

rely on the market to allocate goods in socially optimal
fashion.
This approach also assumes that on the macro level all
of the information which people need is available.

There
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is an additional assumption that all values can be ex
pressed in terms of price.

Values which cannot be ex

pressed in such a manner are irrational and pose a threat
to the market.
Simons elaborates upon the fundamental weakness of
this model.

Can we assume, as SEU does, that a decision

maker, in one comprehensive view, can contemplate the con
sequences of a wide variety of alternatives over all pos
sible future states of affairs and that he or she can as
sign a preference to all of these possible outcomes?

Is it

logical to assume that a decision maker has reconciled or
balanced all conflicting values and incorporated them into
a utility function?

Can we also assume that all values can

be expressed in terms of price?

Furthermore, should we

simply finesse, as SEU does, the origins of values as well
as the way in which information, upon which people rely to
develop their preferences, is disseminated?
In summary, the consumer is seen as having an ordered
structure of preferences, and she enters into market rela
tions with the intent of maximizing outcomes.

But can we

argue that this takes place independently of investment de
cisions made by producers?

Do prices reflect merely the

values of consumers or are many price factors outside the
realm of consumer activity?

For example, to what extent

are purchases made by producers subject to the constraints
of consumers?

Certainly such activity affects price, but

at the very least it is subject to market forces other than
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consumer values as reflected in their purchase.

The next

sections begin to address the more relevant questions of
how much sovereignty exists and to what degree preferences
are structured.

Manipulated consumption.

Market researchers argue that

consumer influence and persuasion is a socially legitimate
activity because the consumer sets the agenda for the
entire process and is ultimately free to make his or her
own choices.

For example, one text argues:

" ...a purchase will never be made unless un
derlying needs (or motives) are activated.

Buying

action is stimulated only when an alternative is
viewed positively in terms of need satisfaction.
The marketer cannot create the basic need."
(Engel, et al., 1986: 53)

On the other hand, Lindblom (1977) argues that ac
tivities in markets have become increasingly susceptible to
the decisions of bureaucracies.

Admittedly there is a cir

cularity in markets that is difficult to deny.
are not buying things that they do not want.

Consumers
Similarly,

producers cannot produce goods without some consideration
for what people desire.

At the same time, producers cannot

be subject to the vageuries of consumer whims.

To a certain

extent, they must try to convince consumers that their pro-
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duct is somehow more desirable than others.

Frequently,

though, advertising has a more pervasive, more insidious,
role.
Advertising can be seen as playing a dual role.

The

first is to give consumers information to persuade them to
purchase one product over another.

In this way, advertising

is filling a role that is absolutely essential for markets
to operate.

Of course, the accuracy of this information is

often questionable.

Misleading of consumers through prac

tices of omission is frequent, especially given the com
plexity of modern industrial societies.
The second role of advertising, however, may be to
create a need where none exists.

The proliferation of triv

ial goods reflects this tendency.
sion has limited success.

Of course, such persua

The fact that 80% of new products

fail demonstrates that consumer wants are finite.
But the net effect of advertising is the creation of a
consumer culture (Ewen, 1976).

Rosenberg (1976) argues that

there has been "a radical transformation of attitudes
towards consumption and savings".

This is reflected in the

recent explosion of consumer debt and the low percentage of
savings in the United States.
According to Lancaster (1979), it is generally assumed
that the variations in taste and preferences are real and
are important because consumers believe themselves to be
better off when they have a product which fits exactly their
ideal means of meeting a need.

Problems arise when three
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conditions are present: when there is variety in prefer
ences, when there is potential variety (depending on tech
nology) , and when there are economies of scale of produc
tion.

Problems occur because a change which brings ef

ficiency, in the form of lower prices for the consumer, by
reducing variety introduces problems of equity by making
some people better off while making others worse off.
Scitovsky’s (1976) lucid analysis of the consumer cul
ture explores the psychological dimensions of this
phenomenon.

He says that since economists see people as the

final arbiter of their own fates, they have ruled out as a
logical possibility any conflict between what a people
choose to get and what will satisfy them.

Economists be

lieve that: 1) consumers are free to follow their own
tastes, independent of others, and 2) that the market can
accommodate consumer tastes all of the time.
The first statement, he says, ignores the fact that
tastes can be influenced by "example, custom, suggestions,
consistently change by...experience, modified by changing
prices and the availability of some satisfactions and the
unavailability of others" (1976:5).

Moreover, even our

ability to derive satisfaction may be culturally influenced.
Regarding the second point, he views the market as a
voting machine, a plutocracy, where the rich rule by virtue
of having more votes.

But this is offset by the economies

of scale evident in modern industrial societies —

a sort of

mob rule where the mob is able to get what it agrees it
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wants.
ment.

Certainly advertising acts to promote this agree
But individuals also find their tastes well catered

to if they are "conformist enough to share them with mil
lions of others" (1976:10).
The problem, he says, is that people have competing
needs.

He consolidates the motivational forces identified

by some behavioral psychologists —

relief of discomfort,

stimulation to relieve boredom, and the pleasures that can
accompany and reinforce both —

into two areas: want satis

faction (relief of pain) and pleasure.

Economists do not

distinguish between the two in their central concept of con
sumer satisfaction.
purchases.

Satisfaction is simply inferred from

The problem is that the net effect of mass pro

duction is the reduction of novelty leading to a reduced
ability on the part of consumers to meet their real needs
for stimulation.

Furthermore, advertising, in conjunction

with education and other socializing agents, convinces
people that what they want is comfort. Since products which
increase comfort are also what are most available, then what
appears to be positive, comfort-seeking behavior may be a
simple response to the types of products made available
through mass production.
Scitovsky extrapolates from this to a critique of our
economic measures of well being.

Stimulus-related products

typically provide satisfaction to more than just the con
sumer.

Comforts, on the other hand, do not usually carry as

many external benefits and frequently generate negative ex
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ternalities
ogy.

through greater reliance on industrial technol

Thus, the consumption of a comfort product as opposed

to a stimulus product, if they are priced the same, may pro
vide the same amount of satisfaction to the consumer but
they do not necessarily provide the same total satisfaction
to the society.

Therefore, statements that a rising GNP

demonstrates a net gain in satisfaction is a logical leap
that requires that we assume a Pareto optimum (and the asso
ciated prerequisites: competition, a free flow of informa
tion, free entry into exchanges, etc.).

In addition, many

of the indicators of satisfaction {self-sufficiency, work
satisfaction, etc.) are non-economic and unmeasured.

Values

other than those measured in the market are considered to be
of less significance (Cottrell, 1955).
In a somewhat analogous criticism, Lasch (1978) argues
that many patterns of consumption are a product of narcis
sism in contemporary society.

Narcissism, in the Freudian

sense in which Lasch employs the term, implies not self-love
but self-hate.

To satisfy feelings of worthlessness, people

consume more, identify with famous figures, etc.

Since his

analysis traces these feelings of lack of self-worth to the
fact that individuals have ceded control over their lives to
bureaucracies, it nevertheless points out that consumption
is affected by cultural considerations.
This, then, leads us back to the basic point.
extent are consumers sovereign actors in markets?

To what
Scitovsky

says that they are free to choose from among a basket of
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goods but that they are not able to choose what those goods
will be.

Similarly, Schnaiberg (1980) argues that we cannot

see the behavior of consumers as autonomous from the discre
tionary investment and production decisions of industrial
bureaucracies.
Furthermore, besides the direct manipulation of con
sumers through production decisions in conjunction with ad
vertising and the creation of a consumer economy, there are
other factors which structure consumption for groups of con
sumers.

Ewen (1976) points out (in keeping with the

Weberian view of power) that consumption is a major factor
in class stratification in contemporary society.
adds credence to Scitovsky*s argument —

While this

since mass produc

tion is designed to give the masses the products of the
wealthy which they so covet —

it also leads to our final

view of consumer behavior.

Structured consumption.

The radical view goes beyond an

analysis of either consumer or producer sovereignty to exam
ine the structural factors which constrain both the market
and the consumption capabilities of individuals.

According

to Gintis this view incorporates two assumptions:

"the choice set of socially feasible options
in the areas of work, technology, and public
policy...is constrained to those compatible with
the reproduction of the social relations of capi-
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talist production [and]...observed consumer behav
ior in capitalist society is a rational reaction to
the structure of available alternatives for social
activity open to the individual."

(1972: 267)

Let us focus for a moment on one major constraint on
consumer action, that of income.

Scitovsky's view would be

that wealthier consumers tend to exercise a disproportion
ate influence on patterns of production since they are pr o 
duct innovators and they shape the consumer aspirations of
the other classes.

The radical view, however, would hold

that since the income of the masses is wage income, it is
determined by the class relations of production, something
well outside of the realm of consumer sovereignty
(Schnaiberg, 1980).

This theory holds that "the basic

spheres of social activity...are alienated in the sense
that their historical development does not reflect even the
manifest preferences of individuals affected by their oper
ation" (Gintis, 1972:210).
In the neo-classical tradition, exchange values are
primarily determined by use values (given certain con
straints of resources and technology).

According to this

approach, since exchange values influence the process of
investment and the resultant production capacity, they be
come "essential determinants of use values" (Gintis, 1972:
275) .
Gintis goes on to describe the two mechanisms which he
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sees as bringing capacity development into line with the
prerequisites of capitalist reproduction:
cybernetic patterning.

associative and

Both of these operate through the

structure of available alternatives.

The first refers

to

the fact that people derive satisfaction from those things
to which they are consistently exposed.

Individuals also

"prefer" those goods and services which are highly avail
able (and thus have a low exchange value).
But, Gintis continues, individuals are also goal
oriented creatures.

They are capable of "conscious pro

grams of self-development", by which he means activities of
an educational nature.

These activities, however, are

limited both by the costs of acquiring skills or knowledge
as well as by the "expected future structure of
availabilities".

Thus, once again, people’s preferences

are shaped by the relative availability of goods.
While this cybernetic patterning is a crucial concept,
Gintis's approach seems too limited.

The argument which he

makes fall short of a traditional Marxist approach.

While

individuals are creatures of habit and goal-oriented, they
are also creative.

A cybernetic approach must imply not

only that individuals regulate behavior to accomplish normatively prescribed goals, but that they can also set goals.
While the social situation may set the objective conditions
under which decisions are made, we must also be aware that
subjective interpretations also have importance.
This has not been the concern of traditional, "offi-
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cial", Marxist analysis.

Traditionally it has been assumed

that objective conditions determine consciousness, and
there has been a dismissal of the concern over false con
sciousness.

True class consciousness would inevitably

arise out of objective structural conditions.

The early

Frankfurt school, however, called this assumption into
question.

The rise of the interventionist state, the in

creased rationalization of social institutions, and the
reification of consciousness would all hinder the develop
ment of class consciousness.

For our purposes, this points

to a need to examine more fully the ways that subjective
interpretation of situations can be affected by social in
stitutions and culture.

To an extent, this is the strength

of the adoption of innovations framework.

The Adoption of Innovations

The focus of the adoption-of-innovations research has
centered primarily on:

a) the psychological character

istics of people who adopt at different stages (Rogers,
1962; 1983); b) where adopters get their information, i.e.,
the relative impact of the media, of models, or of personal
communications at different stages of the adoption process
(Rogers, 1962; 1976; Singh and Pareek, 1965); and, more
recently, c) the impact of values (e.g., profit motivation
versus environmental concern) on adoption (Pampel and Van
Es, 1977).
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In all of these analyses, the theoretical perspective
of Rogers and his associates forms the basic approach.
Rogers regards adoption as goal-oriented behavior, which
involves effort, and which takes place in situations that
are normatively regulated.

Adoption also has four key ele

ments:

an

innovation, communication, in a system, over

time.

The adoption process is also a mental process.

While cultural norms may constrain innovativeness, all
adoption still involves a decision-making process in which
individuals must observe and analyze behavior, decide on a
course of action, take it and then analyze the con
sequences .
This process is broken down into a number of stages.
The first stage of this process involves awareness.
lowing

Fol

the development of interest in an innovation, people

will seek out information.

They will then evaluate the in

formation to determine whether the advantages outweigh the
disadvantages.

The trial stage follows the evaluation of

the innovation and, if it is successful, frequently results
in adoption.
Rogers sees awareness as a fairly passive stage of the
adoption process.
dent.

It is frequently the result of an acci

This is more likely to be true of innovations of

farm technology than it is of the adoption of technologies
designed to avert scarcity.

In the latter cases, it would

seem that emotions are important arousers of interest.
While impersonal information is important at the
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awareness stage, personal communication, involving two-way
exchanges, are more important at the evaluation stage.
Such personal communications are to influence behavior as
well as ideas.

They seem to be more important in overcom

ing apathy or outright resistance.

There is also, accord

ing to these studies, little evidence that lack of knowl
edge affects adoption.

Rather, selective exposure (result

ing from past experiences, values and psychological charac
teristics) has an effect upon the relationship between
awareness and adoption.

Innovators, for example, have more

favorable attitudes toward new ideas.
A variety of other factors also influence the adoption
of innovations.

The perception of some advantage relative

to other types of technology is very important.

Relative

advantage includes more that just initial cost.

It should

also include the length of the payback period, tax incen
tives which may alter cost considerations, etc.
is also affected by a number of other factors:

Adoption
the degree

of compatibility with the adopters’ values, the complexity
of the technology (how difficult it is to understand and
use), and the amount of risk (economic, physical, mechani
cal, or social-psychological uncertainties) perceived as
being associated with the innovation.

The extent to which

an innovation may be tried on a limited basis (divisibil
ity) or the extent to which the results can be disseminated
easily (communicability) also effect the rate of adoption
(Rogers, 1972; Shama, 1981).
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While the perception of advantage is important, rela
tive advantage may also be emphasized by crisis.

In addi

tion, the perceived seriousness of the need can also be an
indicator of advantage.
Rogers sees this process as proceeding from the top
down.

The first innovators are truly venturesome individu

als, but the early adopters who come after them are the
opinion leaders in the community.

Coming from higher

socio-economic backgrounds, they frequently adopt innova
tions in an attempt to increase their status in the com
munity.

Rogers envisions a two-step flow of communication.

These early adopters are influenced by change agents
(professionals who act as communication links) and then in
turn these opinion leaders influence the rest of the com
munity.

Following these early adopters, the early majority

adopters tend to adopt in a very deliberate manner, seeking
out as much information as they can find and going through
a very elaborate decision process.

The late majority adop

ters are individuals who were at first very skeptical and
wait to see how well others do with the innovation.

Final

ly, there are the laggards, people with very traditional
orientations who are extremely hesitant to try something
new.
As successful as this framework has been in explaining
the adoption of innovations, it still has its drawbacks and
its critics, especially with reference to solar energy in
novation.

Shama (1981) points out that while the diffusion
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theorists see solar innovations as simply another service
which is provided to consumers, social change theorists
feel that it is an expression of changing American values.
The latter argue that Americans, in the face of increasing
inability to meet material needs, are opting for a simpler
lifestyle.

Shama argues, though, that the diffusion liter

ature provides a valuable framework for policy makers and
that early research can facilitate the adoption process.
Foster (1973) enumerates the variety of cultural and
social barriers which might impede the diffusion of innova
tions.

Traditionalism, ethnicity, pride, modesty, reli

gion, etc., may all hinder adoption.

Social barriers like

group solidarity, public opinion, factionalism, vested in
terests, or competing loci of authority (family, political
structure, etc.) may retard diffusion.

Finally, caste,

class, political structure or other social structural char
acteristics may hinder the spread of innovations.

But

seldom are these characteristics specifically addressed in
the adoption of energy technologies.
Rogers also takes into consideration a number of meth
odological and theoretical weaknesses found in adoption
studies, pointing out why they have developed and providing
some solutions.

The first of these is the fact that re

search on innovations tends to have a pro-innovation bias.
Most research assumes that the innovation should be dif
fused.

For a number of reasons, a bias of this type is u n 

derstandable:

historically we have studied those innova
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tions which were profitable; the act of innovation is laden
with positive values; the research has often been funded by
change agents; and successful diffusions can be studied
retroactively (Rogers, 1983).
However, this bias limits the range of studies that
are undertaken.

We frequently ignore the study of ig

norance of innovations, underemphasize the rejection of in
novations, overlook reinvention, and ignore the anti
diffusion programs that often develop to prevent the spread
of bad diffusions.

As a result, we know more about: a)

rapidly diffusing innovations than about slowly diffusing
innovations; b) adoption than rejection; and c) continuance
rather than discontinuance (Rogers, 1983).
To solve this problem, it is necessary that we conduct
studies at more than one point in time.

This would allow

us to learn more about the long-term consequences of any
innovation.

Secondly, we must exercise caution in selec

ting innovations and do more comparative studies; we must
look, e.g., at other innovations that have failed in the
same context as the one that succeeds.

Next, we must be

careful not to assume that an innovation is right for
everyone all of the time.
be a rational decision.

For some people, rejection may
We must be cued in to the particu

lar needs and problems of individuals that are peculiar to
their situation.

Fourth, we must examine the broader con

text of innovation: how decisions that something should be
diffused are made; how policies affect diffusion; how in-
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novations are related; and how it was decided to conduct
the research and development.

Finally, we must also in

crease our understanding of motivations for adoption or
non-adoption (Rogers, 1983).
The second major criticism of diffusion research
pointed out by Rogers is the bias toward blaming individu
als when diffusion proceeds slowly.

The tendency, critics

point out, is to side with the agency promoting the innova
tion.

To an extent, this is evident in the types of vari

ables that are employed.
failure —

While some may look for system

e.g., the amount of contact between change

agents and adopters —

the majority of variables —

tion, income, mass media exposure, etc. —

educa

are designed to

measure the success or failure of the individuals within
the system, not the system itself.

This is also evident in

the fact that blame is often placed on "laggards" or "late
adopters", people who are seen as irrational, dogmatic,
resistant to change.
a system problem —

The problem may as readily be seen as
e.g., a self-fulfilling prophecy creat

ed by the failure of change agents to contact potential
laggards.
Again, there are a variety of reasons for this prob
lem.

To a degree, the individual blame bias is picked up

by researchers from change agents.

On the other hand, re

searchers may feel that there is nothing they can do to
change the system, so why not focus attention on the indi
vidual.

Individuals are more accessible and, if the indi-
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vidual is the unit of response (to an innovation), then
perhaps they should be the unit of analysis.
Solutions to this problem primarily involve caution in
setting up your research design.
the causes of success or failure.

Keep an open mind about
Be sure that all partic

ipants are involved, including potential adopters.
ly, more structural variables should be included.

Final
Who owns

and controls the research and development industry? Who
controls communication systems?

Such inquiries will vastly

broaden our understanding of the success or failure of the
diffusion process (or the evaluation of an innovation).
Rogers also deals briefly with a few other problems
evident in the literature.
call data.

Studies primarily rely on re

Such information will vary with the innovations

salience, with the length of time that elapses between the
adoption and the study, and with individual differences
such as education, memory, etc.

To compensate, researchers

should rely more upon field experiments, longitudinal panel
studies, archival records, and case studies.
Another weakness is the fact that many studies fail to
show how the socioeconomic benefits of diffusion are dis
tributed.

Very often, new innovations widen the gap be

tween groups in the society.
Finally, many studies have been conducted in the de
veloping countries, but the assumption is usually made that
the process of diffusion will still be the same as in the
industrialized countries; that it will follow the same S-
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shaped curve despite the lower education, income, etc. of
the citizens of Third World nations.

Studies also assume

that nations must pass through the same process of develop
ment as the industrialized nations.

The dominant paradigm

of western development has maintained that economic growth
takes place through industrialization and urbanization with
capital-intensive, labor-saving technologies and central
ized planning.

Accordingly, problems of development lie

with the developing nations rather than with the system.
Researchers must attempt to understand the socio-cultural
systems within which adoption takes place.
This leads us to a consideration of the apolitical na
ture of this approach.

On the one hand, it tends to not

take into consideration the conflicting norms in any
society.

On the other, it fails to see that policy may

reflect these conflicts of interest.

This is partly a pro

duct of its failure to take social structural conditions
directly into account.

For example, norms are deemed im

portant (since they constrain innovators and influence the
evaluation stage of the adoption process) but they are not
usually explicitly included in the analysis.
Lauer (1977) expands on this by pointing to the fact
that adoption may be hindered not only by social barriers
but also by conflicts of interest.

He says it is not

enough to simply argue that increases in communication may
create confusion.

Rather,

"we need to take more account of conflict and
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contradiction within social systems. A system
does not simply have norms that favor innovation
or norms that favor the status quo; systems may
contain diverse and conflicting norms because
they have diverse groups with conflicting inter
ests... we must recognize the existence of con
flicting interests, so that the innovation which
will be advantageous to some will be dis
advantageous to others." (1977: 173-174)
Finally, this framework fails to apply directly to
the adoption of energy technologies.

For innovations which

entail a large initial investment, trialability is im
possible.

The only means by which people can try out an in

novation is vicariously.

This makes modeling (which here is

used to refer to the observation of the behavior of others)
and information much more important at every stage of adop
tion than it might be for other forms of innovation.
The following sections develop a more flexible approach
to human behavior, one which falls somewhere in between the
idea of manipulated consumption and structured consumption
but draws heavily on the adoption of innovations framework.
This synthesis will view actors as creative interpreters in
established, regulated, structured social situations.
First, however, we will digress briefly for a sociological
explanation of how those structures arise.

Chapter 3

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DECISIONS
Introduction
The previous chapter explored the issue of decision
making from the perspective of market research and econom
ics as well as through the viewpoint of the diffusion of
innovations.

In this chapter we will first look at the

elements of sociological theory which seem to be necessary
if we are to enlarge upon these previous frameworks.

Fol

lowing this, we will consider the micro level theory con
cerning attitudes and behavior from a more sociological
perspective.

Finally, we will present a preliminary model

of the approach to be used in this dissertation.

Toward a Sociological Model of Decisions

Since the starting point of our analysis must be an
on-going social system, we must first examine exactly what
is meant by this term.
interacting individuals.

Societies are bounded systems of
The action possibilities of these

actors are constrained by rules and regulations.

It is

conceivable that there could be as many different modes of
behavior as there are situations in which people interact.
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That this is not the case is indicative of the fact that
behaviors become, to some extent, stereotyped, or con
strained, by the rules of the society.

Thus, certain modes

of behavior, linked to particular situations, become ex
pected and repetitive.

They become recognized by individu

als as the most common patterns of behavior or standards,
conformity to which may be enforced through the use of pos
itive or negative sanctions.

When these repetitive modes

of behavior are found to apply to different populations
over time, i.e. when they become relatively invariant and
independent of the specific actors, we refer to social
structure.
The most prevalent, permanent and organized of these
repetitive modes of behavior are institutions.

They are

systems which structure or organize human action.

They

consist of sets of social relationships which link actors
having common goals to particular issues or activities.
They guide behavior through the development of a division
of labor, patterns of decision making, and the distribution
of resources —
privileges —

along with the associated rights and

among actors (Baumgartner, et al., 1977).

The development of a given order is the result of a
variety of macro-level structuring factors.

These include

the material conditions of the society (geography and tech
nology) as well as the cultural and ideational conditions,
which influence the types of activities which are accept
able and the rewards or outcomes of action.

These may be
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seen as simply inherent in the system or as the result of
the deliberate planning and action of individuals.

Human

action and its indirect consequences may lead to the
restructuring of the society.
The control of resources is crucial to this last fac
tor.

Unequal control over resources may grant individuals

or groups a disproportionate ability to structure their en
vironment.
tors:

This control may result from a variety of fac

environmental considerations may make crucial

resources more available to one group than to another, nat
ural capabilities may be unevenly distributed, the norma
tive structuring of the system may grant structuring capa
bility to some actors to assure the efficient functioning
of the system, or conflict may result in the achievement of
unequal control by one group.
In any event, this initial difference in resource con
trol is cumulative, i.e. it offers further opportunity for
additional control.

The inequality allows some actors the

ability to take advantage of new opportunities, to prevent
or control attempts by other actors to gain control, and to
generally structure themselves and their surrounding en
vironment in such a way that they can facilitate the at
tainment of their goals.
This power amplification may be especially effective
when these initial differences can be turned into meta
power.

This concept refers to the ability of individuals

to manipulate or change the matrix of behavioral expecta
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tions —

the "rules of the game" —

as well as the distri

bution of resources, rewards, and the overall cultural
orientation.

This is not the same as power.

The Weberian

sense of power refers to the ability of actors to influence
actors within a given institutional framework.

Meta-power

is the ability to actually structure the framework within
which action takes place (Baumgartner, et al.

1977).

Lukes (1974) discusses three different views of power.
The first, one-dimensional power, refers to the actual ex
ercise of power where individuals or groups are seen as
having the ability to win our over others in political con
tests because of the resources that they bring to the
situation.

The two dimensional view of power goes beyond

this behavioral approach by recognizing that attempts by
the powerful to control decision-making are not necessarily
limited to actual political contests but may be evidenced
through nondecision-making, "a decision that results in
suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge
to the values or interests of the decision-maker"
(1974:18).
The three-dimensional view sees the exercise of power
as more insidious.

It prevents people "from having

grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in
the existing nature of things" (1974:24) thus maintaining
the bias of the system.

In addition, this bias is

maintained "not only through a series of individually
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chosen acts, but also, more importantly, by the socially
structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and
practices of institutions" (1974:22).
The ability of actors to use any initial advantage to
attract other actors and resources away from the less ad
vantaged in order to structure the institutional framework
is limited by a number of factors.

These might include:

the extent to which there is an increasing surplus avail
able, the legitimation of differential accumulation in in
heritance rules, the development of consciousness and orga
nization or control over resources by weaker actors, pat
terns of immigration or emigration, and by the availability
of alternatives or the development of new and important
resources.
Of course, we still need some means of understand
ing how this process operates on the micro level.

We need

to know how rewards influence behavior, how people arrive
at decisions, etc.

Simons (1981) argues for an alternative

to SEU theory which he refers to as bounded rationality.
He says that while people are certainly motivated to fill
needs, they are not capable of consistently maximizing
their behavioral outcomes.

Bounded rationality is a means

by which people with our mental capacities are able to ar
rive at decisions.

The mechanisms of this approach include

1) some way of focusing attention, 2) a means of generating
alternatives, and 3) a capability of acquiring facts and
drawing information.

It is to a model of this type —

a
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sociological model —

that we now turn.

Symbolic Interaction and Social Learning

In order to emphasize the constructive, emergent na
ture of human action, Shibutani (1968) employs symbolic in
teraction as the basis of a cybernetic approach to motiva
tion.

In symbolic interaction, the objective reality of

the external environment constrains human action, but indi
viduals selectively perceive that environment and their
reactions are creative responses to the subjectively
meaningful aspects of that environment.
Mead's (193 4) basic unit of analysis is the act.

In

dividuals respond to an on-going environment by actively
interpreting the situation and acting toward others on the
basis of that interpretation.

The first stage of the act

is to be found in an impulse, a lack of effective integra
tion with or adaptation to environmental circumstances.
Sensory cues play an important part in redirecting and
channeling activity.

Not all cues are perceived, however.

Perception is highly selective and may be a function of the
impulse (Shibutani, 1968) as well as a person's values.
Mead argues that any activity or object is approached
with a set of expectations, which may also affect our per
ceptions.

The development of these expectations is, to a

large extent, the result of our interaction with others and
with our environment.

The process of role playing and role
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taking work to increase our understanding of these expecta
tions.

The process is facilitated by the use of language

which allows us to anticipate the responses of others.
In Mead's analysis, there are many similarities to the
social learning of Bandura (1962:1977).

This might not be

readily apparent since Bandura is so interested in the role
of reinforcers, as were Watson and other classical behaviorists, theorists who espouse theoretical frameworks which
are strongly criticized by Mead.

But Bandura is not inter

ested in reinforcers in the traditional way.

In classical

Stimulus- Response theory, reinforcers act "backwards" to
strengthen response.
Singleman (1973) points out that the concept of self,
which includes the organized responses to the expectations
of others, is complementary to the concept of social rein
forcers.

More importantly, individuals do not have to be

reinforced for their own behavior in order to learn.
may also learn from the experience of others.

They

Rewards may

act, then, to facilitate learning anticipatorily.

As with

Mead, attention may be shaped by values or needs.

Per

ceived rewards do not strengthen behavior directly but
serve as cues for proper behavior.
Bandura believes that learning is a more complex pro
cess than we are frequently led to believe.

Due to the na

ture of many studies of learning, in laboratories with rats
and pigeons, we have come to equate learning with response.
However, it is also dependent upon an individual's imaginal
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and verbal rehearsing.

A model's response to cues leads to

internal images which may be called upon even in the ab
sence of rewards.

Social agents are important sources of

patterns of behavior.

By observing the outcomes of other's

actions, people may vicariously learn behavior.
velop hypotheses concerning proper behavior.

They de

But the

model's behavior must be within the perceptory and motor
capacity of the observer.

Verbal labels act to facilitate

this process (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970).
Mead also says that on the basis of our expectations,
we develop hypotheses.

These are tested and their validity

or invalidity is established through manipulation.
Hypotheses which prove to be valid will be stored in our
memory (meaning).

The meaning of any object is the manner

in which people are predisposed to act toward it.

Meanings

are "stable relationships between an organism and a class
of objects" (Shibutani, 1968:332).

If our hypotheses prove

to be invalid, meanings will be changed.
Bandura takes essentially the same approach.

Motor

reproduction involves the cognitive reorganization of pos
sible responses, their initiation, monitoring and refine
ment on the basis of feedback.

Rewarded responses, either

ours or others, or their anticipation will lead to in
creased motivation to respond in a similar manner.

Motiva

tion to respond is likely to be higher for valued outcomes.
Mead says that outcomes that prove to be especially
gratifying will provide the basis of these values.

71

In this schema, the responses of others have an effect
on our motivation to behave.

But rewarded behavior, wheth

er direct or vicarious, only motivates behavior through a
process in which rewards are used as cues to anticipate
foreseeable outcomes.

This cognitive process, inherent in

symbolic interaction and social learning theory, implicitly
recognizes the importance of feedback in the development of
our expectations and orientations.

Our actions have cer

tain outcomes which become inputs at later points in time.
This is essential to any understanding of purposeful, goaloriented systems.

It also helps us to recognize how a

diversity of behavior arises.
Mead, of course, is famous for his emphasis on the way
in which social control is inherent in socialization.

The

meanings which we have are subject to control through the
anticipated responses of others.

Yet, what actions are

taken varies from one culture to another as well as from
one situation to another, depending upon the opportunities
and the resources that are available.

Shibutani says that

"individuality is usually manifest only in situations where
there are sanctioned alternatives" (1968: 334).
Bandura is more concerned with the development of
novel forms of behavior and selection from among sanctioned
alternatives.

In contrast to classical S-R theory, in

strumental learning should be regarded as response selec
tion rather than response acquisition.

Miller and Dollard

(in Giewitz, 1969) prefer to speak in terras of response
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hierarchies.
sponses.

Cues may be linked to several different re

A person will respond in the way which had un

dergone the greatest amount of learning.
This implies an active process in which the subjective
characteristics an individual possesses may serve as deter
minants of any response disposition.

In addition, a diver

sity of role models may also lead to creativity and innova
tion.

The observer acquires novel responses through cogni

tive integration of a variety of cues (Shaw and Costanzo,
1970).
Up to this point we have been concerned primarily with
what Mead termed reflective thought or what we might call
response.

We must also be concerned with the non-reflec-

tive determinants of behavior.

Mead sees emotions coming

into play when the consummation of an act is prevented.
But Mowrer (1956) emphasizes the role of learned drives
such as fear.

Once fear, or any other learned drive, be

comes connected to a particular situation or stimulus, any
response which lessens the fear will be reinforced.
Actors may simply react to these emotions or they may
return to reflective thought to select from among a number
of alternative routes through imaginal and verbal rehears
ing.

Bandura also sees modeling influences as important

emotion arousers.

The affective responses of a model may

elicit the same responses in an observer if the latter is
confronted with the same cues (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970).
This framework sensitizes us to the variety of factors

73

which may constrain behavior.

Perception, values, expecta

tions, and modeling all play a role in shaping responses.
Price, information and other market considerations, are ac
tually special cases of cues to which people respond.
There is, however, one final area of explanation to which
we should now tur",

Attitudes and Behavior

We must also be concerned with the relationship be
tween attitudes and behavior since the grass roots movement
surrounding decentralized technologies seems to rely heavi
ly on changing attitudes in order to facilitate adoption.
In this section we will briefly discuss the methodological
and theoretical issues associated with studies of attitude
and behavior.
There are two countervailing tendencies in the social
psychology literatures.

On the one hand, there is a gener

al agreement that the correlation between attitudes and be
havior is very

low.But there is also a notable lack of

consensus regarding the exact nature of attitudes.

The

two

issues are most likely interrelated.
There are

alsotwo basic approaches to the concept

of

attitude, both of which assume that there is a large degree
of consistency between responses over time.

The first of

these has been referred to as a probability view {DeFleur
and Westie, 1963).

The basis of this approach is that if
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attitude responses are more or less consistent, then a
large number of responses is likely to demonstrate some
consistency or predictability.

An attitude, then is no

more than the probability of the occurrence of a certain
behavior.

It is simply inferred from the behaviors.

The second approach, termed latent process by DeFleur
and Westie (1963), also assumes that responses are con
sistent but that this consistency is due to the operation
of some underlying causal mechanism.

According to this

framework, an attitude is not just the probability of a
response but, rather, a hypothetical variable intervening
between stimulus and response.

Attitudes mediate or con

strain an actor's response to some attitude object.
If we assume that attitudes are no more than the prob
ability of a response occurrence, then measurement is a
straightforward process.

However, if we assume that atti

tudes are actually an unobservable inner mechanism, then we
are faced with much greater difficulties of measurement.
Partly this is due to ambiguity regarding exactly what con
stitutes these inner mechanisms.

Most theorists see them

as having a number of components, including affective, cog
nitive, etc.

Others argue that attitudes are

unidimensional.

In either case, there are serious ques

tions about the lack of correlation between verbal atti
tudes and overt behavior.
To an extent, these observed inconsistencies may be
due to methodological problems.

Ehrlich (1969) says that
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while we have standardized procedures for scale construc
tion, etc., we have not managed to develop any standardized
means of observing behavior.

More importantly, we tend to

measure attitudes toward a class of people, but we make our
predictions about the way in which people will behave
toward an individual of that class.

This may be, Ehrlich

argues, a special case of fallacy of ecological correla
tion.
Alwin (1973), says that because attitudes are not good
predictors of behavior, researchers assume that attitudes
are not stable, or that verbal attitudes do not measure un
derlying attitudes, or that attitudes do not determine be
havior.

In a more sophisticated statistical analysis of

the problem, he argues that our difficulties are due to the
fact that our bivariate models of attitude-behavior rela
tionships are under identified.

We need to have observa

tions of either a behavior at two points in time and an at
titude at one point or a measurement of attitude at two
points and behavior at one.
Sample and Warland (1973) also point out that many
people who have weak or non-existent attitudes often
respond as if they had a positive or negative attitude.

By

grouping these people with those who have strong attitudes,
the observed correlations between attitude and behavior are
weakened.

They also imply that attempts to increase the

reliability and validity of attitude measurements neces
sitate a greater conceptual clarity.
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Whether we are concerned with the use of attitudes as
predictors of behavior or simply with the nature of the re
lationship between attitudes and behavior, it is essential
that we face some important conceptual problems.

The first

is the fact that not all of the components of an attitude
necessarily imply a behavior.

Thus, as Ehrlich says,

"without a direct assessment of the 'action potential' of
an attitude component, the researcher's inference about the
subject's behavior, or intentions, may be phenomenologically naive" (1969:29).

To deal with this, we should empha

size the measurement of the components of attitudes which
do relate to behavior, such as direction and intensity.
Furthermore, Ehrlich points out that the observed in
consistencies may be the result of a failure on the part of
the researcher to adequately specify the criteria which
will be used to determine consistency.

This implies the

need to rely on concrete forms of behavior and rigorous
statistical inference.
Perhaps most important, however, is the growing empha
sis on intervening or moderator variables (Ehrlich, 1969;
Sample and Warland, 1973).

These include both psychologi

cal and sociological factors:

the degree to which an atti

tude is capable of being expressed in a behavior, the will
ingness of an individual to express an attitude, or the
fact that the actor’s perspective or definition of the act
may assume consistency while the researcher infers in
consistency.
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Other extremely important considerations include the
degree of learning, the accessibility of behavior and the
extent of the respondent's competence.

Some degree of in

consistency may be due to the fact that while an actor may
express a certain attitude, he or she may not know how to
transfer this to action.

To an extent, this may be due to

"the level of direct or vicarious experience of the actor,
if any, in such behavior situations" {Ehrlich, 1969:32).
However, even if the subject is aware of the appropriate
response, the opportunity, or the perceived opportunity, to
express the behavior may not arise.

Of course, even if the

above situations are met, the actor may not be able to
muster sufficient resources or have the skills that are
necessary to perform the behavior.
Finally, we must also be aware of the compounding ef
fect of situational factors.

Many theorists (Fishbein,

1965; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Triandis, 1971, 1975; Macey
and Brown, 1983) feel that the influence of attitudes on
behavior is mediated by structural considerations.

It is

to these more sociological models that we now turn.

A Sociological Model of Decision Making

For Fishbein (1965; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975,1976; Aj
zen and Fishbein, 1970,1977), attitudes refer to the
evaluation of some entity: a person, a physical object, a
behavior, a policy, etc. (1977).

An attitude "is highly
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correlated with the sum of beliefs each multiplied by its
respective evaluation" (1970:467).

Attitudes toward ac

tions involve the evaluation of the potential outcomes of
that action as well as the evaluation of those outcomes.
The attitude which a person holds toward an object
will have an influence on the overall pattern of behavior
which an individual will exhibit toward that object.

On

the other hand, it need not predict any particular action
toward that object (1977).

Rather, attitudes, in conjunc

tion with normative beliefs, are better predictors of an
individual's intent to perform an act, which may or may not
be highly correlated with behavior.
Note that the attitude toward an act is also closely
related to subjective Expected Utility.

The SEU of a given

alternative is a product of the assumed probability that a
given act will have certain consequences multiplied by the
value attached to that outcome.

The problem with SEU as a

theory is that it encourages one to assume that it is the
most important precursor, and best predictor, of behavior.
Here, in contrast, it is only one of the determinants of
behavior (1970).
In Figure 3.1a, we see a synthesis of the basic
Fishbein-Ajzen model.

The precursors of behavioral intent

are both the subjective attitudes which an actor holds and
the subjective internalization of norms.

Attitudes are a

result of a person's affective orientation toward an object
and his evaluation of that action.

Subjective norms are

79

Figure 3.1

MODELS OF ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIPS

Figure 3.1a
Fishbein's Model
Attitudes

Behavior Intent-

►Behavior

Subjective Norm

Figure 3.lb
Triandis' Model
Habit,
Social FactorsNon-socialconseguences

-Behavioral Intent-

►Behavior

Affect*
Facilitating,
conditions

Figure 3.1c
Macey and Brown's Model
Attitude
Subjective Norm
Past experienc

Behavioral Intent

Behavior
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the product of the actor's subjective understanding that
others wish to act in a certain way as well as his motiva
tion to comply with those wishes.

Behavioral intent is

only indirectly affected by these latter considerations.
The strength of an attitude-behavior relationship will
depend to a large extent on the degree of correspondence,
the intuitive consistency, between the attitude and the be
havior on a variety of criteria: the action, the target,
the context, and the time frame.

For example, if a person

holds an attitude toward a behavior such as the energy
crisis, there may be general attitudes about the crisis,
people may have very specific attitudes about specific en
ergy systems, and these attitudes may vary with regard to
the energy systems they would like to see in their own
homes or the ones they would like to see for the society as
a whole, etc.
Of course, as Fishbein and Ajzen consistently point
out, what they are actually attempting to measure is behav
ioral intent.

The degree of correlation between intent and

actual behavior will vary with a number of factors: the
correspondence in the levels of specificity of measurement,
the stability of the intention, the degree to which the be
havior is under the control of the individual's wishes, and
the amount of time elapsed between the measurement of the
intent and the actual behavior (1976).
Triandis (1971; 1975) presents a more complicated
model.

He, too, argues that behavior intent is a better
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indicator of action, but behavior is also a product of past
experience or habit and other facilitating factors.

In

tent, in turn, is a function of a) social determinants like
norms and roles and values which develop in relationships
with others, b) the affect attached to the behavior, and c)
the expectations about the outcomes of the behavior.

Other

facilitating variables include the ability of the person to
carry out the act and the perception of cues, which are
filtered through expectations, values and needs.

Cues are

most likely to filter through if they are able to reduce
uncertainty or if the behavior permits greater predict
ability of the environment.
Macey and Brown (1983) attempt to incorporate aspects
of both of these frameworks into a study of residential en
ergy conservation practices (turning down a thermostat,
changing the furnace filter, and exterior caulking).

They

propose to include past experience in Fishbein's model in
order to increase its predictive capability (see figure
3.1c).

They find that intention offers little predictive

power over and above past experience, at least for two of
the three behaviors (nighttime setback and changing fil
ters) .

However, their model, which includes past experi

ence, offered considerably more predictive power than the
simpler Fishbein model.
What we need to do now is to begin to synthesize these
variables into a model which will facilitate the organiza
tion of our subsuquent analysis.

Figure 3.2 presents such
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a model.

Behavior is the product of individual character-

stics, (e.g., attitudes, values, the subjective expected
outcomes of specific behavior, and knowledge,), situational
factors (general demographics), and the specific factors
which people take into consideration in attempts to arrive
at decisions.
Here we will argue that these latter factors include
information from primary and secondary sources, subjective
norms, and pricing considerations

Since norms are the

standards of behavior which people associate with situa
tions, we will here assume that normative expectations are
the result of the degree of exposure to behavior which an
actor experiences.

Habit or past experience can play a

role, and the vicarious reinforcement associated with
modeling behavior can affect specific decisions.

In addi

tion, knowledge about the viability of behaviors should af
fect the development of novel actions.
There are strong parallels, however, between this

Figure 3.2
A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF ADOPTION

Individual
Characteristics
Situational
Factors
Decision
Factors"

Behavior
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model and the adoption of innovations framework.

Subjec

tive expected outcomes would include variables such as rel
ative advantage and would be based upon communication
(through information and modeling).

Perceived

complexity

is one of a set of attitudes which may predispose persons
to adopt an innovation.

And compatibility illustrates the

importance of values in the adoption of innovations.

How

ever, our model more directly sensitizes us to the impor
tance of social norms for adoption.

We also must be aware

that a variety of attitudes other than just the perceived
complexity of the innovation may be important.
all, we must be concerned with what initiates

But most of
interest

among adopters, i.e., what motivates them to be concerned
in the first place, what cues prompt their behavior.
To test this model's explanatory capability, we should
see how well each of these variables explains the adoption
of innovative technologies.

Before doing so, however, we

should first determine how well other studies of the adop
tion of energy alternatives fit into this developing frame
work.

CHAPTER 4

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
In this chapter we will survey the relevant studies on
the adoption of energy technologies.

First we will focus

our attention on the market oriented models of adoption.
While the majority of the research in the adoption litera
ture has focused on the adoption of farm implements or
similar technologies (Singh and Pareek, 1965), there has
been a growing emphasis on the application of this frame
work to the adoption of energy-conserving technologies,
much of which has a direct bearing on our attempt to under
stand the adoption of energy systems.

However, as we shall

see there are a number of drawbacks to this perspective
which should be alleviated by the model developed in the
previous chapter.

The end of the chapter will demonstrate

the way in which the model developed in this dissertation
improves upon this previous work.

The Adoption of Energy Technologies

Decision Factors
Market Models and Energy Consumption.

The belief

that consumers will make rational decisions based on avail84

85

able information forms
nent studies of

the basis of many of our most promi

energy use.

The reports of the Committee

on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES, 1978),
of the Harvard Business School (Stobaugh and Yergin, 1979),
and the Mellon Foundation (Sant, 1979) all tend to assume
that consumers are rational utility maximizers operating in
a near perfect economic system.

Others (Landsberg, 1979)

recognize the need to reduce structural barriers and pro
vide incentives, but these incentives are still reduceable
to price signals.
According to Barzelay and Iusem (1984), the

neoclas

sical models of

energy consumption, such as the Consumer

Energy Services

Module on which they base their report, as

sume both that consumers will attempt to strike a balance
between their consumption of energy versus non-energy goods
or services which is dependent on their level of income and
that they will choose the energy system that is most likely
to reduce the costs of energy.
ing assumptions:

The model includes underly

that consumers have perfect knowledge

about fuel prices over the next 40 years; that consumers
are able to accurately compare the operating and capital
costs of alternatives; that consumers have all of the in
formation about these alternatives; that consumers are able
to calculate the utility-maximizing function for both the
energy and non-energy services for different levels of in
come; and that they can select a discount rate which will
allow them to compare today's foregone consumption with the
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increased levels of consumption which they will be able to
enjoy in the future {since investments made today can only
bring returns in the future, they must be able to make
utility levels comparable over time) (Barzelay and Iusem,
1984:392) .
What Barzelay and Iusem do in order to compensate for
what they view as extraordinary assumptions is to vary the
values of different assumptions and run scenarios to test
the sensitivity of the model.

While this is insightful, it

still does not really develop the "inner environment" that
the economic behaviorists such as Simons prefer.

It is

still based on economic assumptions that are too seldom
critically examined in the literature.

These include the

ideas that it is rational to conserve, that consumers will
always act in a rational manner, and that the net effect of
these micro-level decisions will be the increased welfare
of the society.
Regarding the first point, Leik and Kolman (1978)
point out that there are some situations where it is ac
tually rational to not conserve.

Specifically, in situa

tions that involve relatively large costs and benefits, if
there is a continual flow of information regarding both
technological change and the introduction of new policies,
and this potential information is quite likely to reduce
the risks associated with decision making, then inaction is
an appropriate response.

They state that "if the utility

of inaction equals the cost of undertaking an action, and
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the costs of inaction equal the loss that occurs if a
crisis arises before some appropriate response has been
chosen, then...the expected utility of waiting will exceed
the expected utility of action" (1978:).
In contrast to the second assumption, consumers do not
always appear to act in a rational manner.

According to

the CONAES report, energy consumption is not strongly
linked to either the level of economic activity or the
standard of living.

But if we are to follow rational

models, we would assume that levels of energy consumption
should be linked to wealth and income.

The marginal utili

ty of savings due to energy consumption should decrease
consistently with increasing levels of income.

In other

words, the poor should be conserving more than the wealthy.
For those with higher incomes, there is less incentive to
conserve since energy costs are a smaller percentage of
disposable income.

Yet we find that in many cases, in

creases in income are associated with increased levels of
energy conservation activity.
Furthermore, while we tend to assume some degree of
elasticity in demand due to price, we find that many other
factors affect decisions.

Higher prices have not neces

sarily driven people from cars to mass transit.

The ease

and comfort as well as the prestige associated with the
automobile have all discouraged the switch.

In addition,

since markets are so unstable, producers are inclined to
create demand.

This leads to more reliable demand.
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Likewise, since continued production is essential, it is
more rational to build in obsolescence.

However, such at

tempts draw us a long way from the original ideas of an in
visible hand which guides production in such a way that the
society's resources are used most efficiently and there is
a maximum of individual and social prosperity.
Finally, some theorists assume that as energy supplies
become scarcer, the rising cost of fuel, associated with
the costs of reducing pollution, will result in a steady
state economy with limited growth.

But when land, air and

water are no longer available in sufficient quantities,
markets incur severe difficulties.

The theories of Locke

or of Smith require unlimited abundance.

The invisible

hand can operate invisibly only so long as the costs asso
ciated with production do not impinge on the common good.
Rational decisions on the micro level can eventually result
in ecological destruction.
Market decisions are also incredibly short sighted.
As Ophuls (1977) illustrates, it is unusual for an economic
decision maker to consider costs and benefits that extend
more than 20 years into the future.
usually discounted to zero.

In fact, these are

Development of energy

resources which will be necessary over the long term are of
no economic interest to rational decision makers.

Further

more, it is actually rational for a businessman to invest
little in the development of alternatives since it is in
his best interest to have people be as dependent upon him
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as possible.

In conditions of extreme scarcity, the price

that the businessman can charge is less limited.

However,

the market does not react well to conditions of extreme
scarcity or when there is a large discrepancy between supp
ly and demand.

In these cases, there is a tendency for the

market to exacerbate inequalities in the distribution of
essential goods.
None of this is to argue that price is not a factor.
But certainly, cost considerations must be associated with
some rather compelling non-cost considerations (Gordon,
1981).

Values, attitudes and information may be more im

portant in the diffusion of solar energy than in other
types of technology.

For example, the major barrier to

passive solar innovation is not cost, since many elements
of the decision involve no cost to builders (Jackson, 1981)
and monthly payments may actually be reduced when both
mortgage payments and monthly energy bills are added to
gether.

Thus, solar appears to be associated with some

overt values implications (Unseld and Crews, 1981).
This leads us, then, to a consideration of the
sociological variables that may be factors in the adoption
process.

Before dealing with the role of values, norms, or

other sociological concepts, let us first turn to an analy
sis of the general characteristics that might identify
adopters.

Price.

There is substantial evidence that material
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incentives can play a major role in influencing behavior.
Winnet (1978) has demonstrated that large monetary rebates
encouraged reduced electrical consumption (by 12%), but
only over the short-term.

The most effective strategy

seemed to be to combine rebates with feedback and a conser
vation strategy.

Similarly, Becker (1978) reports that

there is a joint effect between goal setting and feedback,
with the greatest reduction in consumption occurring among
those who had very difficult goals and feedback.
However, we face a different set of problems in trying
to encourage the adoption of alternatives.

Cunningham and

Lopreato (1977) argue that price considerations are the
major factor influencing energy conservation, especially
among middle and lower income groups.

But it is the per

ception of cost which influences people's willingness to
buy, and this is a complicated variable to attempt to un
derstand .
Certainly the initial cost of a lot of solar equipment
is high.

But pricing considerations must include more than

initial cost.

Long-term savings and tax breaks (credits or

deductions) also influence the overall price.

Boaz-Allen

says that recent owners install solar for economic reasons.
The Solar Energy Research Institute finds that many people
feel that solar can help to save money over the long term
(84%) and that solar helps to reduce monthly utility bills
(82%).

A similar study conducted by SERI (1980) finds that

respondents feel that solar will reduce monthly energy
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bills (85%) and increase the home’s resale value (75%).
All of this would imply that consumers should be en
couraged to purchase solar by virtue of its economic ad
vantages.

But many consumers are not motivated by long

term paybacks.

They are not often motivated to invest a

large sum in a product that has a payback period of 20
years.

They are also discouraged by large initial costs.

An investment of $40 in weather stripping and an investment
of $4,000 in attic insulation may both have the same
payback period, but consumers will be prompted to make the
smaller investment.

The large initial cost of solar fre

quently leads to rejection (Shama, 1981).
To overcome this problem, a variety of tax incentives
have been offered over the years.

However, these have not

proven to be a major factor in adoption.

Marsden (1980)

points out that relatively few home owners have taken ad
vantage of these credits.

SERI found that these tax incen

tives ranked 10th among a general sample of homeowners.
Even among the actual users of solar, only half felt that
tax credits were important.
It is specifically because of these types of problems
that Darley and Beniger (1981) feel that the unassisted op
erations of a free market will not result in a maximization
of conservation behavior.

While people may informally cal

culate potential savings as a function of the interaction
between cost and payback periods, they react very differ
ently to the large variations in capital cost.

They argue
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that one of the major barriers to adoption is the low de
gree of certainty that savings will be obtained coupled
with the fact that the costs must be paid prior to the ac
tual demonstration of savings.
This illustrates the need to disseminate information
regarding cost considerations to the public.

Consumers

cannot try out the innovation for a period before adopting.
Therefore, in order to reduce uncertainty they must rely on
information and the observed success of other adopters.
Let us turn next to these factors.

Norms, Information and Modeling.

Undoubtedly one of

the greatest barriers to the diffusion of energy alterna
tives is the lack of information regarding both costing
techniques (as we saw in the last section) and system per
formance.

Studies seem to demonstrate, however, that the

problem is not that people believe solar systems to be un
reliable.

Rather, they simply do not have sufficient in

formation to come to any conclusion.

In a study by SERI, 1

out of 8 respondents did not know of any use of solar ener
gy.

In other studies, lack of information is usually

listed as the first or second greatest hindrance.
Here we argue that the perceived acceptability of
solar should have an impact on diffusion.

This perception

could very well be the product of exposure —

the extent to

which friends and neighbors are adopting solar.

If solar

is perceived as an acceptable standard of behavior, or is
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regarded as normative, then this should facilitate the
spread of these technologies among later adopters.
The dissemination of information is strongly affected
by communication patterns among individuals.

Darley and

Beniger (1981) argue that interpersonal networks play a
strong role only for early adopters, however, and that
areal diffusion (through modeling) is more important for
later adopters.

Similarly, Shama (1981) feels that the in

novativeness is more important at the early stages, and im
itation is more important later.

In fact, he points out

that most models of market penetration assume that adoption
is a function of the number of previous adopters.
Lowe and Moryadas (1975) point out some of the factors
which affect the communication process.

They argue that

the type of communication which is important may be depen
dent upon the nature of the innovation.

In addition,

people will demonstrate different levels of resistance to
innovations, depending partly on value, attitudinal and
life-style compatibility.

In the latter stages of diffu

sion, which depend more heavily on areal diffusion pat
terns, there is an inverse relationship between distance
and the acceptance of a communication.
tional and cultural

Finally, institu

considerations (e.g., social class)

will affect communication by molding networks and the un
even distribution of population will vary the opportunity
to observe technologies.
The building industry itself may be a barrier to dif-
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fusion.

The industry consists primarily of small con

tractors who tend to be cost-conscious and conservative.
However, there is some indication that they may be using
solar in homes which they build for private investment pur
poses.
fold:

In any case, the impact of the builders is two
they advise consumers regarding the viability of

alternatives and the homes they build serve as models for
later adopters.

For this reason they are a crucial link in

the adoption chain.
Finally, information, no matter how important or in
which direction it heads, is still subject to interpreta
tion by the potential adopter.

Brock and Balloun (1967)

report that experimental subjects were more likely to at
tempt to clear static out of consonant than dissonant in
formation.

Frey and Wicklund, however, say that factors

other than dissonance —

intellectual honesty, curiosity,

usefulness, attractiveness, or confidence —
lective exposure,

may affect se

since selective exposure is the product

of certain prior conditions (such as values, norms and at
titudes), it is to these that we now turn our attention.

Individual Characteristics
Values.

Values, like norms may frequently serve as

incentives or constraints (Shoemaker, 1981).

Many resear

chers have, in fact, argued that values may be more impor
tant in the adoption of energy alternatives than in any
other form of innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1981a, 1981b;
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Warkov, 1981; Unseld and Crews, 1981).

Sparrow (1978)

argues that since early adopters are community leaders,
then psychic satisfaction must act as an incentive.

Unseld

and Crew found that a desire to innovate and self-reliance
were important characteristics of adopters.

Many adopt

solar because it is a clean, safe form of energy and they
believe that use demonstrates social responsibility.
There is also evidence of an interaction between in
novation and life patterns (Darley and Beniger, 1981).
Leonard-Barton (1981b) has used a measure of voluntary
simplicity (the degree to which people indicate performing
a wide variety of conserving behaviors) and found that it
was the second strongest predictor of adoption.
A wide variety of other values may also be correlated
with adoption.

Concerns for independence, family security,

comfort, etc., all seem to be factors.
Cook and Berrenberg (1981) enumerate the variety of
social incentives which can be employed to facilitate con
servation, many of which apply to adoption.

Providing so

cial recognition and approval, seeking public commitments
from individuals, or involving people in group decisions
all facilitate conservation.

To the extent that these con

servation programs entail adopting energy-conserving tech
nologies, all of these apply.

But the provision of ap

proval or social recognition should be a facilitating fac
tor in any case.
Of course, the relationship between values or norms
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and adoption may be mediated by the fact that people are
receiving conflicting signals.

At times they hear that

there is an energy crisis, at other times it no longer
seems to exist.

While there continue to be statements

regarding the diminishing reserves of oil, the world faces
an oil glut.

Thus, the knowledge which people have about

energy issues, the attitudes that people develop, and the
cues that they perceive, should also be related to adop
tion.

Knowledge. Attitudes and Cues.

There is an obvious

paradox with regard to the public's attitude about solar
and the rate of adoption:

the public at large is very pro

solar, yet this promise is not translated into behavior.
Most people like the idea of solar power and favor govern
ment support.

SERI (1980) reports that 2/3 of their

respondents have named solar as one of the top energy
sources of the future, and 1/3 actually say it is the most
preferred.

The Resources for the Future study says that

solar is by far the energy source named most often as the
one the U.S. should rely on by 2000 and a 1979 Roper study
finds that only 16% of the respondents feel that solar will
contribute very little to our energy needs (in Huttman and
Graeven, 1982).
In spite of these favorable attitudes, most people in
dicate that they are not about to adopt alternatives.

They

do not think that it will be widely used in the next 5-10

97

years.

Generally about 4% indicate that they either will

or might purchase solar in the next 3-5 years (Huttman and
Graeven, 1982).
Policies designed to encourage adoption could center
on these considerations.

Drawing on Bandura, the use of

prestigious persons to model conservation behavior should
facilitate this process.

In keeping with the findings of

Ehrlich (presented in Chapter 3), we should also increase
the knowledge that people find necessary for both the
recognition of and the implementation of appropriate behav
iors (Cook and Berrenberg, 1981).

Often, even if people

are aware of actions, they will hesitate to take them if
they feel that they lack competence.

We should also in

crease attempts to minimize the perceived negative con
sequences of adoption (Cook and Berrenberg, 1981).
On the other hand, some studies, especially of conser
vation behaviors, demonstrate a greater correlation between
attitudes and behavior.

In a study of summer electrical

consumption, Seligman and his associates (Becker, et al,
1981) found that attitudes concerning personal health and
comfort, the relationship between effort and payoff, and
the role of the individual in solving our energy problems
account for 55% of the variance in summer electrical con
sumption.

They also conducted two follow-up studies using

these variables (with health and comfort now loading on
separate factors) as well as with attitudes regarding the
legitimacy of the energy crisis, science and technology,
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and family finances.

In the second study of summer elec

trical consumption, 59% of the variance was explained.
However, these same variables accounted for only 18% of the
variance in winter heating.

Surprisingly, the legitimacy

of the energy crisis never seems to be a factor, and family
finances did not contribute to the explanation of winter
heating.
It would seem at first that the difference is probably
due to the fact that one set of studies deals with a behav
ior which does not demand as much sacrifice; that is, elec
trical consumption in the summer is not as much of a con
cern as heat in the winter.

Certainly for some people air

conditioners are extremely important to health and comfort.
But the elasticity of the demand for heat is much lower
than for cooling, so attitudes may not explain much of the
variance.

Yet in another study, Leonard-Barton (1981b)

finds a number of attitudes associated with gas consump
tion:

norms of voluntary simplicity (-.18), beliefs about

the consequences of action (-.11), the belief in an energy
crisis (-.15), and ecological activism (-.16).
This would seem to indicate that a number of mediating
influences must be affecting the relationship between atti
tudes and behavior.

Heberlein and Black (1981) feel that

people who practice non-normative behavior exhibit greater
cognitive consistency.

In their study of lead-free gaso

line users (conducted before federal law required its use),
they found that those who felt a personal obligation and
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believed that lead-free gasoline saved money were the most
likely purchasers.

They also argue that those who exhibit

the greatest consistency between attitudes and behavior
should have the greatest support from others, the most sup
porting beliefs, and the greatest behavioral commitment.
The formation and change of attitudes is enhanced when
these attitudes receive continual confirmation from a vari
ety of sources (Darley and Beniger, 1981).

This points to

a compounding variable in the study of attitudes and behav
ior.

Especially with regard to energy conservation, the

cues which people receive can be contradictory.

Signals

concerning the validity of the energy crisis, the amount of
oil that remains, etc., may cause different reactions
depending on how these cues are received.
If this is true, then people's perception of an im
minent crisis may help to explain adoption.
search results on this topic are mixed.

However, re

Certainly many

people are aware of the seriousness of the energy problem.
In surveys, 40-60% of the respondents generally agree that
the energy problem is a serious one (Olsen, 1981), but they
differ in their interpretation of the causes.

Some see it

as the result of excess demand over supply, others feel it
is due to waste, U.S. dependence on foreign oil, or the
depletion of natural resources.

Demographic correlates of

this belief include education, income and occupation.
But, with the exception of the Leonard-Barton study,
attitudes about the reality of the crisis have little im-
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pact on behavior.

Some studies (e.g. Sears, 1976; Hass,

Bagley and Roger, 1975) find that perceived personal im
pacts are related to conservation actions, but perception
of crisis was not related.

In fact, Hass, et al (1975)

report that in a study of the interaction between the
noxiousness of a potential energy crisis and its perceived
probability of occurrence, intentions to reduce energy con
sumption were affected only by noxiousness.

It should be

pointed out, however, that the third variable which was in
cluded in the theoretical formulation of the study, the
availability of and perceived viability of a coping
response was not included in the final research design.

It

may also be that the perceived seriousness of the energy
crisis must be strengthened by other attitudes:

the aware

ness of the overall ecological situation, felt personal re
sponsibility, favorable attitudes toward the administra
tion, issues of equity, voluntary versus mandatory
measures, or the role of incentives over penalties (Olsen,
1981).
Cook and Berrenberg (1981) point out that attempts to
encourage conservation behavior through attitudes focus on
two approaches:

promoting pro-conservation attitudes

through persuasive communications and evoking attitudeconsistent behaviors.

Persuasive communications depend

upon both the context in which the communication is
received and the characteristics of the recipient.

While

there is obviously a great deal of disagreement over the
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success of such tactics, the development of pro
conservation attitudes may facilitate the effectiveness of
other conservation efforts.
The latter strategy may involve one of a number of ap
proaches.

Adoption may be encouraged by directing atten

tion to conservation actions, by letting people with pro
conservation attitudes know that opportunities are avail
able or that the time is ripe to adopt.

A second approach

would be to make attitudes more salient to behaviors by as
sociation with others or through the public statements of
group leaders.

In either case, the goal is to enhance the

perception of the behavior as normative.

The final ap

proach would be to demonstrate that the adoption is con
sistent with a pro-conservation attitude.
In any event, it is essential that we examine the rel
ative impact of attitudes which are consistent with the be
havior under question, of communications regarding the
viability of the an energy system, and of normative percep
tions.

Situational Characteristics of Adopters

We must first ask whether people who purchase solar
equipment are a distinct group.

In fact, innovators do

differ from the general population on variety of character
istics.

They tend to be younger and from higher socio

economic backgrounds (Shama, 1981).

In terms of household
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income, solar adopters are above average, although there is
a recent evidence of a shift to a more representative fam
ily (Sparrow, 1978).

They are generally from professional-

managerial occupations.

Their educational level is also

above average.
But the important question is not whether solar adop
ters differ from the general population but, rather,
whether they differ in important ways from other new home
purchasers.

Fahrar-Pilgrim (1981) argues that demographic

differences are not great enough to give us a good idea of
who purchases solar.

Warkov (1981), in a Connecticut study

of solar retrofitting, finds that demographics correlate
highly with initial interest but that they explain very
little of the variance in adoption.

Similarly, the Solar

Energy Research Institute (1980) argues that education is
more highly correlated with awareness than with positive
attitudes toward adoption.
Thus, it would seem that the adoption process is not
strongly influenced by situational characteristics.

Still,

we should be sensitized to the possible influences of
demographic characteristics on attitudes and information
networks, while not expecting them to explain a great deal
of the adoption process independently of these other vari
ables .
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An Expanded Model

Table 4.1 presents a summary of the variable which we
should examine based on the discussions of this chapter and
the previous two chapters.

A variety of factors may act to

influence people's decisions.

Here, however, we will split

these up into those factors which were specifically in
volved in the decision, those attitudes and values which
are more characteristics of the individual, and the situa
tional (or demographic) variables which might constrain or
influence a buyer's decision.
FIGURE 4.1
AN EXPANDED MODEL
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Under the category of decision factors, we must first
examine the role of price.
different factors.

This could include a number of

First of all, there is the initial cost

of the energy system to consider.

This could act to en

courage or discourage purchases, but it may well be
mitigated by other factors like the potential for long-term
savings.

Finally, we must also consider the possible ef

fect of tax credits in influencing the potential economic
viability of different energy systems.
Our next consideration is the effect of past experi
ence or habit.

In addition, we have also included the ef

fect of subjective norms —

the perception that the use of

an energy system is acceptable —

as a factor which is

directly taken into consideration with regard to the pur
chase decision.

This variable might be regarded as a char

acteristic of the individual, but because it relies
primarily on the observed freguency of use by other people,
we have decided that it is something over and above indi
vidual characteristics.
Next, we turn to a groups of variables which might be
classified as information and advice.
may come from primary sources —
secondary sources —
salespeople.

Recall that advice

relative and friends —

or

in this case, engineers, builders, and

Information may also be derived from

demonstration homes (which may or may not be established by
salespeople) or from the media —

newspapers and magazines.

Turning to the characteristics of the individual, we
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must be sensitized to the potential role of general atti
tudes about energy.

While Fishbein might argue that these

are not very good at explaining behavioral intent, much of
the literature on energy adoption still sees them as impor
tant.

Specific attitudes —

those about the various types

of energy systems that are available —

should be better

able to help us distinguish between different types of
adopters or nonadopters.
Values which a respondent might hold should also give
us insights into the adoption process.

While not specifi

cally indicators of lifestyle, they should still
demonstrate the general inclinations of adopters or non
adopters .
Knowledge of energy issues should also play a key
role.

Without some awareness of energy, it is not likely

that someone would purchase an alternative energy system.
Finally in this category, many studies of adoption point to
faults of the individual —

dogmatism in particular —

as

slowing or hindering the adoption process.
Our next general category is that of situational or
demographic characteristics.

These may be of two types:

the demographics of the respondent —

age, sex, marital

status, occupation, education, or family income —
as the characteristics of the house —

as well

the year in which

the house was purchased (later for decentralized systems),
the age of the home (younger for active or passive solar
homes) and the size of the home (smaller for solar than for
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traditional homes).

These, then, are the basic categories

of variables which we will examine in subsequent chapters.

Unresolved Issues

Despite the number of studies which have been con
ducted covering all the different aspects of adoption,
there are still a number of unresolved questions.

Unseld

and Crew (1981), in fact, argue that our energy studies
have raised more questions than they have answered.
To a large extent, this is due to methodological and
theoretical shortcomings in this research.

Down and Mohr

(1976) blame the extreme variability in these findings on:
1) variations in the primary attributes of innovations
(i.e., people compare very different types of innovations),
2) interaction effects, 3) ecological inference, and 4)
varying operationalization of innovation.
Roessner (1981) argues:

Similarly,

1) that the narrow range of vari

ables included in any particular study precludes the pos
sibility of comparing the relative influence of these vari
ables, 2) that comparisons of variables cannot be made
across studies since different measure of innovations or
different dependent variables have been employed, and 3)
that since interactive models have not been employed, such
effects remain hidden and hinder attempts to generalize
across studies.

For example, while no theory can predict

the influence that cost will have in particular markets.
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studies have produced a variety of findings.

However, it

is not clear whether the most important factor is first
cost, lack of a warranty, long payback periods, etc.
Many studies rely on self-reports of energy conserving
behaviors, and these always involve methodological prob
lems, especially in trying to relate these self reports to
savings.

People may underreport if they fail to realize

that actions save energy.

At other times, people may rate

high on a scale of reported behaviors by virtue of report
ing a large number of conservation behaviors, all of which
save only small amounts of energy (Olsen, 1981).

This

should not be a serious drawback in some aspects of this
dissertation, since in many cases the behavior is concrete
—

people either have or have not purchased an energy sys

tem.

However, we are asking people to retroactively

reconstruct their thinking regarding why they made their
decisions, and the relative impact of variables can have
changed over the years.
Unseld and Crew (1981) feel that the problems are also
theoretical.

They argue that the major drawback is the

lack of any theoretical framework which can provide the
basis for judging the validity of research results.

They

argue for more empirical knowledge derived from theoreti
cally based research.

Similarly, Shoemaker (1981) argues

that attempts by diffusion researchers to develop broad
classificatory schemes have not led to the development of a
broad, explanatory theory.
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Among the more important of the methodological issues
is the ability to make significant comparisons between
groups on a number of elements.

First of all, we need to

compare adopters of innovations with adopters of tradi
tional technologies rather than with only the general pub
lic.

Secondly, we need to be able to compare adopters of

different types of alternatives.

There will probably be

different motivational considerations between people who
adopt wood versus those who adopt active or passive solar,
for example.

Finally, we should also be able to compare

those who think about adopting alternatives but decide
against adoption with those who decide to adopt and with
those who have never considered adoption in order to filter
out motivational considerations as well as incentives and
disincentives (Labay and Kinnear, 1981).

Implications for Research

These methodological approaches should also enable us
to resolve some important theoretical issues which remain
unanswered by virtue of our inability to compare groups
across studies.

First of all, do groups differ in their

subjective expectations regarding the outcome of adoption
(price, values) or in the sources of those expectations
(information, modeling)?

Do these variables seem to be ei

ther more relevant or more influential in decisions reached
by adopters of different types of innovations?
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Secondly, do adopters differ in any of a number of
other characteristics?
posure vary?

Does the amount of normative ex

That is, do people who see these systems work

for their neighbors or friends tend to be more likely to
adopt?

Do adopters of different technologies differ in any

significant ways in demographic characteristics?
Finally, since the perspective presented in this dis
sertation emphasizes the importance of interaction effects,
we should be able to answer some important theoretical
questions.

Why are people initially motivated to consider

the adoption of innovations?

Does the perception of crisis

play an important role in motivation?

More importantly,

while attitudes do not seem to have a direct impact on
adoption, do they have an indirect effect either through
sensitizing people to cues or be mediating the impact of
demographic variables?
In the following chapter, the basic methodological de
sign of the dissertation will be presented and some
preliminary questions will be addressed.

In Chapter 5 we

will begin to see how well the variables which we have in
cluded in this study can explain the rates of adoption.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY
Introduction
There are numerous methodological issues which must be
addressed in this research.

First, there is the problem of

deciding who should be sampled in order to make the compar
isons mentioned in the previous chapter.

More importantly,

there is the need to design a survey which will yield valu
able information rather than simply replicate previous re
search.

While the latter approach certainly leads to in

creased reliability of questions and increased validity of
findings, if they do not expand upon our knowledge they
seem to be less valuable.
In this chapter we will first examine the sample de
sign.

Following this, we will look at the construction of

the questionnaire and see how the model is operationalized
in this study.

Sample Design

The first step in the design of the sample was to
select the population to be sampled.

This dissertation is

designed as an exploratory study geared toward determining
the viability of the theoretical model presented earlier by
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comparing groups of people who do or do not adopt specifictypes of energy systems for their homes.

Because of this,

the obvious choice for a population to sample was homeown
ers rather than the general public.

Due to financial con

straints, the survey population was limited to the state of
New Hampshire.

The survey was distributed in 1984.

Two major criteria determined the specific process
which was employed in selecting the actual cases to be
sampled.

First of all, the sample was designed in a way

that allows it to represent as closely as possible the con
ceptual universe.

Secondly it was designed to facilitate

the analysis which is to be conducted (Wilier, 1968).
The simplest way to meet the first criteria is through
random sampling.

However, simple random sampling neces

sitates the identification of all of the elements in the,
population.

In order to make this sample more cost effi

cient, a cluster sample was employed.

While this intro

duces the possibility of a much larger sampling error, it
has the advantage of allowing the researcher to concentrate
efforts on fewer geographic regions and the cluster can be
designed on the basis of readily available information
(Jaeger, 1984; Kalton, 1983).
The simplest means of identifying a sample of
homeowners in the state is through town tax records.

The

primary sampling unit selected was counties, 10 of which
are designated in the state.

The sample size was limited

to 500 due to the cost considerations mentioned above.

The
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decision was made to sample the counties in proportion to
their size in order to obtain as representative a sample as
possible.
Because New Hampshire is such a small state, the pro
portion of people found in cities is very high.

Ten

cities, accounting for 30% of the states 386,381 households
(according to 1980 census data) were therefore designated
as a certainty sample.

150 of the 500 surveys were dis

tributed to these 10 cities in proportion to their size.
The selection of the remaining cities and towns was
conducted in a random manner.

First, a cumulative listing

of the number of households in each city was compiled for
each county.

The number of cities or towns (the secondary

sampling unit) to be selected in each of the counties was
based on the percentage of the total households located in
that county.

Since ten names were to be drawn from each

town, the total number of cities in each county was
determined by the total number of households to be sampled
in that county.
For example, Belknap County has 24,004 households, or
9% of the state's total.

Since there were 250 question

naires to be distributed, Belknap County would receive 31.
This meant that we would sample three towns in Belknap
County.

The towns were selected by first constructing a

cumulative list.

The sampling interval (S) was chosen by

dividing the number of households by 3 (8001).

Using a

random start (R=5306), the first town to be selected was

113

the town where the 5306th household was located.

The sec

ond town was determined by adding the sampling interval to
the random start (5306 + 8001 = 13307).

Other towns were

selected in a similar manner (r+s, r+2s, r+3s...) until the
total number of towns in the county were identified.

Indi

vidual households were then randomly selected from property
tax lists in each of the towns throughout the state.
Unfortunately, a random sample of homeowners is not
likely to turn up enough people who have adopted alterna
tive energy systems to allow for significant comparisons.
For this reason, a second batch of surveys was mailed to a
subset of people who were identified as adopters of altern
atives through letters sent to solar builders and archi
tects throughout the state.

This subset amounted to 149,

making the total number of questionnaires mailed 649.
Of this total, 189 people participated in the survey.
This gives us an overall response rate of 29%.

Of course,

149 of the potential respondents were people who had been
identified as adopters.

Of these 149 people, 72 of them

(49%) chose to participate in the study.

This number con

stitutes 36% of the total number of respondents.

Questionnaire Construction

Dependent Variables
Adopters.

The first step was to identify those people who

had actually purchased some form of energy system as their
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primary source of heat.

Respondents were asked to name

their primary source of heat (oil, coal, gas, wood, solar,
etc.) and to give a description (forced hot air, forced hot
water, etc.).

As a check against misunderstanding, respon

dents were also asked to estimate the amount of heat which
comes from this source.

These responses are tabulated in

Table 5.1.
According to the 1980 census, based on a sample of the
state we would expect to find 43% of households would be
using oil.

In our survey, oil represents 37% of the sys

tems in all households.

Natural gas, which according to

the census is found in 32% of homes, is employed by only 6%
of our respondents.

Similarly, electric heat would be

found in 21% of all households and here is limited to only
11%.

Conversely, wood, which should be found in about 4%

of all homes, and other forms of heat, which were expected
to be in insignificant numbers, here make up 34% and 11%
respectively (if we total all alternatives together).
These differences are due to the fact that we specifically
sought out owners of these alternatives.

Thus they would

make up a higher proportion of the respondents than the
random sample in the census found.
Following this we had to identify which of these
people were to be classified as adopters.

Pre-tests of the

questionnaire had demonstrated that just because people
owned an energy system did not mean that they had actually
made a decision to purchase this for their home.

If they
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TABLE 5.1

ADOPTERS/NONADOPTERS BY TYPE OF
PRIMARY HOME HEATING SOURCE

ADOPTERS
Built-in
Installed
14
11
1
2
1
11
5
1

Oil
Coal
Electric
Natural Gas

NONADOPTERS
Acquired
45
0
8
5

Total
70
3
20
11

Wood
Passive Solar
Active Solar
Wood and Oil
Active and Passive
Wood and Solar

16
7
3
1
1
3

47
0
0
2
2
1

1
0
0
0
0
1

64
7
3
3
3
5

Total

59

70

60

189

had not made the decision, then they cannot be classified
as adopters.
To solve this predicament, all respondents were asked
to check which of three statements applied to them:

1) Did

they have the system built into the design of the house, 2)
Was the system installed after the house was purchased, or
3) was the house simply acquired with the system already
installed.

For each situation, they were also asked to

give the year of the purchase (which in situation 1 or 3
would be the year that the house was purchased).
Persons who responded in the affirmative to either
question 1 or 2 have been classified as adopters.

These

respondents made a conscious decision to purchase an energy
system.

It is possible that the type of energy system

which is already found in a home that people purchase may
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act to influence those decisions, but that is not generally
a determining factor in those purchases.

It would seem to

be most important for those people who purchase solar
homes, but only one solar owner fell into this category.
Respondents were further classified as adopters of ei
ther centralized or decentralized energy systems depending
on their previous description of their primary energy sys
tem.

Those who has actually adopted oil, coal, natural

gas, or electric heat have been designated as centralized
adopters.

As discussed in Chapter 1, while the distribu

tion networks of some of these energy forms may be
decentralized, the manufacture and, especially, the pricing
of these sources is fairly centralized, especially in com
parison to wood or active and passive solar systems.
Returning to Table 5.1, we see the distribution of
these categories.

Those individuals who either had some

form of energy system built into the design of the house or
installed after the home was built are classified as adop
ters (N = 129).

Those who acquired their house with a sys

tem already installed are seen here as non-adopters (N =
60).

These adopters are further subdivided into central

ized adopters (above the line, N = 46) or decentralized
adopters (below the line, N = 83).

Aware non-adopters.

The best way to identify the var

iables which actually discourage the purchase of decentral
ized energy systems is to compare those who decide against
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the purchase with those who actually make the purchase.
So, we also asked people whether or not they had seriously
considered the purchase of a decentralized energy system,
either wood, active or passive solar, windmills, or
photovoltaics.

If they had seriously considered such a

system, we then asked them to answer a series of questions
(see below) for the system that they had most seriously
considered.

These respondents are labeled aware non

adopters.
For purposes of this dissertation, we will have isola
ted only two groups of aware nonadopters: those who consid
ered solar alternative and those who considered wood alter
natives.

These comparisons make the most sense because we

can then compare them with solar adopters and wood adop
ters, both of which are subcategories of all decentralized
adopters.

In terms of our attempts to understand what

might discourage adoption, it makes more sense to compare
people who have considered and rejected an alternative with
those who actually purchase it than it does to compare
adopters with some general category of people who have
never gone through the same type of decision process.

For

example, wood adopters probably talk to different people
than solar adopters, look for information in different
places, etc.
Among our respondents, we have 17 people who have
adopted some form of solar energy (active or passive solar,
active and passive combined, and wood and solar combined).
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We will compare these 17 people with all of the people
(other than these 17) who thought about but rejected a
solar system of some sort (photovoltaics, solar hot water,
passive solar, or a greenhouse).
tains 65 people.

This latter group con

Our other dependent variable will include

all of those people who indicated that they had purchased
some form of wood heat (70) compared to those who thought
about wood but decided not to adopt (23) and were not in
the category of wood adopters.

Unaware Nonadopters.

Finally, it might also be in

formative to compare adopters with nonadopters.

Here we

will first compare all of our nonadopters (59) with all of
our adopters (111).

We lose a few people from our total

number of respondents because in order to construct the
variable it was necessary to select from two separate vari
ables, and some of the respondents were missing in one or
the other.

For example, someone who might have been an

adopter might not have answered the question that asked
whether or not they had ever considered a decentralized
alternative.

For this reason, in any of the analyses, they

would be dropped as missing, even though they had answered
the question about the type of energy system they had pur
chased. If we examine a cross tabulation of these two vari
ables (Table 5.2), we can see that there were 72 people who
never considered a decentralized system and 98 people had
considered it at some point.
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TABLE 5.2

BREAKDOWN OF ADOPTERS/NONADOPTERS BY
CONSIDERED/DID NOT CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE

Nonadopter

Adopter

Did Not Consider
1

25

47

| 72

1

34

64

| 98

59

111

170

Considered Alternative

We can also use this table to sort out those people
who would be identified as unaware nonadopters —

those

respondents who have never purchased and never thought
about purchasing a decentralized energy system.

Such

people would be classified as unaware nonadopters.

In

Table 5.2 we see that the number of people who fit this
category is only 25.
people,

While this is a limited number of

we can still make adequate comparisons with solar

and wood adopters.
Another way of summarizing these breakdowns is evident
in the tree presented in Figure 5.1.

Beginning at the top

of the table, we see that we started out with 189 respon
dents.

Of that number, 128 were adopters and 61 were non

adopters.

We can further break the adopters down into 45

people who adopted a centralized system and 83 who adopted
a decentralized system.

The 83 decentralized adopters can

be further broken down into 17 solar adopters and 70 who
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Figure 5.1
SUMMARY BREAKDOWN OF ALL RESPONDENTS

Total
N=189

Nonadopters
N=61 (4)

Adopters
N=128 (4)*

Centralized Decentralized
N = 4 5 (1)
N= 8 3 (1)

Solar**
N=17 (2,5)

Aware Solar Aware Wood Unaware
N=47(2)
N=23(3)
N=24(5,6)

Wood**
N=70 (3,6)

* Numbers in parentheses indicate the comparison in which
this group is used.
**Four cases (combined wood/solar) are included in both of
these comparisons.

purchased wood.

(There are actually 4 respondents who

adopted a wood/solar combination.

They have been included

in both comparisons, since the comparison groups are total
ly separate and these two groups are never compared to each
other.)
Our aware nonadopters (those who thought about some
decentralized alternative but subsequently decided not to
adopt) are drawn from either the adopters or the non
adopters (i.e., they may or may not have subsequently pur
chased some system other than the one under consideration).
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We see in Figure 5.1 that there are 47 people who consider
ed solar and did not adopt.

These people will be compared

to those who did adopt some form of solar.

There are also

23 respondents who considered adopting wood and then de
cided against the purchase.

These people will be compared

with those who purchaed wood systems.

All of this leaves

us with only 24 people who have never thought about adopt
ing any form of decentralized system and also never pu r 
chased any centralized system.
We need to look now at the independent variables which
we will be using to search for differences between these
groups.

Let us turn to these variables as they were pre

sented in our model.

Independent Variables

Situational Variables.

Much of the design of the

questionnaire was rather straight-forward.

Because there

is such a marked relationship between demographic variables
and the belief in an energy crisis, the beginning of the
survey asked respondents to answer a series of demographic
questions. Age has been coded as a continuous variable.
Sex has been coded as a nominal variable (0 = male, 1 = fe
male).

Similarly, marital status is a dummy variable (0 =

married, 1 = not currently married).

Education ranges from

8 through 15 (13 = some college, 14 = BA/BS, 15 = some
graduate school).

Duncan SEI is derived from a description
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TABLE 5.3

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

NON-MISSING
RANGE
N
LOWER UPPER
AGE..................
SEX
MARITAL STATUS......
EDUCATION
DUNCAN SEX..........
FAMILY INCOME.......
HOUSE A G E
HOUSE SIZE...........
YEAR PURCHASED......

188
188
188
187
157
179
189
188
187

27
0
0
8
15
1
1
3
41

81
1
1
15
96
12
225
15
83

MEAN

STDEV

48.46 13.29
.31
.16
13.78
1.34
60.11 19.87
6.69
2.34
39.63 50.05
7.27
1.96
72.89
8.39

of their occupation as coded in the Duncan socio-economic
index.

Income is a categorical variable that has been de

veloped by breaking down the reported income of each member
of the family according to the following scale: 0 to 6,000
= 1; 6,001 to 12,000 = 2; 12,001 to 18,000 = 3; 18,001 to
24.000 = 4; 24,001 to 36,000 = 5; 36,000 to 48,000 = 6;
48.000 to 72,0000 = 7 ; and 72,001 and up = 8.

Family in

come has been derived by adding the scores for the respon
dent and the respondent's spouse together, giving a poten
tial score of 1 to 16.
In addition, respondents were asked to answer a few
questions regarding their home: the year in which it was
purchased (only the last two digits of the year have been
used, thus 69 = 1969), the approximate age of the house,
and the house size (number of rooms).
continuous variables.

All of these are

The descriptive statistics are pre
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sented in Table 5.3.
The median age of the respondents to this study is 45.
This seems quite high in comparison to the median age for
the state, which in the 1980 Census was 30.1.

This is un

derstandable to some extent since the survey was sent only
to homeowners who would tend, on average, to be older than
renters.
Most of the other characteristics are not so readily
comparable to the census data.

The median education for

the state (people 25 years and older) is 12.6 years.

In

this study, where the youngest respondent is 22, the median
years of education is 14.

This means that we have a some

what more educated sample, but that would tend to be the
case with a mailed survey, especially one that was limited
to homeowners.
The median family income for the state is $22,132.
The data in the survey were coded on a scale, the median of
which is 7.

This would correspond to much higher income

level (in the range of 36,000 to as high as 72,000 and
above).

One might also expect that this would be the case,

since homeowners will tend to have higher than average in
comes, but this factor combined with the higher education
would lead us to conclude that this sample is a higher
class segment of the population than we might expect to
find in a truly random sample of the entire population.
This is also borne out in the analysis of the homes.
The median number of rooms in the state is 5.2.

Here we
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find that houses are larger, with a median of 7.0.

Given

the higher incomes, we might expect larger houses.

On the

other hand, passive solar homes, especially those of post
and beam construction, tend to have fewer rooms and more
open space for air to circulate well from room to room.

A

better indicator might have been square footage, but data
of this type are usually much more difficult for people to
obtain.

Similarly, data on house values, subject to dif

fering appraisals, etc., is difficult to obtain and com
pare.
Those respondents who indicated that they had made an
active decision to adopt were then asked to respond to a
series of questions about what factors were important in
helping them to arrive at their decision.

It is to these

questions that we now turn.

Decision Factors

People attempting to make the best decisions they can
under difficult circumstances may take a wide variety of
factors into consideration.

Here, people were asked to in

dicate not only whether a certain factor entered into their
decision but also the degree and the direction of that in
fluence (i.e., whether these variables encouraged or dis
couraged their purchase).

This was an intended to com

pensate for what was perceived to be a serious flaw in pre
vious studies.

Most of the studies of this type will at
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tempt to discover whether or not people who adopt an in
novation were influenced by certain variables.

However,

this influence may be either positive or negative.

Fre

quently a second set of questions is designed to determine
if people approve or disapprove of different types of in
centives.

A comparison of responses among people who adopt

specific alternatives is then made in order to determine
whether incentives tend, on the average, to encourage or
discourage adoption.
In this study, such a comparison was made in only one
step and the effect of these decision factors can be tied
more readily to adoption.

The range of these variables is

from 1 to 5 (1 = very discouraging, 5 = very encouraging).
Respondents were given the option of saying that a variable
has no impact.
neutral (3).

Such responses have been coded here as
This is a subjective interpretation and it

may be seen as an arbitrary means of coding this variable.
However, it is probably no less arbitrary than to attempt
to break the variable down into a nominal variable, coding
discouraging as 0 and encouraging as 1.

In the latter

case, there would still be a subjective decision regarding
how to classify the no impact response.

Not only is the

method chosen as reliable as any other, it helps to
preserve more of the original data.

The (non-missing)

responses to these factors are presented in Table 5.4.

For

purposes of discussion, we shall break these variables down
into groups of similar variables.
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TABLE 5.4

ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF
DECISION VARIABLES

DISCOURAGING NEUTRAL ENCOURAGING
Some
Some
Very what
what Very TOTAL
Initial Cost.........
3.3 15.0 22.5
25.8 33.3 99.9%
(N=120)
3.3
2.5 11.7
Long-term Savings....
20.8 61.7 100.0
(N=120)
6.1
2.6 69.6
13.0
Tax Credits..........
8.7 100.0
(N=115)
Owned One Before.....

0.8

0.0

71.2

12.7

Relative Owned One....

0.0

3.5

57.5

22.1

Relative's Advice....

0.0

4.5

57.1

23.2

Salesperson1s Advice..

1.8

0.0

79.6

15.9

Engineer1s Advice....

0.0

0.9

73.0

15.7

Builder's Advice.....

0.0

1.8

73.0

10.8

Demonstration Home....

0.9

0.0

87.5

8.0

Newspapers............

0.0

3.7

46.8

34.9

15.3 100.0
(N=118)
16.8 99.9
(N=113)
15.2 100.0
(N=112)
2.7 100.0
(N=113)
10.4 100.0
(N=115)
14.4 100.0
(N=lll)
3.6 100.0
(N=109)
14.7 100.1
(N=109)

Price Factors
Three variables are concerned primarily with price:
the initial cost, the long-term savings, and the tax
credits.

Cunningham and Lopreato (1977) have argued that

price is a major factor, especially among low and middle
income purchasers.

Similarly, Boaz-Allen says that recent

owners install for economic reasons.

But we felt here that

price should be examined in different ways.

Shama (1981)

says that it is high first cost that leads to rejection.

127

According to this data, the vast majority of people found
this factor to be either encouraging (59.1%) or neutral
(27%).

This is to be somewhat expected since these people

actually adopted the energy system that they considered.
What is interesting, however, is that so many people would
actually adopt an energy system that they found discourag
ing because of its large initial cost (18.5%).
Darley and Beniger say that people may informally cal
culate the potential savings prior to adoption and that
this perceived savings is an important consideration in
their purchase.

Here, only 5.8% were discouraged by the

possibility of long-term savings (or the lack of long-term
savings).
Tax credits have never been a very important factor.
The SERI study found that it only ranked 10th among adop
ters of solar equipment, and that only 1/2 of their respon
dents thought that it was important.

Similarly, Marsden

(1980) says that relatively few homeowners have taken ad
vantage of these credits.

Here we see that for nearly 70%

of those who actually adopt some system, tax breaks had no
impact.

When they do have an impact, it is more often en

couraging (21.7%) than discouraging (8.7%).

Norms and Habits
People need detailed, first-hand experience.

For that

reason, we decided to see how many people had purchased an
energy system because they had owned one before.

The
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largest response is for those who people who say that hav
ing owned one before had no real impact on their decision
(44.4%), which, of course, is not to say that they had not
owned one previously.

Again, when it does play a role, it

tends to be encouraging (28% of the total, 97% of the non
neutral responses).

Of course we would not expect people

to adopt an energy system that they were unhappy with in
the past.
We defined norms earlier as expected patterns of be
havior.

Those behaviors which are most often observed and

which are enforced through positive and negative sanctions
will become accepted as standards.

Models of market pene

tration assume that the probability of adoption at time T
is a function of the number of previous adopters (Shama,
1981b).

Lowe and Moryadas state that the uneven distribu

tion of the population varies the opportunities to observe
successful adoptions.

In this study we have two different

measures of normative perception.

First of all, Table 5.4

gives us the impact of the ownership by relatives of sys
tems similar to those which had been purchased by the
respondent.

This is our variable Relative Owned.

We have also been able to develop a measure of the
number of adopters that our respondents may know, but we
are not able to tell whether or not they knew them prior to
making a decision about their own energy systems.

To

measure the degree of normative exposure, respondents were
asked how many people they knew who owned certain types of
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energy systems, including photovoltaics, solar hot water,
passive solar homes, greenhouses, windmills or wood stoves.
This set of responses posed more problems than other
variables in the study.
ses were ambiguous:

First of all, many of the respon

"many", "lots", "everybody I know".

These responses have been given the mean score of all
responses.
The next difficulty was the extreme outliers of the
responses: 1000, 2000, etc.

In order to deal with these

scores, a new variable was created for each of the six
types of energy systems by taking the log of the variable.
By adding together these logged variables, we have created
a new variable which we shall call TOTAL EXPOSURE.

The

mean values of these logged responses and the newly created
variable are reported in Table 5.5.

Information
Lack of information is usually the 1st or 2nd greatest
hindrance to adoption.

According to our model as well as

previous research, we must also recognize that information
can come from a variety of networks.

Darley and Beniger

point out that decisions are affected by interpersonal
networks.

We see these as being of two types, those that

reflect input from primary reference groups versus those of
secondary groups.

Lowe and Moryadas say that the type of

contact depends on the nature of the innovation.
shall just consider all adopters.

Here we
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TABLE 5.5

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR
EXPOSURE VARIABLES

NON-MISSING
RANGE
N
LOWER UPPER
0
14
Photovotaics......
6.66
0
3.00
Solar hot water....
0
94
3.40
Passive solar home.
0
2.49
Greenhouse........
0
7.60
Wood stove........
0
1.61
Windmill..........
189
0
TOTAL EXPOSURE....
7.61

MEAN
.81
.72
.76
.72
2.64
.25
2.82

STDEV
1.75
.79
.78
.73
1.22
.47
1.26

To measure the impact of primary groups, we asked
people what influence relatives had on their decision, ei
ther through the advice that relatives gave them or through
their experiences with similar systems (Relative Owned
One).

Returning to Table 5.4, we find once again that in

the majority of cases this was not a factor (57.1% and
57.5% respectively).

On the other hand, the advice that

relatives gave them and the experiences that they had were
never very discouraging.

In fact, they tended to be en

couraging to about the same degree in both cases.

You

might expect these to fluctuate together since the advice
that the relative's give should coincide with the experi
ences that they have with these systems.

On the other

hand, such an expectation assumes that these relatives are
always happy with the energy systems that they are using.
Certainly, that would seem to be the case based on this
data, but it is an empirical question that can only be ex
amined by looking at both of these variables together.

131

What we have referred to here as secondary group in
formation can come from a variety of resources: builders,
engineers, salespeople, demonstration homes, or newspapers.
The building industry may often be a barrier.

Builders are

likely to want to build the sort of homes that they are
used to building, which means that they will tend to recom
mend traditional systems.

In this survey, the advice of

builders usually had no impact (73%).
(1.8%) was it a negative factor.
cases it was encouraging.

In only 2 cases

In another 25.2% of the

It would seem from this that

most people have made decisions prior to talking to builder
or, if the home is already built, without talking to a
builder or contractor.
On the other hand, the advice of both salespeople and
engineers, the obvious alternatives to builders, was also
overwhelmingly neutral, as was the last category that might
be included with the building trades, demonstration homes.
As with other variables, when they do have an impact it
tends to be encouraging.

On the other hand, they either

offer a lot of contradictory evidence and are thus d i s 
counted or they simply do not enter into people's decisions
at an early enough point to really affect their considera
tions .
The final variable in this category is newspapers.
Here we find more evidence of an impact, and one which
again is overwhelmingly positive when it enters into deci
sions.

It was encouraging for 49.6% of the respondents and
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neutral for another 46.8%.

Individual Characteristics

Attitude Variables.

All of the respondents were next

asked to answer a series of questions designed to determine
their attitudes about a variety of energy issues.

These

questions (see Table 5.6) fell into a few broad categories:
the degree to which people favored solar power, the percep
tion of an energy crisis, the degree to which people feel
personally affected, the types of solutions that people
felt were viable, and the degree of support for the govern
ment’s policies.

Table 5.6 gives the adjusted (non

missing) responses to these questions.
As stated before, many people tend to think favorably
of solar power.

Huttman and Graeven state that 2/3 of the

general public think that solar is one of our top energy
sources.
source.

1/3 even say that it is the most preferred energy
They like it for homes and they tend to favor gov

ernment support.
Here we find support for these earlier findings.

We

have tried, however, to itemize some of the characteristics
of solar power in order to find our what it is that they
find appealing and what might lead them to be disillusioned
with this energy source.

First of all, our respondents

seem to find solar to be a viable alternative.

People dis

agree with the statements that solar will not contribute to
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TABLE 5.6

ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF
ATTITUDE RESPONSES

Disagree Neutral
Agree
Very Some
Some Very
much what
what much
BIG INVESTMENT:The biggest
problem with solar power is
that it requires such a
large initial investment

7.6

8.1

9.3

44.2

30.1
(N=172)

SOLAR NO HELP:Solar power will
never make a significant
contribution to our energy
needs......................... 52.5

28.7

8.3

6.6
3.9
(N=181)

SCIENCE HELPS:
Scientists
will be able to develop new
forms of energy before we
have another crisis..........

27.0

32.5

20.2

13.5
6.1
(N=163)

TOO MECHANICAL: Only people
with a lot of mechanical
ability should own a solar
h o m e ..........................

61.2

24.2

6.7

6.7
1.1
(N=178)

C A N ’T MEET ENDS: Energy
prices make it extremely
difficult for my family to
make ends meet................ 35.3

17.6

16.6

18.2 12.3
(N=187)

SOON OBSOLETE:The solar
technology now on the market
will probably be obsolete in
5-10 years

17.6

23.3

29.6 18.2
(N=159)

USE AS AFFORDABLE:People should
be allowed to use as much
energy as they canafford
47.3

17.4

11.4

11.4 12.5
(N=184)

TOO COLD:While solar homes are
great for warm, sunny climates,
it is too cold and cloudy for
them where I live............ 46.1

25.3

11.2

9.6
7.9
(N=178)

11.3

NUKES SAFE:While some may dis
agree, I think that nuclear pow
er is safe and we should be put
ting even more money into it... 47.3
6.5 9.8
16.3 20.1
_______________________________________________________ (N=184)

134

TABLE 5.6 {continued)

ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF
ATTITUDE RESPONSES

Disagree Neutral
Agree
Very Some
Some Very
much what
what much
NO SHORTAGES:We need not worry
about future energy shortages
because America has a wide
variety of resources......... 67.8

20.8

6.6

2.7
2.2
(N=183)

RAISE TAXES:The government
should place higher taxes on
gas and oil in order to
discourage consumption.......

21.9

16.9

12.0
4.9
(N=183)

44.3

DOUBLE SOLAR FUNDS:The govern
ment should immediately begin
to at least double its funding
for solar research and
development
8.2

7.7

14.3

22.5 46.2
(N=182)

ENOUGH OIL:This country still
has plenty of oil, we just
need to find it............... 49.7

26.6

10.7

9.5
3.6
(N=169)

STOP NUKES:We should immediately
put a stop to the building of
all nuclear power plants..... 38.3

11.1

12.2

10.0 28.3
(N—180)

SHORTAGE INEVITABLE:Another
energy shortage seems to be
almost inevitable..............

10.9

18.9

38.9 26.3
(N=175)

5.1

our energy needs (81.2%). And they do not think that it is
too cold where they live for solar to be practical (71.4%
disagree).
On the other hand, we must ask some questions about
how much trust they have in the systems.

Shama says that-

people do not necessarily find systems unreliable.

In this
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study we see that people tend to disagree that only mechan
ical people should own a solar home (59.5%).

Darley and

Beniger, on the other hand, say that the experimental na
ture of the technology leads people to question its
viability.

Here we find that a large number (47.8%) feel

that the technology now on the market will soon be ob
solete.
Finally, we must explore people's opinions about cost
considerations.

Again, Darley and Beniger sensitize us to

the fact that perceived savings are important.

This study

indicates that people believe that solar requires a large
initial investment (74.3%).

This and the concerns about

the technology would appear to be the biggest deterrents to
adoption.

These ideas, which we shall explore more fully

in later sections (especially the issue of initial cost),
may point to a need for more information (Shama, 1981a).
We must also see if there is some way to change this
generally positive support for solar power into a more ac
tive support.
existence of a

One way might be to convince people of the
crisis.

Becker says that the perceived

legitimacy of the crisis is important.

Similarly, Leonard-

Barton and Rogers correlate the perception of a crisis with
the amount of gas consumed.

Here, though, we find that

people already tend to think that there is a serious prob
lem.

The majority disagree that we have plenty of oil

(76.3%) and that there is no problem because we have so
many resources (88.6%).

Furthermore, they tend to agree
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(65.2%) that another shortage is inevitable.

This would

tend to undermine Shoemaker's assumption that people are
getting confusing signals about the energy crisis, the
amount of oil, etc. and to provide support for Olsen's
statement that most people are already aware of the
seriousness of the problem. But we find that this is not
enough to translate their support into action.
Another factor might be the extent to which they sup
port the government's policies.
against nuclear power.
is safe.

We find here that they are

71.4% disagree that nuclear power

But they certainly do not want to put an immedi

ate stop to the building on nuclear plants (49.4% dis
agree) .

Furthermore, they would like to see the funding of

solar research doubled (68.7%).
Becker says that the degree of belief in science and
technology as a solution to our problems helps to explain
the amount of electrical consumption.

If people think that

science will solve our problems they are more likely to
continue on their old paths now.

Here

we find that they

do not see science as a solution (59.5% disagree that
science helps).

This is in contrast to their belief that

the government should double the amount of solar funding,
which would seem to imply that research and development ef
forts would lead to success.
Perhaps the best explanation of why general support is
not translated into action is that people do not feel per
sonally affected by the perceived crisis.

Hass, Bagley,
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and Rogers argue that it is not the perceived seriousness
of the problem but the anticipated personal inconvenience
which is important in explaining people's behavior.

In

this study we find that people do not think that things are
so bad that they can't make ends meet (52.9% disagree). And
they do not favor actions by the government which would
make things more difficult for them.

Most (66.2%) disagree

that the government should raise taxes to discourage con
sumption.

Similarly, many (47.8%) feel that people should

be able to use as much energy as they can afford.
We are left, then, with a need to consider why people
might be inclined toward the adoption of alternatives such
as solar and yet fail to make a commitment to purchase an
alternative system.

Two partial explanations may be indi

cated by these preliminary findings:

they believe that

solar is too costly and the technology is tentative.
Due to the large number of variables that were in
cluded in this section, we also decided to factor analyze
these variables to see if any of them would cluster togeth
er in ways other than we had originally intended.

Using

SPSS with an oblique rotation, we found that there were a
few underlying factors that seem to make sense and which
were also distinctly different at times from the way that
we had originally designed the questions.

The rotated pat

tern matrix appears in Table 5.7.
The first four of these factors seem to go together
theoretically.

In Factor 1 we find 3 variables which would
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appear to deal with attitudes toward the viability of solar
power and one variable which deals with solutions to our
energy problems.

Since the last variable does not seem to

make any theoretical sense and since it loads on this fac
tor much less heavily than the other three variables, we

TABLE 5.7
ROTATED PATTERN MATRIX FOR
ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

SOLAR NO HELP
DOUBLE SOLAR FUNDS
TOO COLD
USE AS AFFORDABLE
SOON OBSOLETE
TOO MECHANICAL
BIG INVESTMENT
NO SHORTAGES
ENOUGH OIL
SHORTAGE INEVITABLE

FAC 1
.80
-.63
.62
.45
.31
-.30

FAC 2

FAC 4

FAC 5

.33
.70
.60
.58

.32
-.34

FAC 3

.32

-.47
-.72
-.71
.36

STOP NUKES
NUKES SAFE
RAISE TAXES
SCIENCE HELPS
CAN’T MEET ENDS

.93
-.91
-.32

have opted to exclude it from this factor.

.33

.79
-.57
-.52

By reversing

the coding on the variable Double Solar Funds and adding
these three variables together, we have developed a new
variable which we shall refer to in subsequent analyses as
NOSOLAR. It has a range of 3 to 15.
The second factor might not appear at first glance to
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make theoretical sense.

Certainly the variables do not

cluster together in the way that we had anticipated.

The

first two of the variables deal with the technology of
solar power while the final variable was designed to
measure price considerations.

However, the initial invest

ment may appear to be large because of the tenuous nature
of the technology.

These variables also seem to load on

this factor to about the same degree, so we have added them
together creating another variable which we shall call
TOOTECHY.
In Factor 3 we find three variables which would appear
to be concerned with the seriousness of the energy crisis.
The first two of these variables deal with whether or not
people think that there are enough energy resources for us
to survive.
factor.

Both of these questions load heavily on this

We might also assume that the third variable would

be included in this factor, since it seems to theoretically
cluster with the other two.

However, it does not load

heavily on this factor (or any other factor) and does not
meet any minimum criteria for inclusion.
together the first two variables —
Oil —

Thus, we will add

No Shortage and Enough

to create a new variable called PLENTY.

Factor 4 is the most obvious of the group.
the variables deal with nuclear power.

Both of

Here we have

reversed the order of Nukes Safe and created a variable
called NONUKES.
The last factor creates some problems.

They all load
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at above the .5 level on this factor but they do not make
any theoretical sense.

Raising taxes was a policy issue.

The belief that science will solve our problems does not
seem to go well with this variable.

Finally, Can't Meet

Ends deals with feelings of being personally affected.
Some sense could be made of the first or third variables,
but the second one does not fit in at all.

Since it does

not seem logical to leave out the middle variable in a
cluster, we have decided that this factor is simply an
artifact (i.e. these variables are explaining a large part
of the remaining variance) and we will not use it. We will
also continue to use all of the other variables which have
not been included in these composite variables.
In keeping with the model presented in the last chap
ter, we will divide these attitude variables into two
groups.

The first is the General Attitudes: Science Helps,

Can’t Meet Ends, Use As Affordable, Raise taxes, Shortage
Inevitable, and PLENTY.

We also have three specific atti

tudes: NONUKES, NOSOLAR, and TOOTECHY.
Lowe and Moryadas argue that value compatibility will
tend to moderate these other influences.

Shoemaker says

that values may serve as incentives or constraints to adop
tion.

For that reason, we will now turn to a consideration

of the impacts of values on decisions.

Values
’

The idea of voluntary simplicity has been shown to be
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a strong predictor of adoption of solar alternatives.
Leonard-Barton and Rogers said that it was the second
strongest predictor of adoption.

Here we have measured

only one aspect of simplicity, that of independence.

This

seems to be an important variable for almost anyone who
adopts.

In Table 5.8 we see that 78.1% of the respondents

were encouraged by the desire for independence.

For 20% it

was not an impact, but that seems low in comparison to many

TABLE 5.8
ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES FOR VALUES

DISCOURAGING NEUTRAL ENCOURAGING
Some
Some
Very what
what Very TOTAL
Independence......... 1.7
20.0
0.0
19.1 59.1 99.9%
(115)
13.9
28.7 34.8 100.0
Clean Energy......... 3.5 19.1
(115)
Innovative Technology. 0.0
6.3
55.9
25.2 12.6 100.0
(111)

of the other variables we have examined.
The second of these variables, Clean Energy, shows
much more variation.

While 63.5% found this to be en

couraging, 22.6% were discouraged by the fact that the type
of system they adopted was not very clean.

There could be

some confusion here (which failed to show up in the pre
test) about what is meant by clean energy.

"Clean energy"

could imply energy that is clean either in its use (like
electricity in the home) or in terms of its impact on the
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environment (unlike electric energy generated from eoal
fired power plants).

If people are interpreting this in

entirely different ways, then this could be more of a prob
lem in later analyses.
Finally, we need to consider the importance of innova
tiveness in people's decisions to adopt.

Unseld and Crew

state that adopters are interested in technology and desire
to innovate.

Lowe and Moryadas say that each individual

has a different level of resistance to innovation.

Final

ly, Darley and Beniger believe that there is an interaction
between innovation and life-pattern interaction.

In any

event, this would seem to be an important variable for
adopters.

In this study, we find that for half of the

adopters this variable had no impact.

On the other hand,

it was only a discouraging aspect of the technology for
6.3% of the respondents and acted to encourage 37.8%,

Knowledge
On the basis of the findings presented in Chapter 4,
it was also anticipated that the amount of knowledge people
have about energy matters might be an important factor in
their decisions to adopt alternatives.

Let us turn now to

the indicators developed to measure these factors.
Arbuthnot (1977) says the environmental knowledge is
the 2nd best overall predictor of adoption.

Here we have

designed a series of questions to test people’s knowledge
about energy-related issues (Table 5.9a).

These statements
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TABLE 5.9a

ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES
OF AWARENESS QUESTIONS

TRUE

FALSE

DK

TURN DOWN HEAT:Turning down the
heat at night saves less energy
than it takes to reheat it in
the morning......................

23.4

70.2

6.4

CONSUMPTION:On a per person
basis, energy consumption in the
United States is still the same
as it was in 1960................

4.2

73.0

22.8

PASSIVE COSTS:When you consider
both energy costs and mortgage
payments, passive solar homes
cost more than traditional homes.

17.0

46.8

TOTAL

100.0%
(N=188)

100.0%
(N=188)

36.2 100.0%
(N=188)

TABLE 5.9b
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES FOR
VARIABLE KNOWLEDGE

N OF CORRECT RESPONSES
0
1
2
3
TOTAL

ABSOLUTE
FREQ

ADJUSTED
FREQ

15
40
82
50

8.0
21.4
43.9
26.7

187

100.0

are not regarded here as subjective in nature but are
verifiable in terms of their content.

The majority of-

people gave the correct response to each of the questions
(Table 5.9 a ) .
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The first question, regarding whether or not it is
more efficient to turn down the heat at night, is false.
While certainly there can be some individual variation
(depending on the mass of the house, the general house de
sign, etc.), in general as long as the heat is down for 8
hours or more you save more heat than you use to reheat the
house in the morning (thus the proliferation of thermostats
that do exactly this on a regular basis, thereby saving the
homeowner the need to worry about always remembering to
turn it down at night).
The second question is also false.

Per capita energy

consumption in the United States is about twice as high as
it was in 1960.

Here we see that 132 people actually got

this correct.
The final question was apparently the most difficult.
For the average solar home, the actual monthly payments are
less than for traditional homes because the energy costs
are so high for the latter (New Hampshire Governor's Energy
Council, 1981).
The next step was to change these into dichotomous
variables.

For this purpose, correct responses have been

coded as 1 and all incorrect responses (including don't
knows) have been coded 0.
Finally, rather than using each of these variables in
the analysis, the decision was made to develop a cumulative
index by adding together the scores on the individual ques
tions.

The result is a new variable, KNOWLEDGE, with a
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range of 0 to 3.
in Table 5.9b.
wers wrong.

The distribution of Knowledge is reported
Only a few people (15) got all of the ans

The mode is 2 and the mean is 1.97.

Dogmatism
Finally, it would seem that the degree of openness
possessed by individuals could be an important considera
tion in terms of its effect on people's willingness to try
out new ideas or even in their receptivity to novel in
formation. The approach which we have developed here
sensitizes us to the fact that people will be differential
ly receptive to information.

Following Bandura (1976) we

must try to measure the amount of openness of people to new
information.

Here we actually measure the obverse of open

ness, dogmatism.

This variable has been explored through

out the social psychological literature, but here we have
chosen to use four of the top five questions of a scale de
veloped by Triandis (1971).

The actual questions are

reported in Table 5.10.
These variables, like the attitude questions, were
coded on a scale of 1 (disagree very much) to 5 (agree very
much).

The distributions are reported in Table 5.10.

These questions were asked of all respondents so the total
N would again be 189.
In the first question we see that the majority of
respondents disagree that the best way to learn what is
going on is to rely on leaders or experts.

It would seem
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from this that our respondents trust their ability to make
decisions and form opinions.
In the second question, the majority of people either
are neutral or agree that they tend to get angry when other
people refuse to admit that they are wrong.

This would be

TABLE 5.10
ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES
TO DOGMATISM QUESTIONS

DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
AGREE
TOTAL
RELY ON LEADERS:In this
complicated world or ours,
the only way to know what
is going on is to rely on
leaders who can be
trusted.................. 32.6 25.5 12.5
20.1 9.2 99.9%
(N=184)
GET ANGRY:I get really
angry when a person
stubbornly refuses to
admit that they are
wrong.................... 11.0 10.4 28.0
28.0 22.5 99.9%
{N=182)
TWO TYPES:There are two
kinds of people in this
world: those who are for
the truth and those who
are against it
47.8 20.2 14.6
10.1 7.3 100.0%
(N=178)
ONE PHILOSOPHY:Of all the
different philosophies
which exist in the world,
there is probably only
one which iscorrect..... 72.4
13.8 9.9
0.6 3.3 100.0%
(N=181)

an indicator of dogmatism based on earlier studies.

In

contrast, for the third and fourth question we find that
the majority of respondents are answering in what would ap-
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pear to be a non-dogmatic manner.
As with the earlier sets of questions, we decided to
create one new variable for subsequent analysis.

In an

SPSS factor analysis all of the variables loaded onto one
factor.

Thus, we decided that it was legitimate to simply

add them up to create a variable which we will call DOG
MATISM.

People who rank high on this variable will more

dogmatic.

Those who rank low will be less more open and

should be more receptive to new information and more likely
to adopt innovations.

Summary

We began this chapter with a discussion of the sample
design and then proceeded to a presentation of the con
struction of the questionnaire.

Out of the questionnaire

we have developed a few groups of variables that fit into
the model developed in Chapter 4: situational variables;
decision factors (including price, information and norms);
and individual characteristics (attitudinal variables;
values, overall knowledge, and dogmatism).
Up to this point we have only looked at how the
responses to these variables are distributed among all of
the participants in the survey.

Drawing on LaBay and Kin-

near, however, we recognize that we must examine the dif
ferences among those who adopt various types of energy sys
tems.

In the next chapter we shall begin to look for any
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between group differences and then see how well our model
helps to explain the adoption of alternative energy sys
tems .

CHAPTER 6

BETWEEN-GROUP DIFFERENCES
Introduction
In Chapter 5 we looked at how the theoretical issues
which we had elaborated upon in the previous chapters have
been operationalized for this dissertation.

In this chapter

we will conduct one way analysis of variance to look for
differences between the groups for each of our dependent
variables: centralized versus decentralized adopters; solar
non-adopters versus solar adopters; wood non-adopters versus
wood adopters; non-adopters versus all adopters; unaware
adopters versus solar adopters;, and, finally, unaware non
adopters versus wood adopters.

This should help to inform

our discussion in the next chapter in which we will employ
logit analysis to decide which variables to include in a
model which will best predict our various dependent vari
ables.

Let us turn now to the comparisons for each of our

groups of independent variables.

Centralized v. Decentralized Adopters

Situational Variables
In Table 6.1 we see first the breakdown of our demo
graphic variables.

Using a straight-forward analysis of
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TABLE 6.1

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL
BY CENTRALIZED/DECENTRALIZED ADOPTER

Centralized
Mean StDev
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A g e ................ 51.62
.27
S e x ................
Marital Status....
.16
Duncan SEI........ 61.57
7.25
Family Income.....
Education......... 13.91
Year Purchased.... 69.56
House Age......... 38.62
7.62
House Size........

13.52
16.73
2.18
1.10
10.51
46.04
2.50

Decentralized
Mean StDev
46.89 1.99
.24
.13
60.55 19.38
6.61 2.27
13.86 1.31
74.48 7.40
34.17 53.86
6.97 1.74

P-value
ANOVA K-W
.044
.780
.743
.792
.136
.817
.003
.640
.084

.054
.778
.742
.920
.096
.924
.007
.018
.177

DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost......
Long-term Savings..
Tax Credits.......

3.62
3.62
3.08

1.09
1.29
.65

3.75
4.70
3.19

1.22
.58
.94

.551
.000
.537

.424
.000
.289

TOTAL EXPOSURE....
Relative Owned One.
Owned One Before. ..
Relative *s Advice..
Salesperson’s Advice
Engineer’s Advice..
Builder's Advice...
Demonstration Home.
Newspapers........

2. 82
3.34
2.62
3.31
3.29
3.44
3.53
3.12
3.28

1.32
.73
.99
.68
.70
.77
.83
.41
.58

3.23
3.60
2.73
3.57
3.13
3.32
3.31
3.14
3.74

1.14
.84
.82
.85
.47
.63
.71
.53
.82

.072
.117
.529
.118
.188
.350
.160
.819
.005

.058
.092
.760
.106
.128
.342
.169
.683
.001

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps.....
2.73
Can’t Meet Ends.... 2.40
2.74
Use As Affordable..
1.74
Raise Taxes.......
Shortage Inevitable 3.37
3.23
PLENTY.............

1.04
1.42
1.54
.98
1.28
1.61

2.23
2.59
1.95
2.22
3.92
3.17

1.26
1.47
1.33
1.27
1.05
1.37

.049
.505
.003
.035
.014
.829

.013
.578
.005
.051
.023
.926

NOSOLAR...........
NONUKES...........
TOOTECHY..........

8.77
5.07
8.81

3.34
3.27
2.93

7.34
6.68
8.55

3.34
3.02
2.22

.037
.008
.623

.021
.004
.556

Independence......
Clean Energy......
Innovative Tech....

3.34
4.28
3.50

.91
.85
.71

4.78
3.47
3.42

.48
1.29
.83

.000
.001
.608

.000
.002
.598

3.21
.94

9.15
2.05

2.97
.95

.001
.009

.096
.006

DOGMATIC..........
KNOWLEDGE.........

10.20
1.58
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variance, two of these variables show significant dif
ferences between the means —

Age and Year Purchased.

House Size, however, had a highly skewed distribution.

Be

cause this could be characteristic of many of our variables,
we have also conducted a Kruskall Wallis test for dif
ferences between the groups.

The Kruskall Wallis test com

pensates for the skewed nature of the distribution because
it is based on the median rather than the mean.

The results

of this test (reported in the last column), demonstrate that
House Size is also significant.

We will discuss each of

these in turn.
The age of the centralized adopters is nearly 5 years
higher on average than that of the decentralized adopters.
This is to a certain extent understandable.

Adopters of all

innovations generally tend to be younger than those who con
tinue to use traditional technologies.

But here we would

expect it to be the case because the older respondents would
have been more likely to purchase their homes prior to the
era when knowledge and information about alternative systems
was widely available.
This seems to be borne out by the fact that the other
significant variable is the year in which the house is pur
chased.

The homes of the centralized adopters tend to have

been purchased about 5 years earlier than the homes of
decentralized adopters.

the

We would also expect, then, for the

age of the homes with centralized systems to be greater than
the age of decentralized homes.

Such is the case here, but
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the difference does not appear to be significant.

Finally

with respect to the final housing characteristic,the size of
the homes with decentralized systems is slightly smaller
than those with centralized energy systems.
One would not expect there to be significant dif
ferences between these two groups in terms of their sex or
their marital status.

But the fact that there is no dif

ference in education seems somewhat surprising.
may arise from two different points.

The problem

One, it is the wood

adopters who dominate this decentralized category.

Perhaps

women are less inclined to use wood because of the effort
involved.

The other is the fact that both groups are ac

tually adopters, just of different types of systems, so per
haps we should not expect there to be as much difference be
tween them as between adopters and nonadopters.

Decision Factors

Price Considerations.

In this section we find that

there is only one variable which demonstrates significant
differences between the means.

From the price-related vari

ables we find that only the possibility of long-term savings
was significantly different for these two groups.

It had a

much more positive impact for the group that adopted the
decentralized alternative.

It is surprising that the ini

tial cost was not a stronger deterrent for the decentralized
adopters.

Perhaps this, too, is a product of the wood adop
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ters1 domination of this category.

Tax credits appears to

be neutral for both groups, as we would expect based on the
results of other studies mentioned in the last chapter.

Normative Exposure and Habit.

We might very well ex

pect that the people who have adopted decentralized alterna
tives are more likely to have seen such systems in operation
than those who adopt the centralized alternatives.
not borne out in this data, however.

This is

While there is a

slight difference, with decentralized adopters stating that
they knew more people who had decentralized systems, this
difference is not significant using either of our tests.

On

the other hand, the Kruskall Wallis test is very close to
showing a significant difference.
The fact that relatives may have owned a system similar
to the one which the respondent purchased seems to have
played no role here.

For both groups, the impact was

neutral and there was no difference between them.

Similar

ly, the fact that there the respondent had owned the same
type of system which was subsequently purchased shows no
significant differences.

It was odd, though, that for both

sets of respondents, this variable had a negative affect on
their decision.

Only .8% of our respondents answered in

this manner, but apparently those few people who answered
that it was a very discouraging factor in their decision was
enough to bring down the mean.

These respondents wh o were

discouraged but purchased a system again in spite of this
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may have simply perceived no alternative.

Information.

Among the information variables, we find

that information from primary reference groups (relatives
advice) fails to show any difference between these two
groups.

And from among the secondary information variables,

the only significant difference is for newspapers.

Here we

find that the information was more positive for the
decentralized adopters.

This is not the sort of result we

would have expected given the earlier assumption that in
formation networks are primarily controlled by those who
wish to perpetuate centralized alternatives.

It may be that

since the original category was newspapers or magazines,
what people have done is seek out magazines that deal with
non-traditional alternatives prior to making their decision.

Individual Characteristics

Attitudes.

Recall that in the previous chapter we de

veloped new variables based on a factor analysis of the at
titude variables used in the survey.

Here we will employ

those new variables (which we will designate by using capi
tal letters) as well as the other attitude variables which
were not included in the scales.

We will not discuss the

differences between the means for the individual variables
included in each of the scales since they are not going to
be used in our analyses on a separate basis.

That leaves us
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with 5 remaining variables and 4 attitude scales.
We see, first, that those who have adopted the central
ized alternatives are more likely to believe that science
will be able to solve our energy problems.

This would seem

to tie in well with their greater trust in nuclear power,
since we see that they are less likely to argue that it is
dangerous or that it should be stopped immediately.

On the

other hand, while they like science, they do not think that
science in the form of solar power offers much of a solu
tion.

Here we see that they are more likely than the

decentralized adopters to be against solar alternatives.
Finally, as we would expect, those who believe that science
will solve our problems and that nuclear power is a solution
are also less likely to think that another energy shortage
is inevitable.
Turning to the other variables that have significant
differences, we see that the centralized adopters are more
inclined to agree that people should be able to use as much
energy as they can afford.

They are also against raising

taxes in order to encourage conservation.
The other variables do not show significant dif
ferences. It is a little uprising in a few of these cases
since so much of the literature seems to present an opposite
viewpoint on these attitudes.

For example, the only vari

able to measure felt personal impact (Can’t Meet Ends) does
not show a significant difference.

Perhaps this was too

strong a statement since most people tended to disagree.

PLEASE NOTE

Page 156 is cut off on right hand side
No reply froa author or the university
Filaed as received.

University Microfilas International

157

respondents has more to do with the cleanliness of the sys
tem at the point of use rather than a larger environmental
concern, since that would seem to be what the responses dic
tate.

Knowledge and Dogmatism.

Finally, the centralized

adopters seem to know less about energy issues in general.
They score significantly lower on the knowledge variable
than do the decentralized adopters.

They also tend to be

more dogmatic although this latter variable is not sig
nificant at the .05 level.

Solar Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters

Situational Variables

In Table 6.2 we find that House Age and Year Purchased
show significant differences if we account for the fact that
they have skewed distributions by using the Kruskall Wallis
statistic.

The fact that solar homes tend to be much

younger is not at all surprising.

However, we find little

difference between adopters and non-adopters on other
demographic variables.

This is probably due to the fact

that while solar adopters may not be the same as the general
population, those who consider it at all in the first place
tend to have similar characteristics.
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TABLE 6.2

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
BY AWARE SOLAR NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS

Solar
NonAdopters
Mean StDev
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A g e ................ 47.92 12.54
.31
S e x ................
.09
Marital Status....
60.53
20.19
Duncan SEI........
Family Income.....
7.31 2.09
Education......... 13. 98 1.34
Year Purchased.... 73.77 7.82
House Age......... 38. 99 49.77
7. 43 1.87
House Size........
DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost......
Long-term Savings..
Tax Credits.......

Solar
Adopters
Mean StDev
48.29
.29
.24
60.69
6.25
13.82
76.29
8.59
6.88

P-value
ANOVA
K-W

24.28
2.38
1.63
10.20
10.27
1.54

.916
.915
.111
.981
.084
.675
.270
.015
.275

.931
.914
111
.842
.080
.946
.017
.000
.228

15.02

•

1.57
3.47
3.55

.90
1.24
1.03

3.25
4.75
3.81

1.29
.58
1.05

.000
.000
.367

.000
.000
.396

3.02
3.19
3.00
3.01
3.17
2.96
2.92
3.24
3.54

1.18
.52
.00
.54
.47
.44
.33
.69
1.07

3.63
3.53
3.24
3.13
3.60
4.06
3.86
3.53
4.07

1.19
.74
.56
.35
.63
.77
1.03
.74
.80

.060
.046
.003
.439
.006
.000
.000
.159
.082

.062
.048
.002
.335
.002
.000
.000
.221
.068

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
2.19
Science Helps.....
C a n 't Meet Ends.... 2.62
2.33
Use As Affordable..
2.25
Raise Taxes.......
Shortage Inevitable 3.71
3.03
PLENTY............

.95
1.43
1.53
1.31
1.06
1.59

2.25
1.71
1.41
2.41
4.00
3.50

1.53
1.21
.71
1.37
1.28
1.36

.855
.019
.019
.655
.342
.286

.606
.014
.031
.655
.173
.065

NOSOLAR...........
NONUKES...........
TOOTECHY..........

8.14
6.66
8.09

3.52
2.98
2.17

6.24
6.38
8.06

3.35
3.14
2.22

.051
.739
.951

.015
.869
.927

Independence......
Clean Energy......
Innovative Tech....

4.16
4.28
3.75

1.00
.79
1.16

4.82
4.63
4.07

.39
.81
.70

.010
.132
.314

.005
.052
.484

DOGMATIC..........
KNOWLEDGE.........

8.91
2.09

2.44
.86

9.93
2.18

3.75
.81

.203
.724

.400
.795

TOTAL EXPOSURE....
Relative Owned One.
Owned One Before...
Salesperson’s Advice
Relative1s Advice..
Engineer’s Advice..
Builder's Advice...
Demonstration Home.
Newspapers........
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Decision Factors
Price Considerations.

Initial cost and long-term

savings were both more discouraging for those who at first
considered solar power and then decided not to adopt.

The

difference for initial cost is especially large, and would
seem to be playing a major role in people's decisions.

Normative Exposure and Habit.

There is very little

difference between these groups with regard to how many
people they know who have such systems.

This is not sur

prising since they would tend to know other solar owners
prior to even considering such a purchase.
There are significant differences however for our other
two variables in this category.

The fact that relatives had

owned a similar system had a more positive impact on adop
ters of solar alternatives.

Similarly, having owned one be

fore plays a positive role in the decisions of people who
choose to adopt.

We would not expect many people to have

owned such a system before, because they are so rare.
Certainly this is the case with the non-adopters.

However,

some of the owners state that they had owned a solar system
before and the experience had a positive impact on their de
cision to purchase a new system.

Information. Here we find that the advice of both pri
mary reference groups (relatives) and secondary reference
groups (engineers and builders) has tended to discourage
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people who decided against purchasing solar equipment and
acted to encourage those who did adopt such systems.

It

would be interesting to be able to determine to whom these
people had actually turned for advice.

Certainly if this is

characteristic of the entire population, then solar pur
chases could be greatly enhance through the additional sup
port of these categories of people.

Individual Characteristics

Since there are so few differences here, we shall discuss
all of them together.

It is not surprising that there are

so few differences between the groups, since we would expect
that anyone open to solar power would have similar back
grounds and attitudes.

Solar adopters are, however, much

less likely than solar non-adopters to agree that people
should be able to use as much energy as they can afford.
There is also a difference with regard to their attitude
toward solar power.

Those who have adopted solar systems

tend to be more likely to say that solar has a future (i.e.,
they score lower on the NOSOLAR scale).

This should be ex

pected given the advice they have received from people.

The

adopters are more likely to be pro-solar, but the difference
is not significant at the .05 level.

Finally, with regard

to values, the solar adopters are more likely to say that
independence played an positive role in their decision and
that clean energy was also important for them.
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Wood Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters

Situational Variables
This was our largest category of adopters.

We see in

Table 6.3 that the only significant difference between these
groups is on the variable House Age.

Older homes are, of

course, more difficult to retrofit than newer ones, so this
could explain most of the difference.

None of the other

demographic variables showed any significant differences.
This is probably to be expected.

Many people from all walks

of life have adopted wood, it is accessible to people in any
income group, and houses of any age or size can be
retrofitted to accommodate wood.

To explore the differences

here, we must turn to our other categories.

Decision Factors

Price Considerations. As in our other comparisons, both
initial cost and long-term savings had a more positive in
fluence on adopters than on non-adopters.
were discouraging factors for non-adopters.

In fact, both
This fact is

difficult to understand since wood is so often seen as re
quiring very little investment and having a very fast
payback period,

oddly enough, the availability of tax

credits plays the opposite role.

Perhaps those who have ac

tually adopted found the tax credits to be smaller than they

TABLE 6.3

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL
BY AWARE WOOD NON ADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS

Wood
Nonadopters
Mean StDev

Wood
Adopters
Mean StDev

P-value
ANOVA
K-W

SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A g e ................ 46.30 13.61
.30
Sex................
.17
Marital Status....
Duncan SEI........ 59.33 18.98
6.18 2.54
Family Income.....
Education......... 13.27 1.64
Year Purchased.... 72.00 8.22
House Age......... 44.30 38.31
7.22 2.17
House Size........

47.18 11.43
.22
.10
59.93 18.63
6.71 2.20
13.86 1.25
73.97 6.58
39.11 57.17
7.03 1.77

.760
.629
.403
.399
.359
.356
.908 1.000
.356
.426
.081
.105
.254
.341
.686
.020
.676
.949

DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost......
Long-term Savings..
Tax Credits.......

2.25
2.72
3.24

1.02
1.32
.75

3.83
4.69
3.02

1.21
.58
.83

.000
.000
.323

.000
.000
.233

2.15
TOTAL EXPOSURE....
3.31
Relative Owned One.
2.87
Owned One Before...
Salesperson's Advice: 3.25
Relative's Advice.. 3.25
Engineer's Advice.. 2.80
Builder's Advice... 2.93
3.00
Demonstration Home.
3.07
Newspapers........

1.09
1.02
.35
.78
.86
.56
.26
.38
.88

3.14
3.59
3.46
3.12
3.57
3.17
3.21
3.06
3.69

1.09
.86
.78
.48
.88
.48
.57
.43
.81

.000
.265
.006
.412
.369
.012
.068
.613
.011

.000
.525
.003
.472
.511
.012
.051
.511
.014

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
2.89
Science Helps.....
3.09
Can't Meet Ends....
Use As Affordable..
2.55
1.67
Raise Taxes.......
Shortage Inevitable 3.24
4.00
PLENTY............

1.37
1.45
1.60
1.02
1.18
2.09

2.17
2.77
2.06
2.14
3.90
3.09

1.37
1.45
1.40
1.23
1.00
1.34

.029
.370
.175
.110
.014
.029

.040
.335
.202
.095
.016
.083

NOSOLAR...........
NONUKES...........
TOOTECHY..........

8.89
6.35
9.47

3.25
3.28
2.64

7.70
6.67
8.67

3.39
3.02
2.19

.179
.686
.229

.111
.692
.152

Independence......
Clean Energy......
Innovative Tech....

3.50
2.40
2.87

.86
1.06
.92

4.76
3.20
3.29

.50
1.23
.79

.000
.023
.070

.000
.030
.191

11.65
1.50

2.94
.80

9.07
2.04

2.85
.99

.001
.022

.001
.010

DOGMATIC..........
KNOWLEDGE.........
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were originally perceived.

Normative Exposure and Habit.

Wood adopters know more

people who are using wood than do the non-adopters.

They

are also more likely to say that having owned one before had
a positive impact on their decision to purchase this time
around.

Information.

Only three of these variables show any sig

nificant differences.

Again, engineer's advice plays a role

in people's decision, but this time it is a positive role,
although not strongly positive on average.

Builders also

prove to be more supportive of wood as an alternative.

In

addition, newspapers tend to have a more positive impact on
adopters' decisions than they did for non-adopters.

Individual Characteristics

Attitudes.

We see here that three of our attitude var

iables show significant differences.
Science Helps.

The first of these is

Wood users are significantly less likely to

think that science will provide solutions to our problems.
They are also more likely to think that a shortage in in
evitable and less inclined to believe that we still have
plenty of oil. Other attitudes, regarding solar power and
nuclear power, tend to be about the same for both groups.
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Values.

Once again, both Independence and Clean Energy

show significant differences.

As in other cases, the desire

to be independent was a much more positive factor for adop
ters than for non-adopters.

In addition, in this com

parison, a desire for clean energy discouraged the non
adopters.

In other words, nonadopters tend to see this as

not a very clean source of energy, and they are discouraged
on that account.

Dogmatism and Knowledge.

The people who thought about

wood and then decided against such a purchase have a much
higher score on the dogmatism scale than do the adopters.
In fact, this group has the highest score of the entire set
of comparisons we have made.

Perhaps this is due to the

fact that so many people have considered wood.

Thus, the

score is more indicative of the degree of dogmatism in the
survey respondents as a whole.

Finally, those who adopted

wood demonstrate much more knowledge about energy than the
non-adopters.

Unaware Nonadopters versus All Adopters

Beginning with Table 6.4, we will only be able to make
comparisons based on the responses to our demographic vari
ables and respondents individual characteristics {not in
cluding values).

Since the questionnaire only allowed

people to state the role that decision factors and values
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TABLE 6.4

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
FOR ALL NON-ADOPTERS/ALL ADOPTERS

Nonadopters
Mean StDev

All
Adopters
Mean StDev

SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A ge................ 48.26 14.29
Sex................
.43
.20
Marital Status....
Duncan SEI........ 58.55 22.57
6.38 2.49
Family Income.....
Education......... 13.58 1.53
Year Purchased.... 73.23 7.24
House A g e......... 47.80 47.13
House Size........
7.41 1.76

48.57 12.71
.25
.14
60.90 18.426.85 2.25
13.87 1.23
72.73 8.91
35.73 51.10
7.20 2.06

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps.....
2.41
Can11 Meet Ends....
2.58
Use As Affordable.. 2.28
Raise Taxes.....
2.25
Shortage Inevitable 3.61
3.73
PLENTY.............

P-value
ANOVA
K-W
.883
.015
.338
.493
.209
.167
.704
.122
.488

.589
.016
.336
.806
.160
.284
.877
.000
.352

1.17
1.42
1.47
1.33
1.06
2.00

2.38
2.53
2.23
2.06
3.75
3.19

1.21
1.45
1.45
1.20
1.16
1.45

.870
.805
.802
.337
.470
.053

.790
.737
.751
.451
.308
.160

NOSOLAR...........
NONUKES...........
TOOTECHY..........

8.51
6.43
8.51

3.53
3.16
2.08

7.79
6.14
8.63

3.39
3.18
2.44

.203
.573
.794

.206
.591
.785

DOGMATIC..........
KNOWLEDGE.........

9.41
1.92

3.33
.70

9.51
1.88

3.08
.97

.843
.804

.673
.907

TOTAL EXPOSURE....

2.26

1.18

3.09

1.22

.000

.000

played in their adoption decisions, then since they had not
even thought about adopting, the unaware non-adopters, by
definition, have no responses to these variables.

Since

there are so few significant variables to discuss, we will
simply discuss everything at once.
In Table 6.4 we see that Sex and House Age are the only
situational variables to show a significant difference be
tween the groups.

Non-adopters are much more likely to be
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women.

We might attribute this to the fact that women who

live alone may be less likely to devote the energy to the
installation of a new system.

But there is no significant

difference between the groups in terms of marital status or
any other category that would help us to understand this
difference.

It could only be attributed to the fact that in

families where the woman is more likely to respond to the
questionnaire, some other factor is also at work.

As in the

past, the homes of nonadopters tend to be older.
The only other variable to show significant differences
is Total Exposure.

Here we see that the adopters know more

people who have decentralized systems.

Recall that this is

all adopters, both centralized and decentralized.

We need

to look next at a more detailed breakdown.

Unaware Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters

In Table 6.5 we should first note that the age of the
homes of solar adopters is again much less than the age of
homes for unaware non-adopters.

This is not surprising

given that the solar technology is a relatively new innova
tion, so older homes will not be likely to have it in
corporated into their design.

We see no other differences

in the situational variables.

Even the difference in the

sex of respondents has disappeared.
Of the remaining variables, two now show significant
differences.

As we might expect, the solar adopters are
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TABLE 6.5

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
FOR UNAWARE NON-ADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS

Nonadopters
Mean StDev
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A g e ................ 50.21 15.74
Sex................
.42
Marital Status....
.25
Duncan SEX........ 56.50 24.23
6.08 2.36
Family Income.....
Education.......... 13.91 1.16
Year Purchased.... 72.50 7.58
House Age......... 33.38 27.67
6.71 1.57
House Size.........

Solar
Adopters
Mean StDev

P-value
ANOVA K-W

48.29
.29
.24
60.69
6.25
13.82
76.29
8.59
6.88

24.28
2.38
1.63
10.20
10.27
1.54

.698
.435
.917
.638
.828
.840
.179
.001
.743

.643
.428
.915
.748
.759
.816
.028
.000
.828

15.02

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
2.06
Science Helps.....
Can't Meet Ends.... 2.09
2.08
Use As Affordable..
2.45
Raise Taxes.......
Shortage Inevitable 4.00
3.75
PLENTY............

.90
1.20
1.31
1.41
.76
2.12

2.25
1.71
1.41
2.41
4.00
3.50

1.53
1.21
.71
1.37
1.28
1.37

.662
.329
.062
.925
1.000
.686

.880
.265
.074
.930
.446
.869

NOSOLAR...........
NONUKES...........
TOOTECHY..........

8.50
5.81
8.38

3.73
3.47
2.25

6.24
6.38
8.06

3.35
3.14
2.22

.057
.612
.687

.009
.462
.839

DOGMATIC..........
KNOWLEDGE.........

8.09
1.96

3.06
.75

9.93
2.18

3.75
.81

.109
.380

.086
.382

TOTAL EXPOSURE....

2.30

1.18

3.64

1.19

.001

.002

more likely to be pro-solar.

They are less likely to think

that solar technology is too difficult or that it will soon
be replaced.

Finally, they also know more people with

decentralized systems.

Finally, those people who have

adopted solar know more people who have also purchased such
system.
According to our Kruskall Wallis test, two other vari
ables —

Use as Affordable and Dogmatic -- tend to show some
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difference, but it is not significant at the .05 level.

As

might be expected, solar adopters are less likely to think
that people should be able to use as much energy as they can
afford.

They also tend to be more dogmatic, a result which

is highly unexpected according to our earlier theoretical
discussions.

We should pay attention to these in our logit

analysis.

Unaware Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters

In our last table of between group comparisons. Table
6.6, we see that wood adopters are much more likely to be
men, although this is not really significant.

This might be

due to the fact that women find wood use to be too laborintensive, but they are no more likely to be single than the
unaware group.

Of course, the fact that the wood adopters

make up most of the decentralized category explains why the
difference occurred in our earlier comparison between those
adopters and the unaware non-adopters.
In the other categories, we find that there is only one
significant difference.

Once again, wood adopters are much

more likely to know people who have purchased decentralized
systems than are the unaware nonadopters.
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TABLE 6.6

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
FOR UNAWARE NON-ADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS

Nonadopters
Mean StDev

wood
Adopters
Mean StDev

SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A g e ................ 50.21 15.74
.42
Sex................
.25
Marital Status....
Duncan SEI........ 56.50 24.23
6.08 2.36
Family Income.....
Education......... 13.91 1.16
Year Purchased.... 72.50 7.58
House Age......... 33.37 27.66
House Size........
6.72 1.57

47.19 11.43
.22
.10
59.93 18.48
6.71 2.20
13.86 1.25
73.97
6.58
39.11 57.17
7.03 1.77

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
2.06
Science Helps.....
Can't Meet Ends.... 2.08
Use As Affordable.. 2.08
2.46
Raise Taxes.......
Shortage Inevitable 4.00
PLENTY.............
3.75

P-value
K-W
ANOVA
.317
.059
.072
.530
.249
.851
.367
.638
.434

.735
.059
.072
.622
.229
.933
.463
.090
.436

.90
1.20
1.31
1.40
.76
2.12

2.17
2.77
2.06
2.14
3.90
3.09

1.18
1.46
1.40
1.23
1.00
1.34

.727
.045
.933
.319
.655
.102

.966
.050
.675
.384
.890
.313

NOSOLAR...........
NONUKES...........
TOOTECHY..........

8.50
5.81
8.37

3.72
3.47
2.25

7.70
6.67
8.67

3.39
3.02
2.19

.357
.274
.639

.452
.259
.777

DOGMATIC..........
KNOWLEDGE.........
TOTAL EXPOSURE....

8.09
1.95
2.30

3.06
.75
1.18

9.08
2.04
3.14

2.85
.99
1.09

.165
.702
.002

.063
.420
.002

Summary and Discussion

Table 6.7 gives a brief summary of which variables have
proven to be significant in all of our comparisons to this
point.

The asterisk represents simply that the variable was

significant without regard to the level of significance.
There are two ways of looking at this table.

One is to

Table 6.7
Summary of Significant Variables

Comparison
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Age......................
Sex......................
Marital Status..........
Duncan SEI...............
Family Income...........
Education...............
Year Purchased...........
House A g e ................
House Size..............
DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost.............
Long-term Savings.......
Tax Credits..............

* I
I
I

I
I
* I * I
* I * I

*

TOTAL EXPOSURE____
Relative Owned One.
Owned One Before...

NOSOLAR..
NONUKES..
TOOTECHY.
Independence
Clean Energy
Innovative Tech..........
DOGMATIC..
KNOWLEDGE.

I
*|
I **
,*
I

I

I

I

I * I
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examine each comparison to see which variables show
signifi-cant differences between the groups.

Rather than

simply reiterating that earlier discussion, however, we can
also begin to examine which variables seem to be most
consistent-ly involved across comparisons.
The first item that stands out is the fact that there
are quite a few variables which are involved in most of the
comparisons between different adopters or between aware non
adopters and adopters.
pendence —

One of the value variables —

Inde

shows up in all three of these comparisons, and

Clean Energy is significant in two an has a Kruskall Wallis
of .052 in the third, and these were the only three com
parisons in which these variables were included.

Savings

and House Age also show up in all three of these com
parisons.

A number of other variables show up in two of the

first three comparisons:

Year Purchased, Initial Cost,

Owned One Before, the advice of builders and engineers.
Science Helps, Use as Affordable, Shortage Inevitable,
NOSOLAR, DOGMATIC, and KNOWLEDGE.
On the other hand, if we look at the comparisons be
tween adopters and nonadopters or unaware nonadopters, the
only variable that seems to stand out is TOTAL EXPOSURE.

Of

course, that finding is important, since it means that the
very first step, the one which must be included before the
other variable come into play, is that people be aware of
the alternatives.
This seems to demonstrate that the our theoretical for-
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mulations have sensitized us to a wide variety of variables,
many of which should help us to understand the process of
adoption.

On the other hand, we could also begin to con

clude that the demographic considerations do not really help
us to understand this phenomenon.

But to answer that ques

tion we need to turn to our Logit analysis.

CHAPTER 7

LOGIT ANALYSIS
Introduction
There are a variety of strategies that can be followed
in this analysis.
ferent approaches.

Here we shall choose to combine two dif
First, we shall compare the different

groups of variables which we have been using to see which
of these sets best help us to understand the difference be
tween the groups in our various comparisons.
limited by the size of our sample.
analyses,

Here we are

In running our logit

we will eliminate cases that have missing data

on any of the included variables.

In order to retain

enough cases for meaningful comparisons, we will include
only variables that have significant bivariate effects, as
seen in Chapter 6.

Although different variables will be

used in each of our logit analyses, we can still examine
the effects of the major groups of variables (situational
variables, decision variables, and individual character
istics) by comparing the chi square statistics for all of
the relevant variables in each of these major groups.
Following this comparison between the major subgroups
of variables, we will take those variables which show sig
nificant t statistics in these analyses and employ them in
a second analysis where we will decide which collection of
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variables gives us the best model.

Here we have entered

into the logit analysis all of the variables which had sig
nificant t's in our first set of analyses.

Subsequently,

we remove, one by one, the variables with the smallest t's
until we end up with a model where all of the remaining
variables are significant at ot=.l

or until the withdrawal

of a variable makes a significant difference in our chi
square.

Centralized Versus Decentralized Adopters

Table 7.1 shows the log likelihood, the chi square and
the significance of the chi square for each category of
variables when we run a logit with our centralized/decent
ralized dependent variable.

The first comparison we will

make is between these major sets of variables.
Here it is readily apparent that the largest chi
square, and the best set of predictors is the set of indi
vidual characteristics which we have identified.

Recall

that in this analysis, we are using only the individual
characteristics which demonstrated significant differences
between the means (Science Helps, Use as Affordable, Raise
Taxes, Shortage Inevitable, Nosolar, Nonukes, Independence,
Clean Energy, Dogmatic, and Knowledge).

The chi square for

our decision variables (Long-term savings and Newspapers)
is also significant.

The situational variables (Age, Year

Purchases, and House Age) have little predictive value.
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Table 7.1
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSeS FOR
CENTRALIZED/DECENTRALIZED ADOPTERS

Log Likelihood
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......
-40.0989
DECISION FACTORS...........
-32.8778
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. -12.4176

Chi Sg
2.46
16.91
57.83

Siq
.4818
.0002
.0000

Table 7.2
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR
CENTRALIZED/DECENTRALIZED ADOPTERS

Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-15.579776
Variable
Coefficient
Independence
3.24327
Use as Afford
-.68847
constant
-10.64244

Number of obs =
75
chi2(2)
= 51.50
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
std. Error
.802566
.343538
3.100618

t
4.041
-2.004
-3.432

Prob>[t 1
0.000
0.049
0.001

We can also examine these major groups of variables to see
whether or not the addition of either of the other subsets
to the Individual Characteristics yields a significant in
crease in our chi square.

If we test a model which in

cludes the Decision Factors with the Individual Character
istics, we obtain an increase in our chi square of only
3.35 with 2 degrees of freedom, an insignificant increase.
The addition of the Situational Variables yields a similar
ly insignificant increase (2.10 with 3 degrees of freedom).
Thus, we find that the Individual Characteristics are the
best predictors.
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This is further supported by our second analysis.
Here we have taken only those variables from the earlier
analysis which demonstrated a significant bivariate rela
tionship with adoption.

This included Independence, Use as

Affordable, and Long-term Savings.

Since Savings was unre

lated to adoption, we dropped it from our model; the
decrease in Chi-square was insignificant (1.54 with 1 de
gree of freedom).

Table 7.2 presents this final model for

centralized/ decentralized adopters.

The final model in

cludes only individual characteristics —

Independence and

Use as Affordable (Log Odds of Decentralized Adoption =
-10.642 + 3.243 Independence - .685 Use as Afford).
Most of the predictive power of this model comes from
the Independence.

As the desire to be independent in

creases, so does the likelihood that the respondent will
have purchased a decentralized energy system.

In addition,

people who believe that we should be able to use as much
energy as we can afford are less likely to be decentralized
adopters.
The chi square statistic tells us two things.

First,

the coefficients in this model are significantly different
from 0.

In addition, we know that this model is also bet

ter than the model which included Long-term savings, be
cause the addition of that variable did not signicantly in
crease the chi square.
cal reasoning.

This supports our earlier theoreti

It is a bit surprising that none of the de

cision factors showed up in this final model since we
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postulated earlier that price factors would play some role.
The fact that Independence is a better predictor than the
other variables lends additional support to our hypothesis
that price considerations, while important, play only a
limited role in the adoption of alternative energy systems.

Solar Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters

Here we can make a more specific comparison.

One of

our criticisms of earlier studies has been that it is in

Table 7.3
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
AWARE SOLAR NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS

Log Likelihood
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......
-25.9034
DECISION FACTORS...........
- 9.2023
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. -21.6567

Chi Sq
6.82
40.23
15.32

Sig
.0330
.0000
.0091

Table 7.4
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR
AWARE SOLAR NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS

Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-9.4818925
Variable
Coefficient
Initial Cost
1.03403
Engin. Advice
4.70863
Meet Ends
-1.61845
constant
-15.65406

Number of obs =
54
chi2(3)
= 46.67
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Std. Error
.442859
2.145872
.888578
6.178139

t
2.335
2.194
■1.821
-2.534

Prob>ItI
0.024
0.033
0.075
0.014
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appropriate to compare the general population with adop
ters.

If we hope to discover what discourages people, we

need to look more closely at those who have considered
adoption*
Table 7.3 shows us that in this case the Decision Fac
tors are the best predictors.

In contrast to the first

logit analysis, we note here that both of the other groups
of variables have significant chi squares, with that of the
Individual Charactersitics being the larger.
If we add the five variables from our Individual Char
acteristics (see Table 6.7), we get an increase of only
7.94 in our chi square, which is not significant given the
five degrees of freedom.

Similarly, the Situational Vari

ables are also insignficant.

Thus, only the Decision Fac

tors have clearly nonzero effects.
There were only three significant variables in these
individual comparisons: Initial cost, Engineer's advice,
and Can't Meet Ends.

As it turns out, all of these had P-

values below .1 (Table 7.4).

Thus, our final model is Log

Odds of Solar Adoption = -15.654 + 1.034 Initial Cost +
4.709 Engineer's Advice - 1.619 Can't Meet Ends.

The vari

able which stands out the most here is the advice of
engineers.

When their advice is deemed more positive,

respondents are more likely to fall into the adopters
category.

In Chapter 6 we saw that the nonadopters tended

to find engineer's advice discouraging, but now we see that
as their advice becomes more positive, people are more
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likely to adopt.
The next most important variable is the belief that
energy prices make it difficult to make ends meet which has
a negative effect.

Thus, as these attitudes increase, in

dividuals are less likely to adopt decentralized systems.
Initial cost, our last variable, is positively related to
adoption.

Those respondents who have adopted a decentral

ized system are more likely to say that the initial cost
had a positive impact on their decision.
In this particular model, we end up including all of
the variables which had a significant bivariate relation
ship with solar adoption because each one has a P-value be
low .1.

Thus, we will not test alternative models.

Wood Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters

In Table 7.5 we see that the chi sguare for the situa
tional variables is not significant.

We cannot reject the

null hypothesis that these variables are unrelated.

On the

other hand, the chi sguare for the decision variables is
much higher and significant.

But the highest chi sguare is

associated with the Individual Characteristics.

If we add

either of the other sets of variables to the Individual
Characteristics, we get an insignificant increase in our
chi sguare.
The analysis of the three individual variables which
had P-values below .1 —

Long-term savings, Knowledge, and
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Table 7.5
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
AWARE WOOD NONADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS

Log Likelihood
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......
-14.0942
- 5.0292
DECISION FACTORS...........
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. - 1.581e-08

Chi Sq
.02
18.15
28.20

Sig
.9018
.0028
.0000

Table 7.6
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR
AWARE WOOD NONADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS

Number of obs =
52
chi2(2)
= 28.20
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000

Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-5.470e-08
Variable
Savings
Knowledge
constant

Coefficient
52.49393
34.90805
-227.7124

Independence —
comparisons.

Std. Error
1775.903
8895.525

t
0.030
0.004

Prob>1t 1
0.977
0.997

was less straightforward than the previous

None of the coefficients had P-values below

.1, so the emphasis was placed on the testing of models
with different sets of variables.

Long-term savings with

Knowledge yielded the highest chi sguare (Table 7.6).

The

combination of Long-term savings with Independence or of
Independence with Knowledge gave much smaller chi squares.
Thus the model presented in Table 7.6 (Log Odds of Wood
Adoption = -227.712 + 52.494 Long-term Savings + 34.908
Knowledge) would seem to be our strongest predictors.

We

cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for
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Independence is zero.

Most of the predictive power of this

model is associated with Long-term Savings.

Unaware Nonadopters versus All Adopters

We should note, first of all, that there are many
fewer variables included in this set of analyses.

This is

due, as before, to the fact that the decision variables and
the values were all developed as questions specifically for
those who adopted sqme sort of energy system.

From this

entire set, we can only include one of the normative vari
ables, Total Exposure.

These comments hold for all of our

subsequent analyses.
In Table 7.7 we see that the Individual Character
istics are not even included.

This is because there were

no variables from this category which had signficant
bivariate relationships with our Unaware Nonadopters/All
Adopters dependent variable.

On the other hand, both of

the other sets of variables have significant chi squares.
To test whether the coefficients for the Situational Vari
ables are zero, we have added them to the Decision Factors.
This yields an insignificant increase of 6.21 with two de
grees of freedom.
Our final model is Log Odds of Adoption = -.601 + .586
Total exposure - .703 Sex.

Total Exposure, the only one of

the Decision Factors to be included in these last three
comparisons, is the best predictor.

Since its coefficient
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Table 7.7
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
NONADOPTERS/ALL ADOPTERS

Log Likelihood
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES...___ -114.5749
DECISION FACTORS...... .

Chi Sg
7.80
19.60

Sig
.0202
.0000

Table 7.8
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR
NONADOPTERS/ALL ADOPTERS

Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-106.64302
Variable
Coefficient
Total Expos
.586205
Sex
-.702606
constant
-.600850

Number of obs =
188
chi2(2)
=
23.67
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Std. Error
.149287
.347502
.437882

t
3.927
-2.022
-1.372

Prob>ItI
0.000
0.045
0.172

is positive, as the amount of exposure increases, so does
the likelihood of adoption.

It would appear that women are

more likely to be nonadopters, since this variable is nega
tively related to our dependent variable.

Unaware Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters

In Chapter 6, we did find significant bivariate rela
tionships between some of the Individual Characteristics
and our Unaware Nonadopters/Solar Adopters dependent vari
able.

However, in Table 7.9 we see that once again we can

not reject our null hypothesis that the coefficients for
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these Individual Characteristics are zero.

On the other

hand, the Situational Variables have the highest chi sguare
for the first time.

If we add to them the Decision Fac

tors, we see only a small, insignificant increase in our
chi sguare.

Thus, here we would conclude that the Situa-

Table 7.9
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
UNAWARE NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS

Loq Likelihood
-18.0070
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......
-21.5337
DECISION FACTORS...........
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS..
-26.0736

Chi Sq
17.41
10.36
1.28

Sig
.0002
.0013
.2587

Table 7.10
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR
UNAWARE NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS

Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-15.627978
Variable
Coefficient
Total Exposure
1.24361
House Age
- .08459
constant
-2.49651

Number of obs =
39
chi2(2)
= 22.17
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Std. Error
.556870
.035582
1.680905

t
2.233
-2.377
-1.485

Prob>ItI
0.032
0.023
0.146

tional Variables are our best predictors.
Table 7.10 shows that only two variables are included
in our final model (Log Odds of Solar Adoption = 2.497 +
1.244 Total Exposure - .085 House Age).

This time, most of

the predictive power, as evidenced by the size of the coef-
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ficients, is from Total Exposure.

As the amount of ex

posure to decent-ralized alternatives increases, there is a
greater like-lihood that the respondent will be a solar
adopter.

House Age also meets our basic standard for in

clusion in the model.

As the age of the home decreases,

the respondent is more likely to be a wood adopter.

Unaware Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters

Table 7.11 shows us that once again the Decision Fac
tors have the highest chi square.

But considered seperate

ly, the Individual Characteristics are also significantly
Table 7.11
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
UNAWARE NONADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS

Log Likelihood
DECISION FACTORS......... . -47.9370
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS . -49.9199

Chi Sg
8.17
4.20

Sig
.0043
.0404

Table 7.12
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR
UNAWARE NONADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS

Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-46.403549
Variable
Coefficient
Total Exposure
e .6421127
Meet Ends
.3223822
constant
-1.449515

Number of obs =
93
11.23
chi2(2)
Prob > chi2
= 0.0036
Std. Error
.2607796
.1897758
.8415402

t
2.462
1.699
-1.722

Prob>ItI
0.016
0.093
0.088
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different from zero. Our best set of predictors is the De
cision Factors.

The addition of the Individual Character

istics results in an insignificant increase in the chi
sguare.

None of the Situational Variables had significant

bivariate relationships in Chapter 6, so they have not been
included in this analysis.
Turning to Table 7.12, we see that our best model in
corporates Total Exposure and Can't Meet Ends (Log Odds of
Wood Adoption = -1.450 + .642 Total Exposure + .322 Can't
Meet Ends).

The degree of exposure to decentralized

alternatives increases the likelihood that the respondent
will be a decentralized adopter.

Similarly, as the feeling

that energy prices makes it difficult to meet ends in
creases, so does the likelihood that the respondent will be
a wood adopter.

Summary

Table 7.13 provides two separate summaries.

First of

all, if we look at the major groups of variables, we can
see which of these groups have significant chi-squares.
From this we know only that their coefficients are not zero
(i.e., we reject the null hypothesis in these instances).
This does not imply that the group of variables was neces
sarily the best set of predictors.
ysis this way,

In looking at the anal

we see that the Decision Factors play a

role in every one of our analyses.

The Situational Var-

Table 7.13
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

1.

Comparison
2
3
4
5

*

*

SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
A g e ......................
S e x ......................
Marital Status..........
Duncan SEI........... .
Family Income............
Education................
Year Purchased..........
House Age................
House Size...............
DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost.............
Long-term Savings.......
Tax Credits..............

*

TOTAL EXPOSURE..........
Relative Owned One......
Owned One Before........
Salesperson’s A d v .......
Relative's Advice.......
Engineer's Advice.......
Builder's Advice........
Demonstration Home......
Newspapers...............
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps............
Can't Meet Ends.........
Use As Affordable.......
Raise Taxes.......... .
Shortage Inevitable.....
PLENTY...................
NOSOLAR.
NONUKES.
TOOTECHY
Independence...
Clean Energy...
Innovative Tech
DOGMATIC......
KNOWLEDGE.....

*
*

_6
*
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iables and the Individual Characteristics were significant
ly different from zero in four out of the six analyses.
The second way of looking at this table is to look at
the variables singly.
had P-values below .1.

We have starred the variables which
There are generally only one or two

variables in each analysis which contribute most of the
predictive power (given the size of their coefficients).
The results are inconclusive.

When we are comparing

different types of adopters (our first three comparisons),
price considerations played a role while they were entered
into the analyses.

In addition, some of the attitudes

remained in the models and Independence was included in the
first comparison.
In our latter three comparisons, there is a clearer
pattern.

Here we see that Total Exposure is included in

every final model.

We also note that the situational char

acteristics had more predictive power in these comparisons
between adopters and unaware nonadopters.

We shall discuss

the relevance of these findings in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions
Introduction
This study has been presented as purely exploratory in
nature.

The sample is small, non-random, and limited both

temporally and geographically.

Because of this, we cannot

generalize from this study to other situations.

However,

we can make some broad conclusions regarding the ap
plicability of the general model which we have developed
and its relationship to our theoretical formulations.
In this chapter we will discuss three separate issues.
The first of these is the way in which our findings might
support or weaken previous research.

Since the development

of our model was informed by such a wide variety of prior
research, we will discuss the relevance of our findings for
these studies as they relate to our different subset of
variables.

Our second task in this chapter will be to dis

cuss the relevance of this study to the numerous theoreti
cal approaches to the adoption of energy alternatives.
Finally, we will discuss the implications for future re
search.
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Relevance to Prior Studies

Situational Characteristics

The primary question which needs to be addressed in
this context is whether or not solar and wood adopters are
distinctly different from other groups.

Many past studies

have argued that solar adopters, in comparison to the gen
eral population, are younger, have an above average income,
are generally from professional and managerial positions,
have a higher socio-economic status, and have an above
average education. In keeping with criticisms which state
that this comparisons of adopters to the general population
will be innaccurate because not everyone owns a home, we
have been comparing our decentralized adopters with other
homeowners.
The results here suggest that our solar and wood adop
ters are not distinctly different from other homeowners.
When we look at the situational characteristics of individ
uals, we see only two significant bivariate relationships.
There was a significant difference between the centralized
adopters and the decentralized adopters in terms of age.
There was also a significant difference in gender between
unaware nonadopters and adopters.

Sex was the only one of

these individual demographics to be included in our final
logit models.
We find many more significant differences between the
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means when we look at the characteristics of houses.

The

age of the home had a significant bivariate relationship
with all of our dependent variables except the unaware nonadopters/wood adopters comparison.

We would be less likely

to find differences here since homes are more readily
retrofitted with wood.

The year in which the home was pur

chased showed significant differences in both of our solar
comparisons as well as in our comparison of different types
of adopters.

In our logit comparisons, we find that only

house age shows up in our final models, and that only once
—

in comparing solar adopters with unaware solar adopters.
All of his would tend to support the Fahrar-Pilgrim

findings, which state that demographic differences are not
great enough to give us a real idea of purchasers.

More to

the point, Warkov says that demographics correlate highly
with initial interest but explain little of the difference
between adopters.

Here we might qualify that statement by

saying that the demographic characteristics of the respon
dents explain little of the difference between adopters and
our other categories.

Thus, in order to really understand

the differences between these groups, we need to look at
other characteristics as well as the way in which people
make decisions.

Decision Factors

Price Factors.

One of the more important issues we
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have had to address in this dissertation is the fact that
while there is general support for solar among the popula
tion, this is not readily translated into adoption of solar
alternatives.

A variety of reasons have been offered:

people are not motivated to invest for the long term, ini
tial costs are too high, and the marginal utility of long
term savings decreases with increasing levels of income.
We have found some support for the first two of these con
siderations, but little evidence to support the latter.
In all of the bivariate comparisons which we made
where long-term savings could be included as a variable
(the first three comparisons), there was a significant dif
ference between the groups. In our logit analyses, it was
included in our final model for the solar adopters/aware
solar nonadopters comparison.

Of course, sometimes it

acted to encourage people, and sometimes it tended to dis
courage them.

We shall discuss the implications of this

further in the next section.
Initial cost never played as big a role as long-term
savings, but it has shown up in many of our comparisons.
It did tend to discourage those people who thought about
solar or wood and then decided not to adopt.

On the other

hand, it was a positive factor in the decisions of those
who did decide to adopt these alternatives.
This lack of consistency in both of these variables
points to two different possibilities:

either decisions

are also being affected by income levels, and nonadopters
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have higher discount rates or reduced marginal utility due
to their higher income, or the subjective perception of the
cost factors differs greatly for the adopters and the aware
nonadopters.

We have found little evidence to support the

contention that income plays an important mediating role.
There have been no significant differences on this variable
in any of our comparisons.

The effect of a higher discount

rate might be in evidence (given the role of long-term
savings) but this should not be a factor for groups of ap
proximately equal income.

Similarly, while the marginal

utility of savings might decrease as income levels in
crease, this should not vary for people of similar income
levels.

Thus, to fully understand this phenomenon, we will

have to eventually look at a variety of other non-cost con
siderations .

Norms and Habit.

The main question which we were ad

dressing in this section was whether or not the perceived
acceptability of an alternative energy system affects the
rate of adoption.

As we mentioned in earlier chapters,

models of market penetration as well as the adoption of in
novation literature both assume that purchase is a function
of the number of previous adopters.
ables to tap into this issue:

We employed two vari

the influence of relatives

who owned similar systems and the total number of people
the respondent knew who owned decentralized systems (assum
ing that knowing more people with any type of decentralized
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system would make the adoption of any decentralized system
seem more acceptable).
In our comparison of centralized and decentralized
adopters, we found no difference between the groups with
regard to either of these variables.

From this we can con

clude that both groups know about the same number of
decent-ralized adopters {actually, decentralized adopters
knew more, but the level of significance was .058) and that
the relatives had a positive influence on adoption, but the
adopters of decentralized systems may have been the only
ones with relatives who had also adopted.

We can make this

latter assumption because for both groups the influence of
relatives was slightly positive, thus the purchasers of
centralized systems were being influenced positively by
relatives who ownepl centralized systems and the purchasers
of decentralized systems were likewise being influenced by
owners of similar systems.
On the other hand, we need to also ask whether or not
people could be discouraged by knowing someone who had a
decentralized system.

This would not seem to be the case

since for aware nonadopters of both wood and solar, this
variable still had a positive impact, although it was less
positive than for the adopters.

At least it was not dis

couraging .
One of the findings which seems to stand out the most
is the fact that nonadopters know significantly fewer
decentralized adopters than is the case for the adopters.
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This would lend considerable support to the adoption of in
novation literature, although the contention in the litera
ture is that selective exposure, resulting from past expe
rience, has an effect on adoption.

Here we can argue that

exposure has an effect on adoption.

It would seem to be

what sensitizes people to possibilities associated with
alternatives since we found significant bivariate rela
tionships in all of the comparisons between adopters and
unaware nonadopters but not when we compared different
types of adopters and aware nonadopters.

We have not ad

dressed whether or not that exposure is the product of past
experience, values, or psychological characteristics.
Of course, we do have a measure of past experience —
the impact of having previously owned a system of the type
under consideration.

This was slightly discouraging for

both centralized and decentralized adopters, yet, obvious
ly, both groups decided to adopt again in spite of this
fact.

For the aware nonadopter comparisons, this was dis

couraging for nonadopters (and may have deterred their
adoption) and it was a significantly more positive in
fluence on those who adopted (especially in the wood com
parison) .
All of this evidence would lead us to the early con
clusion that prior ownership by relatives or friends or
having owned one before is a strong determinant of sub
sequent action, but that other variables must be interven
ing.

On the other hand, one of those intervening variables
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might well be total exposure, given its apparent importance
in sensitizing people to available alternative.

If people

are even adopting systems which they had some dissatisfac
tion with previously, then it may well be that they do not
know about other options.

It may, of course, also be due

to the information which they receive about those options,
an issue to which we now must turn.

Information.

We argued earlier that the dissemination

of information was strongly influenced by communication
patterns.

Darley and Beniger have said that interpersonal

networks are important early and the modeling plays a more
important role in the later stages of the adoption process.
Similarly, Shama says that imitation spurs later adopters.
Here we have not addressed the temporal aspects of
this question.

However, we can discuss the relative impor

tance of primary contacts (relatives), secondary informa
tion (salespersons, builders, and engineers), the media
(newspapers and magazines), and modeling (demonstration
homes).
Dealing with the latter first, demonstration homes are
probably not very widespread at this point.

Responses

hovered around the no impact score and were not very dif
ferent for our various groups.
Newspapers played a role in two out of our first three
comparisons.

Newspapers positively influenced both cen

tralized and decentralized adopters.

Of course, once again

196

that may be the result of selective exposure.

There were

also significant differences between aware wood nonadopters
and wood adopters, but no real difference between solar
adopters and nonadopters.

On the other hand, both solar

adopters and solar nonadopters said that newspapers posi
tively influenced their decisions, and their responses were
higher than for the wood adopters and nonadopters.
the difference between the groups

It was

which was significant in

the wood comparison, not the size of the impact.

This

means that people who look into solar are finding informa
tion in the media and that information tends to positive.
We must also look at the impact of primary and
secondary groups on this decision process.

Our first ques

tion was whether or not the information from primary groups
would have more of an impact than that from secondary
groups.

Relative's advice was positive for all groups of

adopters as well as generally positive for all nonadopters.
The only significant difference was found between the solar
adopters and nonadopters.
On the other hand, one of our major concerns is that
the building industry is a major deterrent to the adoption
of decentralized alternatives.

This would appear to be the

case since those who decided not to adopt said that the in
formation from these people was decidedly negative.

The

information was positive for those who decided to adopt ei
ther wood or solar, implying that there are some builders
and engineers who are supportive of the alternatives.

Ad
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vice from engineers was the only variable from this group
to be included in any logit model.

Given the decentralized

nature of the industry, it might be very difficult to find
supportive engineers and builders even if one is inclined
to adopt a decentralized alternative.
From this we might conclude that the secondary sources
are an important aspect of this adoption process.

Their

advice is deemed as important as the advice of relatives,
but it is often deters the adoption of decentralized
alternatives.
To summarize to this point, much of what we have
looked at could be seen as confusing.

Frequently, even

though there have been differences between the means for
many variables, most variables still encourage adoption.
The ones which do not are the price factors (in particular
long-term savings) and information from secondary sources.
In our logit analysis, these are the same variables which
show up in our comparisons of specific subgroups.

The

solar logit showed us the importance of engineers advice
and savings.

Thus, it would seem that any model of the

adoption process must include these factors.

Of course,

there is also a compelling case for the inclusion of other
non-cost considerations like attitudes and values.
to these in the next section.

We turn
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Individual Characteristics

Values.

In numerous studies, it has been argued that

values may be incentives or constraints.

Leonard-Barton,

Warkov, and Unseld and Crews have all argued that this mav
be especially true in the adoption of energy alternatives.
We tend to find some support for these contentions in the
results of this study (although we cannot discuss the
results of this study in comparison to the adoption of
technologies other than energy).
We have found significant differences between adopters
and aware nonadopters, as well as between centralized and
decentralized adopters, on both the desire to be indepen
dent as well as the value of clean energy.

Independence

was included in the final logit model for the centralized/decent-ralized comparison.

In addition, independence

was the last variable removed in the solar comparison.
On the other hand, we find no evidence to support the
idea that innovativeness is an important consideration.
Perhaps we have moved beyond the early adopters stage, and
those who are adopting now are relying more on modeling
(which supports the conclusions of the previous section).
Of course, we cannot answer this question, but the conclu
sion seems reasonable given our findings so far.
All of this, then, would lead us to believe that
values play an important role in this process.

But there

may be important mediating factors found in the conflicting
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signals which people get regarding the energy crisis it
self.

Let us now turn to those variables.

Attitudes.

There were many attitudes which could af

fect the process of adoption.
a time.

Let us deal with them one at

First, Leonard-Barton says that a belief in the

seriousness of the energy crisis is an important motivating
factor.

Similarly, others have argued that perceptions

concerning amount of oil that remains may also be determin
ing factor.

We had three different measures of this:

Shortage, Science Helps (because this belief would mitigate
the seriousness of the energy problem), and PLENTY.
We have found that, at least in some instances, these
have shown significant differences between the means in our
bivariate comparisons.

All three had significant dif

ferences in our comparison between centralized and
decentralized adopters.

Science Helps and PLENTY also had

signficant relationships in our aware nonadopter/wood adop
ter comparison.

However, none of them show up in any of

our final logit models, thus their predictive power is
limited.
It has also been argued that a belief in environmental
activism may affect adoption of energy alternatives.

Here

we examined two related variables: the belief that people
should use as much energy as they can afford (a low score
implying that people should act to conserve) and raising
taxes as a means of forcing people to become environmental-
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ly active.

Again, both of these show up in various com

parisons, but not in any of the logit analyses, implying
that they contribute relatively little predictive power.
We could also argue here that we find little support
for Olsen's contention that favoring of voluntary versus
mandatory measures could also be linked to adoption.

We

find here that there is equally little support for either
of these alternatives, although the degree of nonsupport
may vary from group to group.
Along the same lines, it has been argued that feeling
personally affected would increase the likelihood of adop
tion.

Our measure of this, energy prices make it difficult

to make ends meet, shows up only in our comparison of solar
adopters and solar nonadopters.

It would seem that those

people who have adopted solar alternatives now feel that
they are less vulnerable to price increases.
Along a different line, the argument has also been
made that these general attitudes would probably have less
relevance to the actual purchase of a decentralized
alternative than would specific attitudes regarding the
viability of, or support for, various energy alternatives.
To examine this, we have developed three different scales:
one measuring support for nuclear (the ideal typical cen
tralized alternative), one measuring attitudes about the
viability of solar, and one measuring whether or not people
thought that solar was just too technical for them to use.
NOSOLAR showed significant differences between groups
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in both of the solar comparisons, as might be expected.
Both NOSOLAR and NONUKES had signficant differences between
the means in the centralized/decentralized comparison.
These are the only bivariate relationships where these var
iables played a role, and none of the specific attitudes
were included in any of the final logit models.
result could demonstrate one of two things:

This

either the

theoretical assumption is wrong and the general attitudes
are more closely tied to adoption than the specific ones,
or, alternatively, these are measures are actually still
too general or they have low validity.

The latter is as

sumed here to be the case.

Knowledge and Dogmatism.

We had assumed that the

amount of knowledge about energy issues would affect the
rate of adoption.

We find that there are significant dif

ference between centralized adopters and decentralized
adopters as well as between wood adopters and nonadopters,
but not in any other comparisons.

Apparently the solar

nonadopters are very similar to adopters on a variety of
characteristics, including their knowledge of energy is
sues.

It is a little more difficult to explain the lack of

difference between nonadopters and adopters.

Perhaps this

is indicative of the fact that the general population is
knowledgeable about energy, they just need to see it work
ing somewhere to become sensitized to its viability.
There were significant differences between groups on
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our dogmatism scale in only two comparisons: centralized/
decentralized and wood adopters/wood nonadopters.

The cen

tralized adopters and the wood nonadopters both
demonstrated higher scores on this scale, lending some
credence to the claim that nonadoption may be due as much
to individual idiosyncrasies as it is to failures of the
system.
To summarize to this point, there were numerous attitudinal and value variables which appear to contribute to
our understanding of the differences between decentralized
adopters and nonadopters.

And in general, these sets of

variables were better at distinguishing between groups than
the decision factors which we had developed or the
demographic characteristics of the adopters.

To draw some

of the implications for theory, we turn to our next sec
tion.

Implications for Theory

Here we will discuss in turn the implications for the
various theoretical approaches presented in Chapters 2 and
3 as well as what this portends for the environmental move
ment as a whole.

First let us discuss some of the models

of consumer behavior, including the underlying economic as
sumptions, and then turn to the adoption of innovations
literature.
We discussed three different models of consumer behav-
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ior in Chapter 2,

The first of these was the model of con

sumer sovereignty.

In this model the argument is made that

consumers make independent decisions based on their values.
At first glance, much of the evidence presented in this
dissertation would tend to support this theory.

Values,

especially of those which favor independence or clean ener
gy, played an important role.

But we must recall that in

this model, values are simply reflected in price factors;
if people make a purchase, then it must fit into their
values.

Here we can point more specifically to the rela

tive impact of values and prices.

Price issues such as

long-term savings and initial cost were major deterrents
for those who decided not to purchase decentralized energy
systems, but Independence was also a positive considertion
for many who chose to ignore the drawbacks of the initial
investment.
We need to examine the underlying assumptions of this
approach in more detail.

If we can make the assumption, as

we do here, that our variable long-term savings is an in
dicator of the respondents discount rate, we find that the
discount rate would be higher for those who decide not to
purchase decentralized systems.

But since there were no

real differences between our respondents in education, in
come, or occupation, it would seem that this higher dis
count rate is not the product of any objective considera
tions but instead reflects the subjective non-cost consid
erations which seem to inevitably affect the decisions of
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all purchasers.

Certainly the risk is high if the price is

high, the commitment is long in the purchase of most of
these systems, but these considerations hold true as much
for adopters as for nonadopters.

Thus, as Simons has so

eloquently argued, what we need to do is examine the "inner
environment".
Thus we turn to our second model, manipulated consump
tion.

In this approach the assumption is that decisions

are not simply influenced by prices but are also the result
of example, custom, suggestion, etc.
of support for this theory.

We find a great deal

The impact of TOTAL EXPOSURE

or the fact that a relative may have owned a system has
been consistent throughout the analyses.

And regardless of

what type of adoption was taking place, the decision maker
was influenced by normative expectations.
Of course the role of the media in this would lead us
to assume that consumption is not being manipulated since
many adopters have been positively influenced by the in
formation which they found in newspapers.

This would imply

that needs, at least, are not being shaped by the media.
However, individuals are still more likely to have their
needs met if they purchase systems that are in general use.
Builders and engineers are more familiar with, and thus can
more readily install and repair, conventional energy sys
tems.

This could lend more support to Scitovsky or it

could be seen as relating to the final model of structured
consumption.
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In structured consumption, purchasers make decision
based on the perceived alternatives.

Here we argue that

nonadopters (aware nonadopters as well as unaware) perceive
fewer alternatives because they are so difficult to come
into contact with (so disperse) or because of the influence
of "professionals" whom they trust.
reflected in the NOSOLAR findings.

This is further
The fact that groups of

such similar demographic characteristics can have such
vastly different perceptions of the same energy systems
must reflect the structure of the market -- not only prices
but also information.
This leads us to a discussion of the adoption of
alternatives literature.
approach —

One of the cornerstones of this

both in theory and in practice —

is that in

formation, either personal or impersonal depending on the
stage of adoption, is an important correlate of adoption.
Certainly we find evidence of that in our data.

We also

can support the assumption that price considerations are
important as well as that the innovation under considera
tion must be compatible with the adopters values.

Many of

the other considerations we have not tested for, but one in
particular remains unresolved.
Rogers has said that we should not be so quick to
place blame for nonadoption on the failure of the individu
al.

Rather, we need to also look at the possibility of

system failure.

Here we see some indication of both.

Dog

matism played a role in our centralized/decentralized com-
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parison as well as in our wood adopters/nonadopters com
parison.

On the other hand, the fact that some builders

and engineers are so discouraging implies some problems
with the industry.

There is no way to resolve that issue

here.
There is also some support, although tentative, for
continuing to examine the relationship between attitudes
and behavior.

Here we have many significant bivariate re

lationships between either general or specific attitudes
and some of our dependent variables.

This would tend to

support Simons’ criticisms of neoclassical economic theory.
With regard to Fishbein’s argument that there will only be
a connection between specific attitudes and a specific be
havioral intent, we can only argue that here we have found
some connections between general attitudes and a concrete
behavior.
Finally, what does all of this imply for the environ
mental movement.

Recall that this study was initiated by

Lovins* contention that the values necessary for the diffu
sion of decentralized energy systems currently exist and
that what is necessary is that we begin to substitute one
technology for the other.
with regard to this claim.

We now have two comments to make
Certainly the values that he

mentions exist, but it would seem that the assertion is
limited (as we stated in the first chapter).

While the

values may exist, they are not necessarily of equal impor
tance for all people.

And there are considerable dif
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ferences of opinion regarding a variety of attitudes which
might also be connected with adoption.
Our second comment concerns his implicit faith in the
effectiveness of markets.

It would seem that here the con

cerns of Darley and Beniger carry the day.

They have

argued that the unassisted operations of a free market will
not result in the maximization of environmentally sound be
havior because of high discount rates, high initial costs,
etc.

In addition, we would argue here that the market will

continue to be biased due to the information disseminated
by builders and engineers (regardless of how we feel about
the accuracy of that information).
So, what should be done?

Cook and Berenberg have

argued that attempts to encourage conservation (or, we
could argue, the adoption of energy alternatives) have
focused on two approaches: promoting pro-conservation atti
tudes through persuasive
consistent behaviors.

communication or evoking attitude

It would seem that, given this data,

the former would be more important.

The main problem seems

to be that nonadopters attitudes do not support solar adop
tion (in contrast, once again, to Lovins’ claim).
Of course, we should also begin to look at the broader
context of adoption.

For example, we should

how politics affects the adoption process.
have to be left for future research.

begin to see

But that will
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Implications for Future Research

Our primary task in this dissertation was to sort
through the various theories of behavior which seemed to
apply to the adoption of energy systems in order to develop
a model which would sensitize us to the variety of factors
which might affect people's decisions regarding whether or
not they should purchase a conventional energy system or a
nonconventional, decentralized system.

To help us in this

task, we also organized the findings of other pertinent
studies in the context of the general model.

In this way,

we could look for specific values, attitudes, information
channels, etc. which seemed relevant to our study.
We could conclude here that the model has generally
held up fairly well.

By this, we mean not that all of the

variables in the model have significant relationships to
our dependent variables.

This was never expected.

Rather,

we mean that the model forced us to include variables from
many different areas, and the results have demonstrated
that the narrow reliance on any one type of variable -demographics, price variables, attitudes, or values —
an inadequate approach.

is

What we apparently need to do is

rely on variables from all of these areas to enrich our un
derstanding of this process.

That, of course, was also the

fundamental theoretical approach.

Furthermore, few studies

have drawn the links between values and energy systems in
such a specific manner.
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The first step in following up on this study would be
to try to gain further support for the general approach
taken with this model by conducting a truly random sample
of homeowners in different regions of the country.

Having

a sample that is not truly random and is limited to the
state of New Hampshire at a time when energy issues were
still on the minds of many people means that we cannot
generalize from this study to any other group of people.
In this follow up study, some specific changes might
also be made in measurement.
measure of family income.

The most obvious is the

By relying on general categories

of income rather than the real dollar value, this variable
became clouded.

It would seem to be more prudent to retain

as much information about the variables as possible.
Second, some of the attitudes might be measured with
more clarity.

There is a strong possibility that the vari

able TOOTECHY had no impact because of the fact that very
different kinds of attitudes showed up on this factor
(i.e., the inclusion of Big Investment with questions
oriented more to the technology).

Clearer measures of at

titudes may only enhance what already appears to be an im
portant group of variables.
Some links still need to be drawn between this model,
which focuses on the behavior of people on the micro level,
and the more macro level behavior of political and social
systems. Originally, we were going to also look at some in
dicators of macro level variables —

federal support for

research and development, the absolute price of oil (not
the perceived price),
state, etc.

the number of solar homes in the

This became an unwieldy process at this point,

but it might be easier to make some judgment about the sub
jective interpretations of individuals if they were
balanced by objective facts.
Finally, it might also be instructive to compare the
results of this approach as it applies to energy systems
with the results if it were applied to other innovations.
The validity of any model is enhanced if it can be applied
to a wide variety of situations.
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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE
1.
2.

Your age:____

3.

Your sex:

4.

Marital status:

M

F
Married

Single

5.

Nuntier of children:_____

6.

Your occupation:_______________

7.

Your approximate annual inacme:
0- $6,000

9.
10.

Widowed

(circle one)

$36,001-548,000

$12,001-$18,000

$18,001-524,000

$48,001-572,000

over $72,000

Spouse1s occupation:_________________
Spouse's approximate annual income:
0- $6,000

$6,001-512,000
$36,001-548,000

(circle one)
512,001-518,000

$18,001-$24,000

$48,001-572,000

over $72,000

Please circle the highest level ofeducation which you have completed:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

12.

Separated

Spouse's age:__

$24,001-$36,000
11.

Divorced

$6,001-$12,000

$24,001-$36,000
8.

Questionnaire No.__

10 11 12

Seme college

B.A./B.S.

Sate graduate vork

Do you share responsibility for this household with someone other than a spouse?
YES

NO

If yes, please answer the following questions regarding this person:
13.

Age:___

14.

Sex:

15.

Occupation:_______________

M

F

16.

Approximate annual income:
0- $6,000

$24,001-536,000
17.

(circle one)

$6,001-512,000
536,001-548,000

$12,001-$18,000

$18,001-524,000

548,001-572,000

over 572,000

Do you own your heme or are you a renter?
O wner
IB.
19.
20.

Renter

(If you rent, skip to ntntoer 65, otherwise continue.)

If you own your hone, in what year was it purchased?
Approximately hew old is the heme in which you are now living?
Not including bathrooms, how many roans are in your hone?_____

years

In the following sections we would like to find out what type of hare heating you
have (oil, coal, natural gas, electric, wood, active or passive solar, etc.) and ask
you a few questions about that energy source. Next to nurber 21, write the name of
your primary source of heat along with a description (forced hot air, hot water, super
insulated or envelope heme, etc.) and then answer the questions which follow. If you
own more than one home energy source, use the next section (beginning with question 43)
in a similar manner,
21.

PRIMARY B4ESGY SOURCE:

DESCRIPTION:

22.
23.

Approximately how iruch of your heat cones from this source?
%
Haw satisfied have you been with this heat source? (circle one)
very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
How did you acquire this item?
24. Had it built into the design of the house.__ Year:___
(go to #27)
25. Installed after the house was purchased.____ Year:___ (go to #27)
26. Acquired with the house.___________________ Year:___
(go to #43 or #65)
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27. Hew much of this did you build or install yourself?

0

10%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Many things may have influenced jour decision to purchase this form of heat. Sere
may have tended to encourage your purchase, sane may have disaouraged you. Below is a
partial list. Cn a scale of 0 to 4 (0 = did not affect your decision, 1 ■ very
discouraging, 4 = very encouraging), please indicate the anount of influence that each
of these factors had on your decision.
No
DISCOURAGING
ENCOURAGING
Inpact Very Sanewhat Sanewhat Very
28. Initial o a s t ...................... . 0
1
2
3
4
29. Potential long-term savings.........
1
2
3
4
30. Tax credits........................
1
2
3
4
31. You owned one before ...............
1
2
3
4
32. Advice fran an equipment salesperson . . 0
1
2
3
4
33. Advice fran a relative or friend . . . . 0
1
2
3
4
34. A relative or friend owned one . . . . . 0
1
2
3
4
35. Advioe fran-an engineer or architect . . 0
3
1
2
4
36. Advice from a builder or contractor . . 0
3
1
2
4
37. A danonstration hone ...............
1
2
3
4
38. Newspapers or magazines.............
1
2
3
4
39. Greater energy independence.........
1
2
3
4
40. Clean, safe energy .................
1
2
3
4
41. Innovative technology...............
1
2
3
4
42. Other:
........... . 0
1
2
3
4

43.

SECONDARY ENERGY SOURCE:

DESCRIPTION:

44.
45.

Approximately hew much of your heat canes fran this source?_____%
How satisfied have you been with this item? (circle one)
Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Sanewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
How did you aaquire this item?
46. Had it built intothe design of thehouse.
Year:____ (go to #49)
47.Installed after the house waspurchased.
Year:
(go to #49)
48. Acquired with the house.
.(go to #65)
...
Year:_
49.

How mich of this did you build or install yourself?

0

10%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Many things nay have influenced your decision to purchase this form of heat. As
above, on a scale of 0 to 4 please indicate the extent to which the following factors
tended to encourage or discourage your purchase.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

No
_ DISCOURAGING
ENCOURAGING
Inpact Very Somewhat Somewhat Very
4
i
3
2
Initial c o s t ...................... . B
I
3
Potential long-term savings.........
2
4
4
2
Tax credits........................
l
3
2
l
3
4
You owned one before ...............
4
i
3
Advice from an equipment salesperson . . 0
2
4
i
3
2
Advice from a relative or friend . . . . 0
2
i
3
4
A relative or friend owned one . . . . . 0
4
■
3
Advice fran an engineer or architect . - 0
2
i
3
4
2
Advice from a builder or contractor. . . 0
4
i
3
2
A demonstration hone . . . . . . . . .
4
■
3
2
Newspapers or magazines.............
■
3
4
2
Greater energy endependence......... . 0
■
3
2
Clean, safe energy ................. . 0
4
i
3
2
Innovative technology...............
4
2
i
3
Other:
. "........ . 0

224

Below are a few statements concerning energy consumption.
please indicate whether you think it is true or false.
Turning down the heat at night saves less energy than it
takes to reheat the house in the morning.
66. On a per person basis, energy oonsunption in the United
States is still the same as it was in 1960.
'
67. When you consider both energy costs and mortgage payments,
passive solar hemes cost more than traditional homes.

For each statement,

65.

TRUE FALSE

DON’T KNOW

TRUE FALSE

DON'T KNCtv

TRUE FALSE

DCN'T KNCW

Next there are a few statanents about energy related matters.
opinion according to the following scale.

Please indicate your

5. Agree very much
4. Agree somewhat
3. Neutral
2.
Disagree sanewhat
1. Disagree very nuch
DX
Don't know

DIS
AGREE

AGREE
68. The biggest problem with solar pcMer is that it requires
such a large initial investment.........................
69. Solar power will never make a significant contribution
to our energy n e e d s ...................................
70. Scientists will be able to develop new forms of energy
before we have another crisis..........................
71. Only people with a lot of mechanical ability should own a
solar home..............................................
72. Energy prices make it extremely difficult for my family
to make ends m e e t ....................................
73. Hie solar technology new on the market will probably be
obsolete in 5-10years...................................
74. People should be allowed to use as much energy as they
can afford..............................................
75. While solar hemes are great for warm, sunny climates,
it is too cold and cloudy for them where I liv e ...... 5
76. While some may disagree, I think nuclear pcwer is safe
and we should be putting even more money into it.....
5
77. We need not worry about future energy shortages because
America has such a wide variety of resources.......... 5
78. The government should place higher taxes on gas and oil
in order to discourage consunption..................
5
79. The government should immediately begin to at least
double its funding for solar research and development . . .
80. This country probably has enough oil for centuries,
we just need to find i t ............................
5
81.
We should immediately put a stop to the. building of all
nuclear pcwer plants............................
82. Another energy shortage seems to be almost inevitable . . .

5 4

3

2

1

DR

5

4

3

2

1

UK

5

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

54

3

2

1

DK

5

4

3

2

1

DK

5

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

2

1

DK

4

3

543
2

1

i1DK
DK

5

5

5

Here are a few general statanents which people might rake.
Please indicate your opinion according to the same scale.
83.

In this cenplicated world of ours, the only way to know
what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can
5
4
be trusted...................................... . . . .
84. I get really angry when a person stubbornly refuses to
admit that they are w r o n g ............................... 5 4
85. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who
are for the truth and those who are against it
5 4
86. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world,
there is probably only one which is correct
5 4

3

2

1

DK

3

2

1

DK

3

2

1

DK

3

2

1

DK
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Below is a list of items which you nay have seriously considered buying and then
decided against. If so, please put a check next to that item.
_ _ 87. Photovoltaic collectors
_
88. Solar hot water equipment
89. A passive solar home: ____________________
90. Greenhouse
91. Wood stove/furnace
If you chocked any of the above items, please indicate how important the following
factors were in your decision. If you checked more than one item, please answer for the
one which you most seriously considered and indicate which one that is in the space below.
As before, on a scale of 0 to 4 please indicate the degree of influence which each of these
factors had on your decision. If you did not check an item, go to 107.
Item:
DISCOURAGING
ENCOURAGING
NO
Vert_.
Irrpact
Very
sanewhat Sanewhat
92. Initial cost ......................
4
0
3
1
2
4
93. Potential long-term savings.........
3
1
2
0
94. Tax credits........................
1
2
4
3
0
95. You owned one before ...............
4
0
1
2
3
96. Advice frum an equijnunt salesperson . 0
4
1
2
3
97. Advice from a relative or friend . . .
4
0
1
2
3
98. A relative or friend owned one . . . .
3
1
2
4
0
99. Advice from an engineer or architect .
3
4
0
1
.2
100. Advice fitan a builder........... . .
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
101. A demonstration lionu . . . ..........
0
1
2
4
102. News|iapcrs or mig.uincs.............
0
3
1
2
103. Greater energy in.le;jundcnce.........
0
3
1
2
4
104. Clean, safe energy .................
0
3
4
1
2
105. Innovative tcelmology...............
0
1
2
3
4
.............
0
3
4
106. Other:
1
2
Next to each of the following items, please indicate how many people you know who
cwn a product of this type. (For example,
2 Wood stove would mean that you know 2
people who own a wood stove.)
107. Photovoltaic collectors
10B. Solar hot water equipment
109. A passive solar hone: _________________
110. Greenhouse
111. Wood stove/fumace
112. Windmill
There are many ways by which the federal and state governments can aid the spread of
new energy systems. Below is a partial list. Please indicate how strongly you would
support or op[x:se such actions by the government according to the following scale:
5. Support very strongly
4. Support a little
3. Neutral
2. Oppose a little
1. Oppose very strongly
DK
Don't knew
SUPPORT
OPPOSE
113. Tax crctli ts or deductions . . . .
3
DK
5
4
2
l
114. Lew interest leans.............
DK
5
4
3
2
1
DK
115. Guaranteed loans...............
2
1
5
4
3
116. Property tax exenptions........
DK
3
5
4
2
1
117. Research g r a n t s ........... .
3
DK
5
4
2
1
DK
118. Reduced property assessments. . . 5
4
3
2
1
DK
119. Energy seminars ...............
3
2
1
5
4
120. Publications...................
DK
5
4
3
2
1
121. Demonstration homes ...........
• DK
5
4
2
1
3
122. Setting equipment standards . . .
DK
3
5
4
2
1
123. Requiring mininun warranties. . .
3
2
1
DK
5
4
124. Licensing installers...........
DK
5
4
3
2
1
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Following is an alphabetical list of 16 values. Ch a scale of 1 to 5 (1 ■ not at all
important, 5 = very important), please indicate how important each of these values are to
YOU in guiding YOUR life.
VERY
NOT AT ALL
IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
3
4
5
2
125. A CLEAN, HEALTHY EMVTHOWENT . . . .
3
4
5
2
126- A COMFORTABLE LIFE . . . .
3
4
5
2
127. AN EXCITING LIFE .......
3
4
5
2
128. A SENSE OF ACCCMPLISfMENT.
3
4
5
2
129. A WORLD AT P E A C E .......
3
4
5
2
130. EQUALITY ...............
3
4
5
2
131. FAMILY SECURITY.........
3
4
5
2
132. FREEDOM.................
3
4
5
2
133. HAPPINESS...............
3
4
5
2
134- NATIONAL SECURITY.......
3
4
5
2
135. SALVATION...............
3
4
5
2
136. SELF-RESPECT ...........
3
4
5
2
137. SOCIAL RECOGNITION . . . .
3
4
5
2
138. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. . .
3
4
5
2
139. TRUE FRIENDSHIP.........
3
4
5
2
140. WISDOM .................
Below is another list of -13 personal characteristics, Using the sane scale, please
indicate how ijgjortant it is for YOU to be like this.
VERY
NOT AT ALL
i m po r t a n t
IMPORTANT
4
5
3
141. AJ4BITIOUS.................
4
5
3
1-12. BROADMINDED...............
5
3
2
143. CAPABLE................... . . . . 1
5
3
144. CLET!. ...................
S
3
2
145. DECISIVE ................. . . . . 1
5
J
146. HELPFUL...................
5
3
2
147. IMAGINATIVE............... . . . . 1
5
3
148. INDEPENDENT...............
5
3
1
2
149. INFLUENTIAL............... . . . .
5
3
2
150. INNOVATIVE............... . . . . 1
5
3
2
151. T W T F T . T F C T O A I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
5
3
. . . . 1
2
152. LOVING........... .
5
3
2
153. OBEDIENT ................. . . . . 1
Using the same scale, please indicate belcw hew important each of the following
factors would be if you ware to purchase a new heme in New Harpshire.
VERY
NOT AT ALL
IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
5-154. Attic insulation . . . .
5
155. Wall insulation.......
5
156. Storm windows and doors.
5
Fireplace.............
157.
5
Wood
stove/fumace
.
.
.
158.
5
159. Southerly orientation. .
5
160. Passive solar design . .
5
161. Solar hot water.......
5
162. Photovoltaic collectors.
5
Greenhouse
...........
163.
Thank you very much for your' cooperation. Feel free to use the r e m a i n i n g space to
make whatever comrents you would like regarding this survey or our energy policies.

